Open Letter to the President of the Republic of Uganda, Yoweri K. Museveni

Association of Concerned Africa Scholars
January 31, 2001

[Note: Within a week after this letter, Dr. Depelchin was released and ended his hunger strike after UN observors were dispatched to Ituri province. Dr. Depelchin shortly thereafter left Uganda. We thank ACAS members and others for their work on this and related, continuing, issues.]

31 January 2001
His Excellency Yoweri K. Museveni
President of the Republic of Uganda
The President’s Office
Kampala, Uganda
Fax: 256 41 235 462

Dear Mr. President,

I write on behalf of the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars to express our deep concern and dismay over the kidnapping by Ugandan forces of Dr. Jacques Depelchin, whom many of us know from his work in the North American and African academic community. Dr. Depelchin was arrested at gunpoint on January 28, 2001 in Bunia, and taken to Kampala by force. He is now apparently under some form of “city arrest,” and is engaged, in response, on a hunger strike.

As far as we know, there is no justification for this action, and no charges have been laid against him. We thus urge that restrictions on Dr. Depelchin be immediately removed, and that his possessions be returned to him.

If, however, the Ugandan authorities have evidence that Dr. Depelchin has violated the law or committed a crime, then they should formally charge in open court and give him an opportunity to defend himself, with legal counsel, as guaranteed under law.

We also urge that your office to work to end the promotion of ethnic violence and genocide in Ituri province, and to encourage the despatch of neutral international observors to Bunia and Ituri.

Sincerely,
William G. Martin, Co-Chair

Boycott Conflict Diamonds

Physicians for Human Rights
July 17, 2000

Open Letter to the World Diamond Congress

Antwerp, Belgium

To whom it may concern:

We the undersigned human rights, religious, development, humanitarian, and consumer organizations call upon the international diamond industry to announce immediate, practical measures to end the international trade in conflict diamonds. We are dismayed that despite clear evidence that international trade in rebel-controlled diamonds has ignited, fueled, and sustained cruel conflicts in Sierra Leone, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for many years, to date neither the diamond industry nor diamond importing governments have taken actions to successfully limit or end that trade.

Notwithstanding the promises of leading companies within the diamond industries that they do not deal in conflict diamonds, sales of such diamonds mined in rebel-controlled territory in Angola, the Congo, and Sierra Leone continue to the present day. Diamonds from these areas are laundered through such countries as Liberia, Togo, Zimbabwe, Congo-Kinshasa, Ivory Coast, and Burkina Faso; and then they are admitted to major cutting and export centers with few questions asked.

We are deeply concerned that Americans have unwittingly subsidized violence in Sierra Leone and Angola through their diamond purchases. According to U.S. State Department sources and independent experts, smuggled and illicit conflict diamonds may amount to as much as ten to fifteen percent of the $50 billion worth of diamond jewelry sold internationally every year. The United States accounts for sixty-five (65) percent of world diamond jewelry sales, which likely includes a significant portion of those conflict diamonds on the market. Thus, American purchases of diamonds provide substantial resources to insurgent forces which mine and/or steal rough stones, providing enormous profits to the diamond industry who export, cut, and sell these conflict diamonds.

Diamond smuggling has permitted the RUF in Sierra Leone and UNITA in Angola to spend hundreds of millions of dollars for weapons and equipment, transforming these insurgencies into formidable fighting forces that have wreaked devastation on their countries. The human cost of wars fueled by diamonds has been extraordinarily high: in Sierra Leone 75,000 have been killed since 1991; in Angola 500,000 have died during the return to civil war in the past decade.

The thousands of American citizens affiliated with our organizations will not knowingly subsidize war and violence in Africa through the purchase of conflict diamonds. Because the diamond industry has failed to impose any realistic or practical controls on its own members, failed to support and maintain a legitimate market that could marginalize the market in conflict diamonds, and failed to initiate a comprehensive, forgery-proof system for identifying, marking, and certifying the country of extraction from which it buys, cuts, and exports, then neither our members nor anyone else can exercise ethical choices when buying diamonds.

Important players in the diamond industry have very recently announced a number of positive steps, including the threat by De Beers, the Diamond High Council, the Israeli Diamond Exchange, and India to ban any member who knowingly trades in diamonds obtained from rebel movements in Africa. We are also aware that De Beers, which controls upwards of sixty percent of the world diamond industry, promised in March that all of its stones were conflict-free. But such threats and promises, while welcome, are largely symbolic unless the diamond industry, in collaboration with diamond producing, cutting, exporting, and importing countries, establishes a transparent, legitimate system that can force the trade in conflict stones out of business, or greatly reduce its profits.

Such a system will require a comprehensive, global system of transparency for establishing origin, legitimate export and import centers, customs and excise regimen in importing countries, international inspection of diamond packets, and other measures proposed by the Working Group on African Diamonds which met in Luanda in June 2000.

We support the Luanda recommendations and welcome the process that has been set in motion for an international ministerial meeting in September. However, the establishment of a comprehensive global system for the mining, export, manufacture and sale of legitimate diamonds will take time, and it may well be years before such a system dries up the flow of money and weapons to insurgents in Sierra Leone and Angola. But the diamond industry can take immediate action to deprive rebel movements of resources by identifying (or marking) diamonds or packets of diamonds and providing forgery-proof certificates of origin/legitimacy, without which no stone (or packet of stones) can be cut, exported, or sold.

The diamond industry has, to date, refused to initiate a system for assuring the legitimacy of the diamonds it buys, cuts and exports. It is past time to do so. We call upon the industry to announce that 1) it will no longer admit rough stones to cutting or export centers that do not have legitimate, internationally sanctioned certificates of origin from reputable diamond producing countries or government-controlled areas within diamond producing countries. 2) that the industry will not buy, or admit to exporting or cutting centers any diamonds or packets of diamonds that originate in the Democratic Republic of Congo, RUF-controlled Sierra Leone, or UNITA-controlled Angola or that have been transshipped through Liberia, Togo, Congo, Burkina Faso, or the Ivory Coast.

These actions could help in the short run, and will indicate the diamond industry’s good faith as a partner in longer-term actions that are needed. We urge you to announce these measures at your meeting in Antwerp on July 17.

Sincerely,

Leonard S. Rubenstein
Executive Director
Physicians for Human Rights

Serge Duss
Director, Public Policy and Government Relations
World Vision

Vicki Ferguson
Director of Outreach and Education
Africa Policy Information Center

Gay McDougall
Executive Director
International Human Rights Law Group

Beverly Lacayo
Missionary Sisters of Our Lady of Africa
North American Province

Reverend Phil Reed
Justice and Peace Office
Missionaries of Africa

Erin McCandless
Director
Cantilevers

Edward W. Stowe
Legislative Secretary
Friends Committee on National Legislation

Alan Graham
Chief Executive Officer
Air Serve International

Stephen G. Price, Director
Office of Justice and Peace
Society of African Missions

Daniel Hoffman, Africa Executive
Africa Office, Global Ministries
United Church of Christ/Disciples of Christ

Nina Bang-Jensen
Director
Center for International Justice

Larry Goodwin
Executive Director
Africa Faith and Justice Network

Daniel Volman
Director
Africa Research Project

Ezekiel Pajibo
Facilitator
Advocacy Network for Africa (ADNA)

The Africa Fund

United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR)

Jennifer A. Stewart
Manager, Product/Program Development
Citizens Development Corps

Charmain Gooch, Director
Alex Yearsley, Campaigner
Global Witness

Africa Office of Global Ministries
United Church of Christ/Disciples of Christ
Daniel Hoffman, Area Executive for Africa

Leon P. Spencer
Executive Director
Washington Office on Africa

Merle Bowen and WIlliam Martin
Co-Chairs
Association of Concerned Africa Scholars

Gail R. Carson
Director
Relief and Food Security Programs

David Mozer
Chairperson
Washington State Africa Network

American Committee on Africa

Roney A. Heinz
International Director
Canaan Christians Fellowship Fund

William Goodfellow
Executive Director
Center for International Policy

Peter Vandermeulen
Paul Kortenhoven
Christian Reform Church of North America

Abdul Lamin
Coalition for Democracy in Sierra Leone

Rob Williams
International Development Manager
Concern Worldwide – U.S.

Margaret Zeigler
Deputy Director
Congressional Hunger Center

Stanley W. Hoise
Chief Executive Officer
Counterpart International, Inc.

John Kvcij
Chairman of the Board
Friends of Liberia

Billie Day
Friends of Sierra Leone,

Loretta Bondi
Advocacy Director of the Arms and Conflict Program
The Fund for Peace

Lynn Sauls
International Aid

Kakuna Kerina,
Director, Africa Program
International League for Human Rights

Kathryn Wolford
President
Lutheran World Relief

Kathleen McNeely
Program Associate
Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns

Terry Sawatsky
Co-director for Africa
Mennonite Central Committee

Bill Akin
Coordinator of Non-Violent Education Programs
Mid-South Peace and Justice Center

Rev. Kevin S. Kanouse, Bishop
Rev. Mark B. Herbener, Bishop Emeritus
Northern Texas – Louisiana Synod
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

Jack Marrkand, Executive Director
Partners for Development

Gordon Clark
Executive Director
Peace Action Education Fund

Lionel Rosenblatt
President
Refugees International

Cecelia Gugu Vilakazi
Editor and Publisher
SIMUNYE Newsletter

Maureen Healy
Africa Liason
Society of St. Ursula

Mark Harrison
General Board of Church and Society
United Methodist Church

Susie Johnson
Director, Public Policy
United Methodist Women

Roger Winter
Executive Director
U.S. Committee for Refugees

Jeredine Williams
West African Women’s Crusade
for Peace and Democracy

Mary Diaz
Executive Director
Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children

Meredith Tax, President
Women’s World Organization for Rights, Literature and Development
(Women’s WORLD)

Clive Calver
President
World Relief

Arne Bergstrom
World Relief

Rev. Seamus P. Finn, OMI
Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate

Breifing paper on the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act

The Association of Concerned Africa Scholars
July 19, 1999

Africa Growth and Opportunity Act Passes House
Efforts to Oppose Economic Conditionality Defeated
Opponents Focus on Senate

The House of Representatives in mid-July approved the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (H.R. 2489), legislation that if it became law would link new trade preferences for Africa to structural adjustment reforms and IMF style conditionalities. The ACAS Executive Committee believes the legislation approved by the House is worse than no bill at all and we recommend members urge their Senators to vote against the bill when it comes for a vote in that body.

Supporters of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), including the Clinton administration, most business groups, Africare, the African American Institute, a majority of the Black Caucus and the entire African diplomatic corps in Washington, argue the legislation is a long overdue recognition of U.S. interests in Africa and an important first step in promoting U.S. trade and investment. The conditionalities in the legislation, argue supporters, are modest and in most cases are subject to the presidential discretion. But opponents such as Representatives Jesse Jackson, Jr., Maxine Waters and 12 other members of the Black caucus as well as the 13 million member AFL-CIO trade union federation, TransAfrica, the Sierra Club, Public Citizen, COSATU and a coalition of African NGOs argue the legislation imposes economic policy prescriptions without providing meaningful development for the poorest continent in the world. (For a full list of opponents see the Public Citizen web site at http://www.citizen.org/pctrade/Africa/opponents.htm). Although the South African government now supports the legislation, Nelson Mandela’s first reaction to the legislation was to call it “unacceptable.” An alternative trade bill proposed by Rep. Jesse Jackson (and cosponsored by 75 other members of Congress), that would expand trade preference, call for debt cancellation and insist on minimal levels of continuing development aid, was not even brought to a vote. Its provisions should be reconsidered by the House and Senate.

What AGOA Does

The legislation approved by the House offers African countries a series of rewards, including expanded duty free access to American markets for certain products, equity and infrastructure funds to support U.S. investment, and establishment of a mechanism to promote and review U.S. trade policy toward Africa. Yet to receive these benefits, African governments must remove restrictions on foreign investment, reduce corporate taxes and privatize state owned companies.

The benefits of these programs are, moreover, minimal. The House bill would in theory allow duty free imports of textiles, primarily from Kenya and Mauritius, if the textile imports do not damage U.S. companies. But a March 1999 Congressional Budget Office study suggested that in reality 90 percent of African textiles would probably be declared “import sensitive” and denied access to U.S. markets. The Senate version of the bill, which has been approved by the Senate Finance Committee but not by the full Senate, allows imports only of textiles made with U.S. cloth and thread.

The legislation also provides authority for the president to provide “duty free” access to U.S. markets for certain African goods under a trade provision known as GSP. Yet according to the Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, more than 29 African countries already have GSP trade status and the real effect of this provision is simply to encourage the president to consider allowing “enhanced GSP” status for certain African products if they will not damage U.S. manufacturers. Each decision on each product would have to first be reviewed by both the U.S. Trade Representative and the International Trade Commission.

Supporters argue the real value of the bill is not so much in the specific lifting of trade restrictions, but in the framework it establishes for promoting trade with Africa including the call for a free trade agreement between the U.S. and Africa and the establishment of annual forums at which trade and finance ministers from Africa and the U.S. meet. Efforts to strengthen U.S. ties with Africa are indeed welcome, and the Clinton administration has already established a special trade office for Africa and the first ever meeting of African and U.S. trade and finance ministers was held in Washington in early 1999. But what are the benefits to those who do not attend meetings of government officials and other elites?

The Wrong Framework, the Wrong Symbolism

A closer examination reveals that the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act approved by the House establishes the wrong framework and is a step in the wrong direction. The legislation passed by the House establishes a framework that might at best help a few more economically advanced countries-but will bring few if any benefits to the majority of people in Africa. Indeed at its core are policies now proven to increase poverty and decrease the provision of public goods such as health care and education.

At the core of the Act is another attempt to force African governments to prioritize a series of free market principles, including cuts in government expenditures, privatization of government corporations, new rights for foreign investors to buy African natural resources and state firms without limits, deep cuts in tariffs, and membership in the World Trade Organization. (See the attached excerpts from the bill for a list of the conditions.)

Labor advocates did manage to force the sponsors to add a provision raising the issue of labor rights and there is a reference to the importance of respect for “internationally recognized human rights,” but eleven of the twelve items on the checklist used to determine “eligibility” for benefits under the legislation are designed to open markets for U.S. investment and trade.

Such priorities were made starkly clear in the debate on the House floor in mid-July, when the sponsors of this legislation used a parliamentary maneuver to defeat an attempt that would have allowed countries to import generic, lower cost drugs to deal with national emergencies such as the HIV/AIDS crisis. At the moment, the U.S. is vigorously threatening South Africa with trade sanctions in retaliation for the South African government’s efforts to obtain low cost, generic alternatives to drugs necessary for combating AIDS.

These policies are not new. The World Bank and IMF have been imposing these policies on poorer countries in the world for decades, but even the multilateral institutions have acknowledged that these policies have not improved conditions for the poorest segment of the world’s population. In fact, according to a new report by the United Nations Development Program, the poorest countries have actually gotten poorer in the last decade and that same report notes that 29 of the 34 poorest countries in the world are in Africa.

In summary: the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act passed by the House is a step in the wrong direction. This legislation is an attempt to force African countries to prioritize macroeconomic policies that are not appropriate for the level of development in Africa.

An Alternative Vision

Congressman Jesse Jackson, with the assistance of labor, citizen and environment groups, drafted an alternative piece of legislation-the HOPE for Africa Act (H.R. 772)–that sought to focus U.S. Africa policy on debt relief, development assistance and social programs. That legislation, however, was never brought to the floor for a full debate. (For a full comparison of that legislation with the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, see the Public Citizen comparison on the web).

Defeat AGOA in the Senate

The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act must now be approved by the Senate. The ACAS Executive urges members to write to your senators and express your opposition to this legislation, and urge a new, fairer deal for Africa-as proposed in key provisions of the Hope Act.

July 19, 1999
The Association of Concerned Africa Scholars

Action Alerts: Need to Oppose the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act

By Bill Martin, Co-Chair ACAS
20 July 1998

The trade and investment legislation known as the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act has already been approved by the House and is coming up for a vote in the Senate Finance Committee this week. ACAS, along with many of our African allies and US groups like TransAfrica, the AFL-CIO and Public Citizen, believes this legislation is worse than no bill at all.

We encourage our members to actively oppose the bill.

We attach to this message background material that documents the problems with this legislation in its current form. This includes a background briefing, entitled “Dictated Trade,” that explains the principal problems with the legislation. We also provide excerpts from the eligibility requirements contained in the bill, which demonstrate the strict conditionalities to be imposed on African states.

We urge you to contact your Senators and asked them to vote against the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (S. 778).

Senate and other Washington DC addresses can be obtained from our web site

Further information, including statements by other African and US organizations, is also available on our ACAS web site as well as Public Citizen’s extensive site on the bill: the Public Citizen web site

Dictated Trade: The Case Against the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act

Dictated Trade: The Case Against the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act [H.R. 1432, S. 778]

President Bill Clinton and the U.S. Congress should be applauded for seeking to define a new U.S. foreign policy toward Africa that recognizes the demands from the continent for political, social and economic change. ACAS also welcomes the legislation’s intent to strengthen U.S. ties with the continent. The current draft of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act pending before the Senate, however, is worse than no bill at all.

While this trade and investment legislation has won the enthusiastic support of some African governments, and the more lukewarm support of others (note President Nelson Mandela’s dissent), other African social movements and analysts have long argued that the policies promoted by the bill will result in yet greater hunger, poverty, and foreign control over the continent.

The Act does break new ground: it proposes to shift our relationship with Africa from aid to trade and investment. In fact, this month as the trade legislation is being debated, the Senate is also proposing cuts in foreign aid that will result in a 20% t o 30% reduction in foreign aid to Africa according to the Clinton administration.

The legislation offers a series of rewards for countries pursuing IMF style market-led economic reforms, including expanded duty free access to American markets for certain products, equity and infrastructure funds to support US investment, and the establishment of a mechanism to promote and review trade policy toward Africa.

Promoters of the Act, however, have been unable to demonstrate how African producers will benefit, beyond slight increases in textile exports. How producers of other manufactured goods, much less raw materials-and particularly oil which is 70% of US imports from Africa–might gain is not at all evident. It is no surprise that the most industrial and powerful African government has found the bill’s provisions, in the words of Nelson Mandela, “unacceptable.”

Those who will benefit are obvious. As one South African business magazine reported: “the prime beneficiaries of the Clinton African plan are the major American corporations.” Hundreds of millions of dollars in guarantees are allocated to insure US investment, subsidizing firms who reap the rewards of the forced privatization of African telecommunications and infrastructure. While the bill’s promoters speak of assisting Africans, African-Americans, and women, the primary group targeted for assistance a re the multinationals who control Africa’s trade and access to rich markets.

The bill’s sponsors argue there are no conditionalities contained within this legislation. A review of the text of the bill passed by the House, and the legislation pending before the Senate, reveals however an attempt to force African government to prioritize the following policies:

* severe cuts in government spending;
* fire-sales of government assets;
* new rights for foreign investors to buy African natural resources and state firms without limitation;
* deep tariff cuts;
* imposition of US monopoly and patent rules;
* binding membership in and adherence to all World Trade Organization regulations;
* compliance with all International Monetary Fund and other international financial institutions’ rules;
* avoidance of any “activities that undermine US national security or foreign policy interests” [HR 1432].

The US President alone is to apply these eligibility rules, using “quantitative factors” to monitor compliance.

These policies not new: in one form or another international financial institutions and multinational corporations have been seeking to impose them upon poorer African, Asian, and Latin American states for over twenty years. Where they have been implemented in other countries, the outcome is not only a loss of African states’ sovereignty, but documented increases in income inequality, poverty, malnutrition, and increasingly unstable economies.

These outcomes have led directly to widespread opposition to IMF, World Bank, and related programs by African trade unions, democratic movements, church groups, women’s organizations, etc.-and often riots as food prices rise, and health clinics and school s close.

Never however have these policies and conditions been gathered together as in the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, and then applied to a whole continent. This portends a bleak future, as Africans are stripped of their democratic right to make the most b asic of economic policy decisions, while foreign states and firms dictate trade and investment rules.

If we want to open the door to a more prosperous and democratic future for citizens of both the US and Africa, we need to forge a new relationship based on mutual needs and open public discussions with democratic African governments and movements–and not unilateral and private interests as in HR 1432 and S. 778. In its current form, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act should be roundly rejected.

July 20, 1998
Contact:
William Martin, Co-Chair
Tel: 217 333 8052; fax: 217 333-5225/359-0949

Action Alert: Act Now on Africa Growth and Opportunity Bill

Association of Concerned Africa Scholars
March 9, 1998

To: ACAS Members
From: Bill Martin, Co-Chair
Date: March 9, 1998
Re: Act Now on Africa Growth and Opportunity Bill

I am writing to urge ACAS members to ask their members of Congress to vote against the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act that the House of Representatives is expected to consider this coming Wednesday, March 11.

In principle, supporters of Africa should welcome the new attention to Africa represented by this legislative initiative and President Bill Clinton’s upcoming trip to Africa. But the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (H.R. 1432) provides few tangible benefits to the majority of African countries that are too poor to take advantage of the bill’s purported trade and investment benefits. Furthermore, the legislation entrenches the positions of U.S. multinationals, reinforces failed structural adjustment programs, and imposes onerous new strictures for debt relief.

ACAS, together with TransAfrica, several unions, and Ralph Nader’s consumer organization Public Citizen, has openly and jointly opposed the act as currently proposed. We urge you to write your Congressional representative in opposition to the legislation as currently formulated. The House vote is scheduled for this Wednesday, March 11 and the legislation will then go to the Senate. Equally important, we urge you to consider writing op-ed pieces and letters to the editor of your local newspaper, arguing for an alternative partnership between the U.S. and Africa. Among the points we believe should be considered in developing this alternative are:

* Structural adjustment programs, so harshly imposed on African states, have failed and should be abandoned–as is being considered for Asian states confronted by economic crisis. SAPs in Africa to date have exacerbated income inequalities, forced a defunding of education and social programs, and brought broad-based growth to only a small number of African states at best;

* African trade unions, church groups, women’s organizations and a broad coalition of groups representing civil society have raised serious questions about the economic provisions enshrined in this legislation. Organizations representing these African forces have persuaded the World Bank to engage in a joint, two year long study of the effect of these programs in four African countries to better understand and critique the consequences of these programs;

* Most African countries are dependent on a relatively small number of primary commodity exports, and will thus see few tangible benefits from the provisions of this legislation, while multinationals are given further control over African markets and products;

* Debt relief–often contracted by US-installed and supported dictators–remains a priority for Africa, where 50 percent of the population of Africa as defined by the World Bank are living in poverty;

* Continuing and protected levels of U.S. foreign assistance to Africa remain a critical priority for U.S. foreign policy in the region. But the current Clinton administration proposals do not contain specific protected levels of assistance to Africa –although assistance is protected to the countries of the former Soviet Union and Israel/Egypt.

ASSOCIATION OF CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS
8 March 1998

The Case Against the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act

Association of Concerned Africa Scholars
March 8, 1998

The Case Against the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (H.R. 1432)

Since the end of the Cold War, US policy toward Africa has drifted and become increasingly erratic. ACAS thus welcomes new thinking and initiatives. Unfortunately our analysis suggests that the new Africa Growth and Opportunity Act does not represent a step forward in US-African relations. And many Africans agree.

The Act does break new ground: it proposes, along with other initiatives, to shift our relationship with Africa from aid to trade. This recognizes a reality: US aid to Africa has been steadily declining since the early 1990s. Many, most notably the Congressional Black Caucus, have called for aid to be restored to the levels of the early 1990s, including the restoration of earmarked sums as is still provided for Eastern Europe, Israel/Egypt, etc. The President’s proposed 1998 budget continues the downward trend with slight increases only in military training and debt relief.

To replace this faltering commitment the Act proposes to promote African exports to the US and US investment in Africa. Promoters of the Act, however, have been unable to demonstrate how African producers will benefit, beyond possibly some slight increases in textile exports from Kenya and Mauritius–and even these, as US trade unions point out, may simply be transshipments from Asia. How producers of other manufactures, much less raw materials–and particularly oil which is 70% of US imports from Africa–might benefit is not at all evident.

Those who will benefit from this change in administration policy are obvious. As reported in the South African business magazine, Finance Week: “the prime beneficiaries of the Clinton African plan are the major American corporations” (June 5-11, 1997:17). Hundreds of millions of dollars in guarantees are specifically allocated to insure US investment, particularly those who reap the rewards of the forced privatization of African telecommunications and infrastructure.

The rules are of course quite different for African governments: to qualify for any assistance, particularly in the crucial area of debt relief, African governments must accept structural adjustment and free market provisions. NAFTA-like provisions to link US-African markets likewise target independent African regional market initiatives.

African trade unions, church groups, women’s organizations and a broad coalition of groups representing civil society have all raised serious questions about these provisions, which have most often meant cutting education and social programs while exacerbating inequality. Organizations representing these African forces have even persuaded the World Bank to engage in a joint, two year long study of the effect of these programs in four African countries to better understand and critique the consequences of these programs.

In short, while the bill’s promoters speak of assisting Africans, African-Americans, and women, the only group targeted for assistance are the multinationals who largely control Africa’s trade and access to rich markets.

For over two decades we have witnessed the US, the IMF, and the World Bank insist on structural adjustment, foreign investment, and export promotion as the solution to Africa’s development crisis–and reject real debt relief while cutting aid levels. It is time to recognize that these policies have failed, and led not to growth but inequality and increasing poverty.

Those seeking more equitable and beneficial relationships with Africa might consider:

· Reducing multinational corporations’ control over African exports and markets,

· Promoting fair prices for Africa’s exports, particularly raw materials and processed goods,

· Supporting African democratic movements, and human and academic rights,

· Setting aside structural adjustment policies–as is being discussed in Asia, and

· Providing more equitable, earmarked aid–as is done for other areas of the world.

ASSOCIATION OF CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS
8 March 1998

Action Alert: Ban Landmines

Association of Concerned Africa Scholars
November 25, 1997

Members of ACAS have given strong support to the campaign to ban landmines and remove the 100,000,000 mines from the ground in 66 countries of the world, mostly developing countries where women and children (mostly people of color) are the casualties. The time has come for a final showdown in favor of a total ban.

Over 100 nations are ready to sign such a treaty in Ottawa, Canada, on Dec. 2-3, 1997. Unfortunately, the US is not one of them. Rather, as a grandiose public relations move, the US has announced its leadership in a major demining effort over the next decade, but refuses to sign the treaty that would stop most of the source of anti-personnel landmines. As a “ban bus” crossed the US this past month, citizens everywhere rallied in support of the ban. NGOs have taken the lead, as symbolized by the recent Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. Retired military leaders have supported the ban. Congress, though time prohited final passage, was ready to pass legislation to support the ban. ONLY THE PENTAGON OPPOSES THE BAN….and that without reference to their own documentation which shows them to be counter-productive.

THUS, ACAS members are encouraged to make a final attempt themselves…and through their influential contacts…to persuade President Clinton to sign the treaty! Send a strong message in support of the ban, through whatever means you wish, before December 1st.

President Clinton’s e-mail address is: president@whitehouse.gov

The White House comment web site is: http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/Mail/html/Mail_President.html

And on Dec. 2nd, phone the white house opinion line 1-202-456-1111

Maybe your comment will be the one to swing his position to that of the rest of the world. You might want to praise him for his demining initiative….and point out that 20 times as many new mines are placed each year, than removed. Why not stop the source???

The Case Against DoD and CIA Involvement in Funding the Study of Africa

Scholars of Africa vs. the Department of Defense and the CIA

Since the 1970s, many scholars of Africa have rejected all connections with intelligence and military agencies based on a long-standing commitment to honesty and integrity in their relationships with African institutions and individuals. The hard-won protection of African studies from military and intelligence agencies’ agendas is now threatened by the implementation of the National Security Education Program (NSEP). The NSEP is funding scholars and programs in Africa despite repeated assertions by U.S. Africanists that DoD and CIA involvement in African studies is inimical to the independence of scholarship. All national African studies organizations – African Studies Association (ASA), Association of African Studies Programs (AASP), directors of the Title VI African Studies Centers in 19 universities, and ACAS -have maintained this clear stance (see quotes below).

The CIA, DoD, and Africa

This resistance to linkages with and funding from U.S. intelligence agencies and the Pentagon has been so strong because of the long history of Western interventions, the supporting of repressive rulers, and the ventures against legitimate and elected le aders in Africa. For more than 30 years, U.S. military and intelligence agencies have:

* Provided both direct and covert support to colonial and settler regimes – including the white-minority regime in Southern Rhodesia; the Portuguese colonial regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau; and the apartheid regime in South Africa.
* Subverted progressive leaders and their governments and national liberation movements – including Patrice Lumumba in the Congo, Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, and Nelson Mandela and the ANC during the apartheid era.
* Installed and/or supported dictators such as General Mobutu in Zaire, Idi Amin in Uganda, Nimeiry in Sudan, and Siad Barre in Somalia.
* Fomented civil war and conflicts through direct or indirect covert support for ‘contra’ factions such as UNITA in Angola and Renamo in Mozambique.

Moreover, the end of the Cold War has not eliminated the inclination for covert intervention against popularly supported governments and movements. Recent Congressional investigations reveal that the CIA not only has pushed forward highly misleading ana lyses but has played a direct role in subverting popular movements – for example, in undermining the elected government of Jean Bertrand Aristide in Haiti.

Some U.S. scholars of Africa and academic institutions have been linked to military and intelligence agency programs. This has raised broad suspicions in Africa about the bona fides of U.S. African studies and individual scholars. Now, the NSEP is reinvolving scholars of Africa with the DoD and CIA.

The NSEP Program

NSEP funds (1) scholarships for undergraduate students for study abroad, (2) fellowships to U.S. students in graduate programs, and (3) grants to institutions of higher education.

Such funding is urgently needed in most U.S. international studies programs. The people of the U.S. certainly need more study and understanding of world areas beyond the borders of Europe and North America, and especially of Africa. However, the NSEP program was compromised at its inception when it was firmly lodged in the military and intelligence agencies. As the NSEP’s brochure notes, “Program policies and direction are provided by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the 13 member National Security Education Board.”

The majority of Board members are representatives of federal agencies, including most notably representatives of the DoD and the Director of Central Intelligence. While an advisory committee of outside experts assists the Board and regranting agencies re commend student grant recipients, the criteria for selection of students and priorities among world regions, languages, and academic fields is determined by the Secretary of Defense.

The Changing Institutional Complexion of the NSEP: Camouflaging the Linkages

ACAS and other scholarly associations opposed NSEP from the outset because its funding and direction come from the DoD and CIA. Congressional hawks who insist that the military and intelligence should benefit directly from NSEP (which is funded from int elligence budgets) and supporters of the NSEP in the higher education community who seek to distance NSEP from the national security establishment have fought over the service requirement of the NSEP.

The Service Requirement

The outcome of this political struggle is that the service requirement has been changed to tie the NSEP even more directly to national security agendas. A new provision requires students who receive at least 12 months of funding from the NSEP to work for agencies with national security interests for a period equal to their scholarship or fellowship. In October 1995, the Congress had adopted language drafted by Rep. Bill Young (R-Fla.), Chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on National Security, requiring that student awardees “serve at least two years with the Department of Defense or the intelligence community.” This threw the NSEP and its supporters into crisis, and NSEP awards were suspended temporarily.

Then, in September 1996, with lobbying from the study abroad community and the Association of American Universities (AAU), Senator Paul Simon (D-Ill.) convinced the Congress to replace this language with the current provision requiring students to work in a sector of the federal government “having national security responsibilities.” (Work in higher education could be substituted only if a government job were not available.) This new provision is much more restrictive than the original service requirement in 1992 that allowed the work to be done either in any federal agency or in a higher education institution.

The President’s annual National Security Strategy report is being used as the basis for interpreting “national security.” Applicants are being informed that acceptable jobs might be in offices and organizations within the Departments of Defense, intelligence agencies, National Security Council, Commerce, Energy, Justice, State, and Treasury, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, certain Congressional committees, and federally funded laboratories and research and dev elopment centers such as RAND and the Lincoln Laboratory at MIT.

Defining National Security Priorities

While the service requirement has been a lightning rod for criticism of the program, the NSEP Board has been quietly narrowing what countries, languages, and fields of study are critical to U.S. national security and will be targeted for grants. Concerning Africa, emphasis is being given to four countries (Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, and South Africa) and only one African language – Arabic. The fields of study given primary emphasis are business and economics, engineering and applied sciences, international affairs, political science, history, and policy sciences. With these changes, Thomas Farrell, vice-president of exchange programs at Institution of International Education (IIE) – which administers the NSEP undergraduate scholarships – now describes NS EP as “a niche program” that focuses on a narrower arena of academic fields (Chronicle of Higher Education (CHE) 5/30/97).

Because of these changes in the service requirement and focus of the NSEP and the resultant confusion, the number of applicants for NSEP scholarships and fellowships dropped by more than two-thirds and the number of awards was cut by more than half from 1 995 to 1997. The NSEP now is aggressively promoting the program. Because of its narrower focus, NSEP plans to market the program more heavily to students interested in working in national security (CHE, 3/14/97).

NSEP Funding for Students of Africa

A relatively small number of NSEP’s approximately 1,400 student awards have gone for study of Africa – about nine percent of fellowships and scholarships funded in 1994-97. This is due at least in part to the greater opposition to NSEP from scholars of Africa than from other world areas and the relatively low priority the NSEP is giving to Africa.

The NSEP has given 35 graduate fellowships for study in 18 Sub-Saharan African countries and 11 African languages as well as 88 undergraduate scholarships for study in 11 Sub-Saharan African countries and 9 African languages. In many cases, the host African institutions and even the sponsoring U.S. study abroad programs through which undergraduate students have traveled to Africa have not known that the source of students’ funding is the DoD’s NSEP program.

NSEP Direct Institutional Grants

The NSEP has made a total of $6.8 million in grants to 22 higher education institutions in 1994-97. Although the AAU and other associations that support NSEP have cited the importance of “regranting agencies” to ensure independence of the programs it fun ds, there has been no public outcry against the institutional grants being administered directly by the NSEP Office within DOD (with peer-review mechanisms that are standard for government grants). By far, the largest number of institutional programs focus on Asia. Two focus on Africa – an internship program to examine the role played by African women (Clark Atlanta University) and study by doctoral students of Arabic and classical Islamic thought offered in Morocco (Washington University, St. Louis). Another grant is to a consortium of 10 medical universities in the U.S., Africa, Asia, and Latin America to internationalize medical training (University of California – Davis).

Why say No to NSEP Funding?

Cooperation among scholars of North America and Africa can be maintained only if scholarly activities and exchanges are public, transparent, and based on academic integrity. This is impossible if academic inquiry about Africa is defined in a major way by “national security” and military goals.

NSEP represents an attempt to use intelligence and Pentagon funding to direct undergraduate overseas experience, graduate scholarship, and programs at higher education institutions toward national security purposes and priorities.

Indeed, funding from NSEP imperils academic relations with Africa and the heritage of trust that has developed between African and North American scholars because of shared commitments to broader humane values and the disavowal of military and intelligence funding. Now, with some scholars operating with NSEP funding in Africa, all who are engaged in research in the field may be suspect and find themselves in unpleasant and even dangerous situations.

Over 100 scholars have protested NSEP in a statement sponsored by ACAS in the Chronicle of Higher Education:

“Funding from national security agencies threatens the openness of scholarly inquiry and publication, the physical safety of scholars and students overseas, and cooperation between African and U.S. scholars.” (June 2, 1993)

ACAS calls on scholars and students of Africa to:

* reject funding from the NSEP program for all scholarship on Africa,
* call on one’s university administrators to reject NSEP student and institutional funding,
* publicize NSEP’s links to military and intelligence agencies, and
* work to secure additional funding from non-military/intelligence agencies for students of African studies, particularly those traditionally excluded from overseas study programs.

Organizations Opposing the NSEP

“We … reaffirm our conviction that scholars and programs conducting research in Africa, teaching about Africa, and conducting exchange programs with Africa, should not accept research, fellowship, travel, programmatic, and other funding from military an d intelligence agencies – or their contractual representatives – for work in the United States or abroad.” Association of African Studies Programs (AASP), December 1993 (reaffirmed in April 1997)

“We … strongly object to the passing of the National Security Education Act…. The link which the legislation seeks to make between U.S. intelligence/defence and funding for African scholarship will seriously compromise the virtues of honesty and integ rity among both American and African scholars and institutions.” Association of University Teachers, University of Zimbabwe, August 1992

“The credibility and integrity of American university-based scholarship in the African studies field depend upon arrangements which ensure the independence of academic research and publication from the military and political interests of the government.. .. The Board … calls upon African scholars to refrain from participation in the Central Intelligence Agency’s program for research and support and to oppose participation in other activities it sponsors.” African Studies Association, April 28, 1990 (reaffirmed in December 1993)

“The American Council of Learned Societies … cannot support … either the present location of the NSEA within the Department of Defense or its present oversight structure.” American Council of Learned Societies, January 1993

Since 1981, the directors of the Title VI African National Resource Centers have agreed not to apply for, accept, or recommend to students any military or intelligence funding from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the NSEP, or other sources. This stance was reaffirmed by the directors gathered in Washington, D.C. at their meeting in April 1997. Title VI African Studies Center Directors Policy since 1980s, reaffirmed April 1997

“[The Social Science Research Council’s] board determined, even before the provisions for implementation of the program had been finalized, that they were sufficiently flawed that the council should not even enter into discussions and negotiations about i ts possible participation in the program.” Stanley J. Heginbotham, former Vice President of SSRC, in Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars January-March 1997

“We are gravely concerned … at the presence of the Director of the CIA in the oversight of the program… Linking university based research to U.S. national security agencies will restrict our already narrow research opportunities; it will endanger the physical safety of scholars and our students studying abroad; and it will jeopardize the cooperation and safety of those we study and collaborate with in these regions.” Presidents of the African Studies Association, Latin American Studies Association, and Middle East Studies Association, February 1992

“Past experience, in South Asia as elsewhere, amply demonstrates the perils of connections, however tenuous, between scholars and U.S. national security agencies. Possible consequences range from mistrust and lack of cooperation to physical violence agai nst U.S. scholars and their colleagues abroad….” South Asia Council, April 1992

Prepared and distributed by: Association of Concerned Africa Scholars
E-mail: chair@concernedafricascholars.org
Internet home page: concernedafricascholars.org

© ACAS, November, 1997

Action Alert: Sudan

From: Sudan Human Rights Organization (SHRO)
Re: Urgent Action re Sudan

A military tribunal in Sudan, which has been set to try 31 persons accused of attempting to overthrow the government, ordered the defense council today to submit their final defense statement immediately. When the defense council asked for time to prepare the statement they were told that the tribunal should finish by the end of the day–and that they will file the trial for judgment whether the defence statement is submitted or not.

The trial of accused persons (army officers and civilians) was seen by many of the observers as flagrant violation to human rights standards due to the fact that it is military court trying civilians and the court sessions were not open to the public. The final development ensures that the court is acting under direct orders from the regime, and that the accused are likely to face a capital punishment.

In light of the appalling human rights record of the current Sudanese regime in general and its brutal treatment to its opposing or suspected opposing military personnel in particular, the Sudan Human Rights Organisation is very concerned about the fate o f the accused persons. SHRO calls upon all governments, human rights activist and organisations to exercise the maximum possible pressure on Sudanese government to stop the murder of the accused persons.

Write to:

Dr Mahdi al amin
Sudan Ambassador to USA
Sudanese Embassy
2210 Massachusettes Ave N.W.
Washington DC 20006
Fax: 202-667-2406 or 202-745-2615

Lt. General Omer Hassan A. al bashir
People’s Palace
P.O. 281
Khartoum sudan

abdel Basit Sabdarat
Attorney General’s Chambers
Khartoum Sudan.

Chief Justice
Judiciary Building
University ave.
Kharoum Sudan

The following are among the accused:

1. Col. Jamal Yousif Mohamed Saleh
2. Lt. Col Al Abbas Ali Al Abbas
3. Lt. Col. Othman Abdel Rahman Hamid
4. Lt. Col. (Navy) Ahmed Mahmoud Mohamed Al Hassan
5. Lt. Col. Ismael Ahmed Mohamed Isawi
6. Lt. Col. Badr Al Din Al Haj
7. Lt. Col. (Engineer) Tarig Mohamed Ahmed Abu Libbda
8. Maj. Al Dardeery Al Haj Ahmed
9. Maj. Camelio Loutari
10. Maj. Salah Hamid Karbous
11. Maj. Al Bashir Hamid Beraima
12. Capt. Ali Ofkash Mohamed
13. Sgt. Maj. Issal Deen Gasmal Seed Mohamed
14. Sgt. Yahiya Dahiya Musa
15. Retired officers:
16. Col. (Ret.) Omar Mohamed Othman Abdel Rahman
17. Col. (Ret.) Fadl Al Seed Abdalla
18. Col. (Ret.) Abdel Marouf Hussein Abdel Rahman\
19. Civilians (never in the military): 20. Al Daawi Ibrahim Al Sheikh
21. Abdel Moneim Hassan Sharwani
22. Salim Borainma Salim
23. Diyab Ibrahim Diyab

Sudan Human Rights Organization: E-mail: shro@dircon.co.uk