A Greater Voice for Africa in the United States: An Analysis and Proposed Agenda for Africanist Scholars (1993)

Introduction

Africa is in danger of being discarded as “the Fourth World,” irrelevant to the global economy, and of being abandoned as hopelessly mired in insoluble problems. The continent has been utterly marginalized on the U.S. policy agenda by the end of the Cold War and by a new domestic fixation in the U.S. electorate. Yet Africa’s human needs are real and its problems are not isolated. Rather they are linked to the world economic recession, a global glut in many African agricultural commodities, and the effects of years of regional militarization.

Never before have the peoples of Africa so strongly needed the support of their friends in the West, and especially in the United States. Food aid is urgently needed in the face of drought and famine. More important is the rebuilding of an indigenous agenda for development beginning with basic human needs, setting aside the simplistic formulae of the modernization models and the Cold War tolerance of minority and repressive regimes. Such an agenda cannot succeed without changes by the wealthy governors of the world economy.

The Clinton Administration does offer opportunities for a fresh dialogue about U.S. policy toward African nations. Despite virtually no attention to Africa during the campaign, the principles of Clinton’s Africa statements merit support: attention to human rights and democratization, reform of development assistance, strengthening of UN peacekeeping efforts, and retaining sanctions pressure on South Africa. It is important to grasp these opportunities in order to respond to the remnants of 30 years of U.S. Cold War policy in Africa including — the rejection of democratic elections by U.S. client Jonas Savimbi, the continued South African ploys to avoid democracy and to foment ethnic strife, the banditry residual from the U.S. and USSR arming of Somalia, the continued support of Mobutu in Zaire and the failure to provide necessary international support to contain the disastrous conflicts in Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia (and its neighbors).

Thus, there is an urgent need for a more articulate and powerful voice in the United States advocating a larger, more compassionate, and serious policy focus on Africa. U.S. citizens must muster support for the future of this sub-continent from which so many of our peoples and so much of our American culture, heritage, and products have been drawn.

This paper calls on U.S. Africanist scholars to mobilize more effectively as part of a broader constituency dedicated to these ends. The Association of Concerned Africa Scholars (ACAS) has begun a number of new policy discussions to broaden and deepen the attention of U.S. Africanist scholars beyond Southern Africa to the entire continent. Organizationally, ACAS is expanding and re-organizing to respond to the new situation. We hope that these new directions will interest more Africanist scholars in participating in ACAS.

The African Crises and the World System

Like many Third World economies, most of Africa is in trouble. African countries are besieged by debt, further collapse of commodity prices (simultaneous with significant Won in the price of needed industrial goods from the North), devaluation, inflation, unemployment, political upheaval, some bad political leadership, erosion of the environment and infrastructure, food shortages, and massive health problems (the public health diseases of cholera, hepatitis, and meningitis; HIV; and the resurgent six WHO-targeted tropical diseases, especially malaria).

These burgeoning crises are occurring in the context of major structural reorganization of the global system, its economy, polity, and military power. Because of the relaxing of East-West tensions, most of the nations of the South -both government leaders and various political movements within them -can no longer automatically use the Cold War polarities to gain access to aid and support from the big powers of the North. The Eastern European powers have turned to their own crises, and the wealthier West has become largely disinterested, excepting those rare cases such as Somalia in which there is an apparent congruence of public outcry against the famine and the disorder and of U.S. politicos to find a new role for the military.

Despite this geopolitical reorientation away from Africa, we believe that Africa actually is deserving of more, not less, attention. In the 1990s, we have comprehended more than ever before the depth of human heritage and culture that is owed to Africa, especially in the culture of the U.S. and the Americas. We also are more attentive to the many products from Africa which enrich the consumption and quality of life of America.

In recent years, economic attention to Africa has been limited mostly to pressure from the World Bank, IMF, and U.S. for the many aspects of economic structural adjustment and for democratization. These changes can correct some of the distortions of prices, the lack of economic incentives, the high cost of centralized bureaucracies, and the lad of popular participation in some African nations; however, many believe they do not hold the key to — and may even block — addressing the depth and breadth of African economic problems. A large number of African states that are politically fragile have acceded to these pressures.

Even while dealing with these economic pressures, many African nations are offering internal political trans- formations. Democratic elections, multi-party rule, new leadership, and a priority on the basic human needs of the population are taking hold in many places throughout the continent. Despite both these economic and political changes, little foreign assistance or serious political attention from the West has been forthcoming.

Indeed, foreign aid to African countries has been minuscule. In 1990-91, total U.S. economic assistance for the 47 nations of Sub-Saharan Africa only barely exceeds that of Nicaragua and Panama together and totals less than one-tenth of the combined assistance to Israel and Egypt. In the early 1990s, the period of Africa’s most pressing crises, less than five percent ($800 million) went to Africa of the $17 billion total U.S. foreign development aid.

The Waning of Advocacy for Africa in the United States

Africa’s political transformations should create new possibilities for calling on the U.S. to truly support the democratic principles it purportedly seeks in Africa, as was not possible under the Cold War ethos. Nevertheless, at this time of potential new opportunities, interest in Africa has fallen among diverse U.S. publics — mass and elite.

The interest of U.S. politicians has been eroded by Nelson Mandela’s release from prison, the broad perception that apartheid is bound for the rubbish heap of history, and the “donor fatigue” at the seemingly endless parade of new African problems. Distracted by pressing domestic issues of jobs, housing, health, education, and racism on which few victories are being won, even the traditional friends of Africa in the Congress and the Congressional Black Caucus have failed to mobilize effectively on Africa’s behalf, including on emergency humanitarian assistance and conflict resolution. Even some of the liberal politicians elected to the 1993 Congress campaigned on an isolationist platform to “bring our dollars home” to bolster the U.S. economy.

The attention of the Western and Japanese corporate and investment communities has shifted to new opportunities in the Pacific and Europe as U.S. investments and trade with Africa declined since the 1970s. The U.S. foreign policy-making elites, likewise, are riveted to global competition among the economic powers and the transformation of the Eastern Bloc.

For masses in the U.S., attention is focused on declining job and economic opportunities. The concentration of wealth in the Northern Hemisphere. Indeed this decline is paralleled by the greatest concentration of wealth in U.S. history. Many people in this wealthy nation are caught in a new experience of impoverishment, decline in standard of living and quality of life, and the prospect of downward mobility. Ethnic and racial antagonisms are on the rise. As in Europe, this experience of personal insecurity accentuates national chauvinism and myths about the threats of foreign peoples.

The media coverage of Africa available to the mass “viewing market” continues to demonstrate gross disinterest in Africa (with the obvious exception of the images of anchormen — in the midst of U.S. military operations in Somalia). Images of starving African refugees flow into U.S. living rooms, leading most to conclude that Africa is but a caricature of endless problems, bad government, and incompetence — an undesirable continent with which to link and identify. This translates into an inadequate market for good educational and media materials on the continent, small enrollments in many college classes concerning Africa, and the continuing dissemination of gross racial and social stereotypes of the peoples and cultures of Africa.

Most of Africa’s U.S. supporters have failed to mount any effective action on the pressing problems of the continent. Africa’s friends have become demobilized on a broad front — among churches and unions, on the campuses, and even among some Africa-focused organizations. The national organizations with which activist scholars have cooperated on legislative and pressure campaigns (Washington Office on Africa, American Committee on Africa, TransAfrica, and others) are suffering financially and organizationally in varying degrees in the post-Mandela release period. Simultaneously, while many major funders have focused even more of their resources on projects inside Africa, they offer little support for initiatives to build a constituency with a greater voice for Africa in the U.S.

The present political demobilization on behalf of Africa is particularly striking in juxtaposition to the success of the friends of Africa not so long ago. For 30years, key African- American, student/faculty, church, labor, and liberal groups mobilized against apartheid, achieving one of the most remarkable changes in U.S. foreign policy of the century. Building from campus, local, and statewide actions, the divestiture and sanctions movement eventually overwhelmed the President, the State Department, and a great majority within the foreign policy establishment with the Congress’ adoption of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. But after this important national victory, most Africanists and other friends of Africa have failed to maintain their activism on South Africa.

The Role of Africanist Scholars

Where do Africanist scholars fit into this picture? In the domain of mass education and culture, centers of African and African-American studies and teachers in African-American communities are making important efforts to give new attention to Africa’s complex histories and cultures. The resources available for this task from African studies centers are very limited. Probably only four or five percent of the total U.S. public and private budget for foreign language and area studies is spent in research funding for the study of one-fifth of the global landmass with more nations, cultures, and languages than any other world region.

Most academic Africanists, however, remain professionally dispassionate, and focused on occupational productivity and advancement, mirroring the turn to self-interest by many Americans in these insecure times. Younger scholars in many disciplines face more difficult roads to academic advancement than did the previous generation of Africanists. While scholars by and large decry the broad disinterest in Africa, they have not raised an effective voice to demand a U.S. response to Africa’s crises. Even those scholars who are politically engaged are largely geographically isolated and racially divided.

Why has Africanist activism waned? As with other segments of the constituency for Africa in the U.S., it is partly due to the loss of apartheid as a relatively simple target of U.S. support. Issues facing South Africa have become more complex and multi-faceted — democracy, ethnicity, jobs, affirmative action for correcting the discriminatory past, food production, and pent-up demand for social services and economic opportunity. These issues are similar to those confronted by the continent as a whole, and Africanists so far have failed to broaden their perspective or develop any strategy for addressing these multiple issues effectively.

Africanist scholars should be particularly suited for assisting the broader U.S. constituency for Africa to make the transition from focusing on apartheid to the various critical issues facing the continent. Many U.S. academic specialists on Africa have strong sympathies with the particular countries and people they know from their research and collegial relationships. They understand the impoverishment and fragility of the continent caught in a marginal position in the global system. The historic ambivalence in the scholarly community toward economic assistance should be translated into a cogent critique of those programs that hamper development for the majority of the people and strong support for humanitarian and longer-term aid that can be helpful. Scholars with experience in Africa’s environmental issues and problems should nurture the nascent environmental movements and groups in Africa. U.S. scholars should create opportunities for African experts to speak for themselves about the solutions to Africa’s problems and should assist these scholars to acquire the resources they need for their research and communication.

A New Agenda for ACAS

The Association of Concerned Africa Scholars (ACAS) has embarked on a plan to refocus the political attention of Africanist scholars, particularly among its own membership. Our major tasks in this period are to struggle to understand the new situation in Africa and globally, to explore both those policy issues in Africa that merit our attention in this new period and what needs to be said about them to U.S. policy-makers, and to redirect ACAS to become a more effective instrument of change.

ACAS has identified a number of policy issues to explore and has established Issue Working Groups (IWG) on each to address the problems and to recommend policies to advocate. Several of the IWGs have developed draft papers on their topic, which are published for the first time in this issue of the ACAS Bulletin. Earlier drafts and ideas were discussed at a Consultation held in Washington, D.C. in May 1992and at a one-day ACAS Conference in November 1992. We now encourage discussion and comments from all ACAS members or prospective members as we seek to set our organizational policy course for the months ahead. (Send your comments to the Research Committee listed on the back cover).

In addition, we suggest the following policy priorities for ACAS efforts in the months ahead:

• Support for just and stable terms of economic exchange between Africa and the industrial nations

• Support for sustainable forms of majority rule and democracy in Africa

• Financial and political support for the peace-enforcing, peace-keeping, and peace-making (conflict resolution) activities of a genuinely representative UN, OAU, and other multilateral agencies

• Support for appropriate development that gives primacy to the needs of children, women, and those who are socially and economically displaced

• Continued attention to achieving both non-racial democracy in South Africa and across the continent as well as peace and reconstruction in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and the conflict- and drought-damaged SADCC states

• Increased U.S. attention (research and assistance) to the health crises in Africa (public health, HIV, malaria, infant death, etc.) and the background nutrition problems in Africa

• Debt relief and investment capital for appropriate development work which serves the needs and interests of the common peoples of Africa

• Partnership with Africa to achieve environmental sustainability, based on an integrated social and economic development that does not harm the planet

• More attention to the increasing erosion of academic institutions and the academic capabilities and work of our colleagues in African universities under the assault of structural adjustment programs

• Support for individual African colleagues under attack by repressive regimes

• Proactively building linkages and coalitions with African peoples, especially African academic colleagues, who work for progressive change in the economy, government, and society at all levels of their societies

• As a means of affecting U.S. policy, collaborating with a broad spectrum of North Americans to build a more enduring and effective constituency in support of all African peoples and oriented especially toward the Congress and U.S. foreign policy-makers. To accomplish this, ACAS must address and join the wider U.S. constituency for Africa and especially African-American constituencies.

The Means for Achieving Our Goals

ACAS was formed in 1977 to activate scholars to use their academic skills to analyze U.S. policy toward Africa, to mobilize public critical commentary, and to provide scholarly knowledge and legitimacy for criticism and the alternative policies. ACAS was constructed as well to bridge the separation of scholars working in the African Studies Association (ASA) and the African Heritage Studies Association (AHSA).

ACAS has used several means toward this end. ACAS members have testified before Congressional committees and the organization has initiated legislative campaigns on issues including a broad array of Southern Africa concerns, harmful U.S. interventions in Africa (particular1y CIA intervention in Angola), emergency assistance for victims of African drought and famine, protection of individual scholars in Africa, dislodging foreign interests in the Western Sahara, and funding through U.S. military and intelligence agencies—for African studies programs and research. Like many Africa-focused organizations, our focus in the 1970s and 80s was on the southern part of the continent

ACAS members have received regular commentary, information, and action-relevant articles, status summaries of key legislation, and news of the anti-apartheid movement in the ACAS Bulletin. The publications and network provided by ACAS has also given indirect guidance or resources to individual Africanists working on their campuses, Africanist programs and administrators seeking to be supportive of political change, and even administrators inside the government arguing for more progressive policies toward Africa.

The primary arena for communication with the broader Africanist community has been several panels organized by ACAS at the annual meetings of the ASA and twice at the AHSA. The panels, which have regularly been well-attended and well-received, have been on key topics concerning Southern Africa, human rights, repression against African scholars, other struggles in the Horn and across the continent, and the potential uses of defense and intelligence agency funding in African studies. In the 1970s and 1980s, the panels often had liberation movement representatives.

The Issue Working Groups (IWG’s) are a new mechanism to bring several ACAS members together to develop analysis and recommendations on policy issues that we have not previously addressed.

A Strategic Action Plan for ACAS at this Juncture

In light of the growing crises in Africa and the radically altered global parameters, the membership of ACAS made a commitment at its 1991 and 1992annual meetings to seek to achieve a greater impact on U.S. policy-making in Washington by increasing our organizational capacity and our program and by expanding our membership.

ACAS has always been bedeviled by the lack of infrastructure to coordinate its willing membership in mobilizing to influence U.S. policy-makers. Until now, we have operated on a shoestring, partly by our intentional decision not to compete with the Africa lobbying organizations on which we and others rely. Now, when we need to diversify our political foci, we have decided that we cannot make an effective contribution without greater resources and staffing and that we must have an organizational presence in Washington, D.C.

Therefore, we have hired a part-time executive secretary in Washington, D.C., with the hope of eventually enlarging that position to full-time. A new staff person does not substitute for a network of active and informed members, but nor can scholars scattered across the country be effective without consistent information and mobilization.

ACAS has also established a closer working relationship with the African Policy Information Center (APIC), formerly the Washington office on Africa Educational Fund. We will also be coordinating ACAS activities more closely with pro-Africa organizations in Washington, including the Washington Office on Africa, TransAfrica, and other groups such as Africare, Bread for the World. Development Gap, and Africa Development Foundation, and with the American Committee on Africa in New York. We plan to organize several seminars and colloquia on issues of current policy, possibly in conjunction with other actors in Washington. And we will continue to inform and mobilize ACAS members on selected current policy debates in the Congress. In all of these efforts, we will work to expand our capacity to address more diverse political and economic issues of the entire African continent.

In 1993, with new opportunity for Africa in Washington, we invite the wider Africanist community to join us in our effort to transform and expand ACAS. Scholars have a special role to play — in explaining African realities, developing policy recommendations and critique, and adding a certain academic legitimacy to Africa’s constituency in the U.S. We believe that the new direction taken by ACAS in the past 18 months and the commitment of ACAS members to greater participation and financial support have positioned ACAS to more effectively assist scholars to make their unique contribution in the political arena. The problems of Africa which will be solved will be managed by the African peoples and institutions themselves; however, the pressing needs and challenges facing those people of Africa in a radically altered global system surely give us cause to seek a greater impact on U.S. policy.

The author acknowledges the contributing comments and suggestions of Christine Root and William Martin.

Originally published in ACAS Bulletin 38-39 (1993), pp. 9-13

Reprinted in ACAS Bulletin 81

Activist Scholarship (1988)

What should Western-based movements do to facilitate African liberation? There are several important measures. One is opposition to military build-ups. Another is lobbying for the conversion of armaments expenditure to investment in genuine development efforts. Similarly, pressure on Western governments to adopt a non-interventionist policy in countries undergoing fundamental structural change is essential. But policy makers do not usually act against the interests of the groups that put them in power. To ask capitalists to refrain from expansionism is to ask them to cease being capitalists. This is not to suggest that tactical decisions are predetermined. Surely the anti-war movement influenced the U.S. decision to withdraw from Vietnam. Nonetheless, it is not enough to stop Western states from interfering in Africa.

Basic change must come about within African countries themselves. In this process, Western support for realigning the domestic divisions of labor in Africa should be linked more closely to the internal situations within the advanced capitalist countries. Just as production is increasingly international, struggles in various parts of the global political economy must be interwoven. As the struggles intensify, moralizing about the evils of exploitation should not replace thoroughgoing analysis of the crisis.

Equally important to contemplate is the question of what has not been done adequately at all. Although state actions must be continually challenged, it is wrong to allow those who hold the reins of power to set the agenda. Unfortunately, many opponents of their government’s policies in Africa have largely been reactive, their strategies crisis-oriented. Typically, critics have formed single-issue movements: anti-apartheid, nuclear freeze, pro-Sandinistas, and so on. What is required is an interlinking of movements that mobilize constituencies across such diverse issues as militarism, feminism, and intervention in different parts of the world. It is essential to bring home to workers, community groups, and intellectuals precisely how individuals are personally involved in Third World struggles.

Surely there is a long road to travel before liberation is achieved. Setting aside the exaggerated optimism of the early post-colonial period and the ensuing pessimism about Africa’s prospects for development, it is a truism to say that massive struggles in earlier historical epochs, such as the passage from feudalism to capitalism, a transition which engulfed the entire globe, have spawned fundamental transformations. It is out of the crucible of crises and from hard-fought struggles that new social forces emerge and invent creative solutions to deeply embedded problems. Improvements do not come steadily; there are traps and confusions, followed by sudden breakthroughs. And even then it can be hard to measure progress.

If liberation requires a monumental feat, one can say that the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars has contributed modestly to the struggle. Political work and research by Africanist scholars over the last decade have helped to reformulate questions and provide vital information for educators. Now we must continue to expand our membership, form coalitions with like-minded groups, consider the merits of a broader publications program, seek new ways to alter U.S. foreign policy, and open additional channels for assisting the liberation movements. The task is no less than devising novel ways to abolish the grim conditions in which the majority of humankind has been condemned to live and charting strategies for the course ahead.

Originally published in ACAS 10 years On – Now, ACAS Bulletin 23 (1988), pp. 35-40.

Reprinted in ACAS Bulletin 81

On Scholar Activism (1988)

I remember vividly a conversation with the late FRELIMO President Samora Machel in my garden in Dar es Salaam in 1972. I had done a variety of odd-jobs for the Mozambican liberation movement during the seven years of my teaching tenure in Tanzania and a few weeks earlier Machel had arranged for me to accompany FRELIMO guerrillas on a trip into the liberated areas of Tete province. Now he had com to bid me and my family goodbye as we packed to leave Tanzania.

“You have now seen something of our struggle”, he said. “But for most Canadians their knowledge of it is at point zero. You must try to do something about that when you return home.” It was not an order exactly, yet I could literally feel his will galvanizing me into action, communicating to me personally the kind of drive and purpose I have seen him communicate to Mozambicans, singly and in large gatherings, both before and since that day. It was no accident that on my return to Canada I would soon find myself working with others to launch the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal’s African Colonies, TCLPAC (which, as the since renamed Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa, TCLSAC, celebrated its fifteenth anniversary in 1987). No accident, either, that this kind of experience was to have a profound impact on my scientific work.

Like so many other “activist scholars concerned with Africa”, I thus discovered my vocation for political work around African issues — and, in my case, specifically around Southern African issues — in Africa itself. And certainly, “in the last decade (or so)”, those of us who have followed this path have been privileged to accompany a remarkable upsurge of popular assertion in the region — the overthrow of the Portuguese colonial presence, the downfall of Ian Smith’s Rhodesia, the revitalization of the resistance movement in South Africa. Self-evidently, the struggle for liberation which we now seek both to interpret and to facilitate is at a very different level than it was in the dark days of the 1960s when South Africa’s first Emergency crushed hopes for significant changes for a decade and reduced the anti-apartheid constituency in western countries to a debilitating posture of mere moralizing about a seemingly static situation.

Of course, the situation in Southern Africa remains framed by the larger development crisis in Africa as a whole: no-one can now pretend, if ever they did, to have any very ready answers to the problems which confront the continent. More immediately, the regional conjuncture is marked by the continuing vitality of the apartheid state itself. This is a state contested in new ways — in ways that the more recent and on-going Emergency can only forestall although not, this time, crush — but it is strong nonetheless. Strong enough, unfortunately, to smash by means of its destabilization strategy the high hopes that accompanied Samora Machel and his colleagues into power in 1975. And strong enough, at least in the short-run, to stalemate the euphoria and the momentum which characterized the South African resistance movement’s advances of the period 1984 to 1986. No-one can doubt that there is unfinished business in Southern Africa and if, as is obvious, the main protagonists of renewed advance must be Southern Africans themselves, there is also more than enough unfinished business for “activist scholars” to be getting on with.

But what is our “business”? We should not underestimate the extent to which it is, in fact, scholarship, scholarship shaped by our activism and our commitment to the struggle in Southern Africa, but scholarship nonetheless. Not that we need apologize for twinning the terms “activism” and “scholarship”. Quite the contrary, since scholarly preoccupations — the questions asked — do not spring spontaneously from the data but are themselves shaped by an on-going process of “ideological class struggle”. As it happens, there are few fields of scholarly endeavour where radical intellectual work has had such a profound impact as in African Studies. This is precisely because an impressive level of engagement has encouraged as many “Africanists” as it has to ask the hard and searching questions that a more conservative and passive scholarship would obscure.

Engagement can only take us so far, of course. Once those “hard and searching questions” have been posed, adequate answers to them can only be found by doing full justice to the highest scholarly-cum-scientific canons — in elaborating arguments, pursuing data and weighing evidence. Needless to say, there will always be the danger of shaping our analyses to fit our preconceptions. We must work to keep each other honest as we continue to walk the tightrope of understanding regarding Southern Africa: scrutinizing carefully the weaknesses as well as the strengths of the various post-colonial and socialist projects in the region, for example, while never losing sight of the broader context of South African destabilization, the crippling impact of which so profoundly blights all development efforts there; evaluating the weaknesses as well as the strengths of the resistance movement in South Africa itself while never losing sight of the shifting mix of repression and pseudo-reform which defines the powerful drag of apartheid state and racial capital upon the drive for liberation.

Let me emphasize that something more than mere intellectual honesty for its own sake is at stake here. Analytical rigor is actually of direct and profound importance to the anti-apartheid movement itself. For an anti-apartheid movement built on mere enthusiasm and apolitical moralizing cannot easily survive the cruel vicissitudes inevitable in so difficult a struggle as the one for Southern Africa; those who stay the course, experience attests, are those who are least naive. Of course, the most salient voice itemizing those vicissitudes must be that of Southern Africans themselves. Yet the analyses we have produced as “scholar-activists” have, in western countries, percolated usefully through the profession, through the anti-apartheid movement broadly-defined and even into the public arena, where – rather against the odds and without overstating the case –we can at least presume to assert (with Brecht) that “our rulers would have slept more comfortably without us”!

Engagement and scholarship, then. But a warning: militant sentiments manifested exclusively in the privacy of one’s own study are unlikely to sustain themselves or to retain their relevance. At the very least we must be better publicists, forcing the pace of the percolation process just referred to by self-consciously developing, each and every one of us, additional kinds of communications skills crafted to reach a wider range of potential audiences. Even more importantly, we must sustain our involvement, alongside others approaching the Southern Africa issue from different angles and different life experiences, within the anti-apartheid movement itself.

This is essential, as I have suggested, because activism — including such apparent “shit-work” as licking stamps and pounding the pavements! — is not merely good for the scholar’s soul but also for his or her brain. Self-evidently such activity is equally important for its more immediate and tangible impact on the struggle itself. Certainly, those of us who have been involved in the sanctions campaign — on-campus or off — have been active on a key front for both weakening the South African regime over time and for expanding the anti-apartheid constituency. At least as crucial, and rather less developed as an action front, is the building of direct support for the beleaguered progressive governments of Southern Africa (Angola and Mozambique, in particular) and for the progressive movements for change in South Africa and Namibia (the ANC-UDF-COSATU alliance and SWAPO, in particular).

Such support work for liberation is in many ways even more difficult to carry out than sanctions-related activity. Several factors produce a much less responsive and united audience for it in North America. There is, in the first instance, the prevailing 1980s’ atmosphere of Reagan/Thatcher-style global red-baiting and, linked to it, the promiscuous use in public discussion of the emotive charge of “terrorism”. There is the sincere but too often misleading, selective and overly comfortable predilection for “non-violence”. And there are the tensions and confusions still generated within the anti-apartheid movement itself by the manipulation of oversimplified “black consciousness” formulations. Yet in light of the intransigence of the South African regime and the consequent inevitability of escalating conflict, there will be an even greater necessity in future to support the on-going popular struggle — including armed struggle — in South Africa. We must, as activists and as scholars, move to comprehend and seek to legitimate that struggle even more successfully than we have done to date.

I began this brief note by invoking the name of Samora Machel, so important in shaping my own commitment and that of many others touched by the Mozambican experience. Let me close by invoking another name, that of Ruth First, friend and former colleague at the University of Eduardo Mondlane in Mozambique, and a formidable exemplar of the “activist-scholar” role if ever there was one. Her substantial contributions to both the hands-on struggle in South Africa and to progressive Africanist scholarship are well known. But note something else. She was assassinated in 1982 when, as Director of Research at the university’s Center of African Studies, she was using her formidable skills to design research and training programs extremely helpful to the Mozambican development effort. Moreover, only days before her death she had helped host a meeting of scholars drawn from all of the Frontline States of Southern Africa, a meeting designed to coordinate and focus research efforts the better to service the region-wide struggle against South African hegemony. There seems little doubt that her success in thus putting scholarship at the service of the Southern African revolution was the chief reason why the South Africans felt compelled to kill her.

Of course, few of us are as close to the front-line, either physically or spiritually, as was Ruth First –n or are we ever likely to be quite so dramatically at risk. Yet the urgency of the present situation in Southern Africa surely dictates that he attempt to be as committed as she was — and even that we be prepared to take a few risks. In short, her spirit is something that, as aspirant “scholar-activists”, we must seek to emulate.

Originally published in ACAS 10 years On – Now, ACAS Bulletin 23 (1988), pp. 35-40.

Reprinted in ACAS Bulletin 81

ACAS Ten Years On: Reflections on a Decade or so (1988)

It seems that, at least since 1945, every decade has been “fast moving” in Africa. The period since 1975 has not been less so. We must first appreciate it by reference to the previous decade. 1965-66 was in fact a bad year for Africa: the rash of coups which toppled Nkrumah, Modibo Keita, Ben Bella (the stalwarts of the old “Casablanca” powers), the closing-out (at least momentarily) of Congolese social revolution with the coup by Mobutu, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of the Rhodesian white settlers.

The bloom was off. The rosy optimism of 1960–”Africa’s Year of Independence”–was over. The euphoria of the founding of the OAU in 1963 was now a memory. And Africa settled into the realities of enormous economic difficulties, political repression (including massively in South Africa after the Rivonia trial), and neo-colonialism seemingly triumphant. The main “action” was in the Portuguese colonies, where the movements had launched their wars for national liberation.

The Portuguese African struggles paid off, as we know. The Portuguese collapsed internally, and suddenly in 1975, all the former Portuguese colonies were independent states. We know too the further developments: independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, the increased struggle of SWAPO, and the reemergence of a popular political struggle in South Africa coupled with an intensified pressure from ANC: the Durban strike, the founding of COSATU, Soweto, the mergence of the UDF, the Dakar meting, etc. We know also the other side of this coin: “destabilization” everywhere, beginning with the march on Luanda in 1975.

Yet we of course should not miss the difference between 1965-75 and 1975-87. Today South Africa tries to destabilize and forbids TV coverage of African funeral marches. Then they ruled with an iron hand. Today the U.S. Congress votes sanctions. Today they are compelled to release Govan Mbeki. Today they “merely” destabilize. Today they are clearly on the defensive.

The transformation is the result of African political organization, particularly in southern Africa. What role have outside solidarity organizations played in this? An important one. We should neither minimize it nor exaggerate it. The outside solidarity work has affected in important ways the constraints within which the U.S. and west European governments operate. This in turn affects the constraints within which the South African government operates. It is vital to tighten (and sometimes to alter) these constraints. And this has been done.

The campaign for disinvestment began in the late 1950s. It is today at last more or less successful. This is a very positive achievement. On the other hand, it points to the limitations of our possibilities. Disinvestment is more complicated in its consequences than we pretended, which is what our conservative opponents always predicted. As a result, everyone is “thinking” about it–the legal movements inside South Africa, the ANC, the Frontline States, the solidarity organizations. In a sense this shouldn’t have been so. We should have anticipated the present ambiguities and have had a strategy ready.

It is of course not too late. And we will solve this one, with a little effort. But are there other such “pitfalls” or dilemmas awaiting us? The struggle in Southern Africa will still be long. We should look ahead.

Originally published in ACAS 10 years On – Now, ACAS Bulletin 23 (1988), pp. 35-40.

Reprinted in ACAS Bulletin 81

Statement of Dr. Jean Sindab (1986)

I feel quite privileged and very honored to be asked to serve as the co-chair of ACAS. It is an organization which I have long admired and whose members have been particularly important in my intellectual, professional and personal development. Their commitment to the cause of peace and justice in southern Africa has been particularly heartening and encouraging to me and so many others over the years.

This is quite an exciting time for those of us who have struggled so hard, for so long, to bring an end to apartheid and U.S. support for that racist system. Last year, we saw a tremendous leap forward, both in the struggle inside South Africa and in this country. With the Free South Africa Movement building on years of anti-apartheid grassroots activity, it became the catalyst for igniting the spark of mass opposition to apartheid which has swept this country. Those loud protests succeeded in raising the visibility of the apartheid issue to force the international community to intensify its opposition to the Botha regime. Here in the U.S. we have dealt a death blow to the policy of constructive engagement by forcing Reagan to sign the Executive Order – no matter how weak – imposing sanctions on South Africa. Clearly, it is not enough, and we must go much, much further. Because of our success, our enemies have recognized our strength and our power and they are fighting back.

In fact, they are fighting back harder than ever.

However, the coming year offers us some of the best opportunities to keep the apartheid issue before the public despite attempts to put it on the back burner. Several important anniversaries will be observed this year: the 10th anniversary of the Soweto massacre, in which close to a thousand school children were murdered, the 20th anniversary of South Africa’s illegal control over Namibia and the 25th anniversary of the launching of the armed struggle by the African National Congress (ANC). We must use these anniversaries to further mobilize and educate the American people.

This also promises to be a very significant year for the struggle in southern Africa for other reasons as well. If 1985 was a pivotal time for South Africa, then 1986 will he even more of a watershed year. The formation of the Congress of South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU) is an exciting development which will precipitate important events. Already the new federation has announced that it will call for the burning of pass-books in the middle of this year. Bishop Tutu also has announced that the churches will call for an economic boycott. What this means, of course, is that the struggle will intensify even further.

When these events happen, we must be prepared to take immediate action in support of our brothers and sisters in South Africa. This is where an organization like ACAS can make a valuable contribution. One of the major tactics the racist regime and their U.S. allies will attempt is to obfuscate the real issues in the southern Africa region in order to gain support for apartheid. The activist-scholar community can play a critical role in providing the information necessary to refute the South African propaganda machine. We must be in the vanguard of exposing the lies and misinformation that will be presented to the American public.

We must take the lead in focusing attention on how apartheid is affecting the entire southern Africa region. We must expose the continued exploitation and oppression in Namibia, the hunger in southern Africa and the activities of the “contras” in Angola and Mozambique. Most importantly, we must help shift the focus in this country back to apartheid terrorism as opposed to Soviet expansionism as the root cause for problems in southern Africa.

Jonas Savimbi’s visit to the U.S. leaves us with a task to be done. We must intensify our lobbying efforts to defeat congressional bills to fund UNITA and to prevent covert aid as well. Our campaign cry must be “funding for UNITA is funding for South Africa.” We must lobby for the passage of the Namibia bill introduced by Pat Schroeder and we must go back to push for stronger sanctions against South Africa. A comprehensive economic sanctions bill is the only viable option given the present level of the struggle inside South Africa.

We must seize this historic moment to make our contribution to the final phase of the struggle for justice in South Africa. The time is now. The task is at hand. The challenge is ours and I know that we will not fail. Onward to victory!

Dated February 5, 1986

About the Author

In 1986, Dr Jean Sindab of the Washington Office on Africa was Co-Chair of the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars.

From ACAS Bulletin 81

What might a better US policy towards Zimbabwe look like?

I recently attended a symposium sponsored by the Africa Initiative of Syracuse University and the African Studies Center of the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, entitled, “Obama and Africa: Which Way?” It was pointed out that the US imports more of its oil from Africa than it does from the Middle East; that there are thousands of US military personnel assigned to the continental strategic military command, Africom. As any scholar of the late colonial period in Africa knows, the US has a long and sordid history of anti-communist interventions, support for dictatorships and disregard of the will of many nations on multilateral funding, trade, health and debt policies. US social agendas dictate the shape of foreign aid programs, rather than the needs of recipients. Even social and agricultural research has often been tainted by “strategic” considerations. US policy thus carries a long legacy of the imposition of an unfortunate level of national arrogance.

However, the thrill of Barack Obama’s assumption of the US presidency has not faded. Symposium participants were celebratory at the departure of George Bush. Even the most cynical seemingly felt a little urge to lift a corner of the gloom, and let a bit of the sun generated by Obama’s dazzling smile shine in.

Perhaps destined to eclipse that sunshine will be the choice Obama is likely to make about where to place the continent of Africa on his list of “change” priorities. Still, his inaugural remarks did seem in some direct way to be pointed towards Robert Mugabe: “To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict or blame their society’s ills on the West, know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.”

Readers of this website do not need to be told how dire the situation in Zimbabwe has become. Starvation and cholera stalk that lovely land. The country’s executive “completely ignores the orders of the courts, thus placing itself above the law, able to do whatever it wishes to citizens, ignoring all laws and constitutional rights, abusing its powers at will and with impunity.” Just as there seems to be no limit to the heights that can be reached by the inflation rate, there seems to be no depth that cannot be breached by each new day’s awful reality.

Readers will also be aware of the backlash against the Bush/Blair/Brown style of Zimbabwe criticism, and of the hearty support that Mugabe still seems to enjoy amongst those for whom denunciations of “imperialism” largely trump any evidence of local culpability in the current tragedy. The eternal question “what is to be done?” exercises the rest of us.

In the anti-apartheid solidarity movement, the slogan was developed in the progressive sports fraternity, “no normal sport in an abnormal country.” It is time this spirit was adopted towards Zimbabwe in general (not just in sporting and cultural affairs). It is clear, as the Legal Resources Foundation says, that “the Zimbabwean authorities no longer abide by the Constitution of the country.” The US and other countries can thus no longer fall back on the same policies which imply that appeals to constitutionality will succeed. Zimbabweans are telling America that those appeals will continue to fall on deafened ears. “Change” therefore has to mean doing things differently: no more assumptions that a normal dialogue with Zimbabwe lies just around the corner. The current task is to find ways to isolate Robert Mugabe and render him irrelevant in the service of making a new Zimbabwean reality.

In making this argument, I do not for a moment want to give the impression that the solution to the Zimbabwean problem lies in military force, whether covert or overt. More death will not assist the dying. In a recent otherwise reasonable syndicated column, Nat Hentoff quoted the Washington Times of December 7, 2008, “Alas, at some times in some places diplomacy just doesn’t work…Has anyone in [Zimbabwe] thought of the ‘f’ word – force?” Hentoff is mistaken. Warfare satisfies the impatient but it grinds the boot-heel of suffering ever more closely on the necks of women and children. In Zimbabwe it must be avoided.

What might a better US policy towards Zimbabwe look like?

Genuine multilateralism is the key. The first things the US must do are to pay its dues to the United Nations, and recognize the International Criminal Court, thus making an important statement and crafting a new image as a credible international partner rather than the cowboy bully of the Bush years. It must work to break the old imperialist-era logjams and coordinate more work with the European Union in Africa. It must ask the leaders of the African Union what the US can do to strengthen its negotiation and peacekeeping capabilities. In the southern African region, the most important things it can do are to build up substantial pressure on South Africa to acknowledge Zimbabwe’s pariah status – and to meet its own obligations to the woefully underserved and endangered refugees from Zimbabwe and other African countries who have fled to South Africa.

In the improved international atmosphere that would result from these actions, the US could press for the following specific initiatives which could credibly flow from a better regional diplomatic climate.

• appoint a special envoy to the African Union;
• state that the “who is going to be Prime Minister” circus is at a dead end;
• call for the release of all political detainees in Zimbabwe at the UN;
• encourage the UN Secretary General to approach the heads of the Zimbabwe armed services and negotiate a transitional arrangement;
• as the current Zimbabwean state no longer recognizes its own constitution, consider setting up an AU- and UN-backed government in exile in Botswana;
• insist that Zimbabwean women’s organizations are recognized and brought into international negotiations;
• sponsor and convene a conference of Zimbabwean activists, feminist organizations and NGOs and hear what their ideas are. Zimbabwe is blessed with an extraordinary corps of articulate, knowledgeable, experienced activist women. Let their voices be heard and let their ideas circulate.
• Consult with Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Medecins Sans Frontieres, etc on governance and humanitarian issues – rather than treat them warily as adversaries at best.

None of these actions would be an end in itself; rather, each would contribute to the achievement of enabling conditions for a Zimbabwean recovery. These ideas are proposed here in the spirit that “change means doing things differently.”

Terri Barnes is Associate Professor of History and Gender and Women’s Studies at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.

Food Crisis Debates: Open Letter to Paul Collier

Open Letter to Paul Collier, Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University, UK

In response to “Politics of Hunger,” Foreign Affairs (USA), November-December 2008.

From:
William Aal, Community Alliance for Global Justice, Seattle
Lucy Jarosz, Professor, Geography, University of Washington
Carol Thompson, Professor, Political Economy, Northern Arizona University

Date: 20 January 2009

Paul Collier advocates “slaying three giants” to end the food crisis: peasant agriculture, fear of scientific agriculture, and the myth of biofuels from grain to overcome US oil dependence. His analysis is, however, very much grounded in the agriculture of the last century.

Collier continues to make the 20th century-long argument that increased yields is what can feed the hungry, a point that seems self-evident. But much research now documents that the hungry remain with us, not because of the lack of food but rather, because of distribution and the inability of the poor to access food that is available, often only a few miles away. Amartya Sen won the Nobel Prize for Economics (1998) for demonstrating not only the theory, but the empirical reality, of famines occurring in the midst of plenty. Moreover, research on commercial agriculture demonstrates its negative effects on the environment, public health, and farming families (Magdoff et al., 2000; Nestle, 2002). Commercial farming is highly dependent upon fossil fuels for production, processing, and transport, and is a major contributor to climate change (IPPC, 2007).

Collier is correct to lament the high price of food in 2008, causing food riots in about 80 countries. However, he places “the root cause” blame on the increasing consumption of the Asian (e.g. China and India) middle classes. The statistics tell a different story. As stated by the senior economist at the International Grains Council, Amy Reynolds, “At the start of the decade, a small amount of grain—18 million tons—was used for industrial purposes. This year 100 million tons will go towards biofuels and other industrial purposes. Can anyone really tell me that hasn’t had an impact on what we pay for food?” (Chakrabortty, 2008: 4).

There is never one root cause, and using grain to feed American cars, instead of people, is just a single factor, but one we can change quickly. We fully agree with Collier that Americans must end their addiction to oil, by refusing to put, as he states, one-third of our grain production into gas-guzzling vehicles. A longer term issue, but relevant to increasing demand , is that more than half the U.S. grain and nearly 40 percent of world grain is being fed to livestock, rather than being consumed directly by humans (Pimentel, 1997).

Other contributing factors include the increasing costs of petroleum-based fertilizers and pesticides and increasing speculation on commodities markets (Stewart and Waldie, 2008). These factors demonstrate, contra Collier, that the root causes of the global food crisis are related to the political economy of commercial agriculture itself, and not simply a matter of supply and demand.

We disagree quite strongly with Collier’s derisive depiction of “peasant agriculture.” He attacks the populism that “Peasants, like pandas, are to be preserved.” This overly general category seems to include the very diversified category of small-scale family farming, which comprises the majority of farm operations throughout the world. These smallholders (often female farmers) are highly entrepreneurial and innovative. They are even more efficient than commercial agriculture, if one uses the measure of capital expenditure per bushel or ton of yield.

Many scientists now provide statistics that “Africa can feed itself” and that “organic farming can feed the world.” (Halberg et al,. 2007; Norstad, 2007). Organic food production and localized forms of small-scale food production are among the fastest growing areas in agriculture today as the health and environmental effects of commercial agriculture are increasingly rejected and as people move to more healthful plant-based diets. Small-scale urban agriculture in the form of community gardening is becoming increasingly important in seasonal food supplies and local forms of food security.

Commercial agriculture, according to Collier, may increase yields 10-20 percent. Yet long-term analyses from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) demonstrate, across the globe, that “best practices” of smallholder agriculture will double yields. “Best practices” include sharing of seeds (farmers’ rights), research following farmers’ requests, available and affordable credit and yes, agricultural extension. Collier is very wrong in saying that the latter has “largely broken down,” for many sources across the African continent document that removing the government from agriculture was a systematic policy of the World Bank (Berg report) and USAID from 1981. If agricultural credit, extension and markets do not work in Africa, the explicit policy of removing “government interference” from agriculture is a major cause.

Another way Collier reveals he is caught in the last century is that he considers “scientific” thinking as coming from those with white coats in elaborate laboratories. The barefoot woman bending over her cultivated genetic treasure is not “scientific”, even though such farmers have cultivated genetic biodiversity over thousands of years. These free gifts do not fit into the corporate logic behind commercial agriculture, where only profit can be an incentive, not curiosity nor sharing. Yet indigenous knowledge provides us with all our current food diversity and is the basis for 70 percent of our current medicines. Americans, for example, need to know that every major food crop we use today was given to us by Native Americans. In contrast, commercial agriculture makes a profit by depleting the gene pool, the result of valuing only very specific traits. As the FAO concluded (1996: 13-14), “The chief contemporary cause of the loss of genetic diversity has been the spread of modern commercial agriculture.”

A major point which Collier avoids is that genetically modified seeds rely on patenting of life forms, which most all the world rejects, except the U.S. government and the global biotechnology industry. Much of the genetically modified research currently involved in the Alliance for a Green Revolution for Africa (AGRA of the Gates and Rockefeller Foundations) relies on freely taking seeds and experimenting them with them in the laboratory; if an innovative trait is produced (e.g., pesticide resistance), the plant is patented, with zero recognition to other breeders of the variety, over thousands of years. By adding one gene, the corporation patents the whole plant, and often, the whole specie. Africans call this act “biopiracy,” or the theft and privatization of genetic wealth, which had previously been available to all (Mushita and Thompson, 2007). We agree with farmers that the sharing of biodiversity is both the past, and the future, of human sustenance.

Food is a human right, not a corporate commodity for speculation. Mother Nature does not operate on a board-room quarterly profit margin. But food production can be very profitable, sustainable…and feed all of us. It is just not capable of feeding the “giants” of Wall Street or the City of London; it is those giants’ interference with food production that needs slaying, because food produced mainly to feed corporate profit will lead to further food crises, not less.

References:

Chakrabortty, Aditya. 2008. “Fields of gold,” The Guardian (London), 16 April, p. 4.

Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations. 1996. Report on the State of the World’s Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, prepared for the International Technical Conference on Plant Genetic Resources, Leipzig, June17-23, Rome: FAO.

Halberg, N., et. al. 2007. Global Development of Organic Agriculture: Challenges and Prospects. London: CABI Publishing.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), United Nations. 2007. Climate Change 2007. http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/index.htm

Magdoff, Fred, et al., 2000. Hungry for Profit. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Mushita, Andrew and Carol Thompson. 2007. Biopiracy of Biodiversity – International Exchange as Enclosure. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

Nestle, Marion. 2002. Food Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Norstad, Aksel, ed. 2007. Africa Can Feed Itself. Oslo: The Development Fund.
Articles from a June 2007

Pimental, David. 1997. “‘U.S. could feed 800 million people with grain that livestock eat,’ Cornell ecologist advises animal scientists.” Cornell University Science News. http://www.news.cornell.edu/releases/aug97/livestock.hrs.html

Stewart, Sinclair and Paul Waldie. 2008. “Who is responsible for the global food crisis?” Globe and Mail, 31 May.

Mugabe’s Endgame

Could it be possible that while the public, the press, and the international community were busy with cholera, the illegal regime in Harare actually declared a state of emergency under cover of a “national emergency” (ostensibly against cholera)?

I may not be the only one seeing the reality that what has intensified is not the energy with which Mugabe is combating cholera, but, rather, abducting human rights activists collecting information on human rights abuses and MDC activists.

We have also seen first ‘Comical Ali’ Sikhanyiso Ndlovu insinuating that the British and Americans deliberately infected Zimbabwe with vibrio cholerae. Mugabe himself further expanded on that accusatory narrative when declaring at the burial of the infamous former youth minister Elliot Manyika that cholera had ended and there was no longer a reason for these western powers to declare war.

In the meantime, the narrative of Anglo-American plotting is being linked to alleged MDC “training bases” in Botswana. In the past, the British and Americans have always been Mugabe’s curtain to shut Africa off from seeing his violent crackdown on internal opponents.

What’s left is to get evidence that the MDC and human rights NGOs are behind this broad strategy of regime change.

All this would not have been necessary if the MDC had agreed to ceding Home Affairs to Zanu (PF) or at least “sharing” it. Of course Zimbabweans know that such an arrangement was never going to work because Mugabe would always circumvent and usurp the position of the MDC co-minister and turn him into a deputy minister at best, or, more appropriately, a complete buffoon. The agreement in theory gave a semblance of power-sharing between two equal partners. However, that’s not how things work in Mugabe’s world: in practice, the deal was a virtual swallowing of the MDC and the end of multi-party democracy. The MDC would be used as a goblin to look for money from western countries while Mugabe was busy spending it.

Building a Case: Accusations, Abductions, ‘Assassination’

People should read and analyze carefully the timing of Mugabe’s threat to call new elections if the GNU deal flounders. Patrick Chinamasa, the Zanu (PF) official masquerading as justice minister (there being no government in Harare) made Mugabe’s strategy clear yesterday when declaring:

“If no support is forthcoming, it means that (the constitutional) amendment number 19 bill will be a dead matter…. In the event that the collaboration that we envisage (to pass the bill) is not forthcoming, then that will necessitate fresh harmonized elections at some point in time.”

For the first time in the history of Zimbabwe, Zanu (PF) is a minority party in parliament. While editors are letting their journalists get away with the lie that Zanu (PF) is the “ruling party”, the fact of the matter is that Zimbabwe is now effectively under military rule. It is the Joint Operations Command (JOC) that is running the circus. Zanu (PF) can’t live in a world without a two-thirds majority to chop and change the Constitution as it used to. Are we to assume, therefore, that those who are being “disappeared” daily are casualties in preparation for the next election?

What Chinamasa enunciated yesterday is tantamount to holding a gun at MDC and telling them to pass Mugabe’s laws or else he will dissolve parliament and ‘win’—as he did during the presidential election—through outright violence and rigging. What the MDC perhaps did not foresee when agreeing to the so-called ‘Global Political Agreement’ is that Mugabe would use his executive powers to dissolve parliament and call elections if he could not get his wish.

It seems to me convenient that the change of tone to call fresh elections coincided with the split of “Zapu” from Zanu (PF). Such a dovish approach turns out to be part of a broader constellation of events that add up to what is behind the abductions: a plot to obliterate the MDC.

So first Elliot Manyika dies and many Zimbabweans conclude that it is a “hit job” by internal enemies within Zanu (PF). And yet he was on his way to Gwanda to reorganize the party. Gwanda, in the same province in which a few days later, Dumiso Dabengwa leads the “revival” of Zapu. But how sure are we that the Elliot Manyika “accident” was not, like Cain Nkala’s abduction and murder, another plot designed to incriminate the MDC as a decoy to justify the clampdown that followed?

Anyway, so Manyika is sacrificed. Just as Nkala had been implicated in the abduction of an MDC official, one Patrick Nabanyama from Nketa, so too was Manyika implicated in the abductions, tortures, and murders of MDC operatives in Bindura. So they are convenient and believable alibis deserving of any “hit jobs” the MDC might plot.

Rest that bloody case. So Manyika dies, and the next day or two Zapu is “revived”. A reader of the Zimbabwe Times who is conscious of history questions the authenticity of the man chosen as Dabengwa’s deputy, Nziramasanga, saying he has some close associations with the state security apparatus. The observation and caution passes quietly as a “comment” on a published article.

Soon after this “revival”, Chinamasa discloses details of an MDC plot to destabilize the army and to invade Zimbabwe from Botswana. This is not anything analysts, readers, and observers were not already seeing in their crystal balls. The power of the internet, camera phones, laptop computers, and digital cameras lies in their ability to get information out quickly and expose such plots while they are being hatched. Some are able to do so using “anonymous inside sources” whose authenticity readers or those implicated can dismiss as not concrete enough.

However, the information itself, as each set of seemingly unconnected events unfolds, enables those who take time in the service of their country to think very deeply about what it may add up to. For several analysts, the answer was clear: There were signs that the illegal regime in Harare was plotting to implicate and destroy the MDC. The “mutiny” in Harare was a virtual giveaway—baton-wielding and even unarmed soldiers, well dressed in their combat gear, throwing stones at shops in downtown Harare, chased around by policemen armed with rifles. I digress.

So now we hear that Joseph Chinotimba, the notorious security guard whom Mugabe used as a hatchetman to orchestrate violence to seize white farms and redistribute them to Zanu (PF) bigwigs and cronies and to bludgeon pro-democracy activists and supporters, was involved in a “freak” accident and is probably now paralyzed. We have just learnt of attempts on the life of Perence Shiri as he left his farm. Exactly: sacrifice some of your best men to make the story authentic. That’s one way to read this: that even within JOC itself, nobody is safe from Mugabe’s bloodthirst. Let’s be less charitable. The guy is said to have been alone in his car. Nobody reliable has actually seen Shiri’s bullet wound, so cut the excitement. The bullet marks on his vehicle can be made: it’s expendable.

So here is a follow-up from the soldiers in the streets. That’s right, rebellious troops targeting first Gono and the forex people and now the commander of the air force. The question is not who-dun-it but who is behind it.

The same day Patrick Chinamasa, the Zanu (PF) person responsible for legal affairs and who calls himself a minister, is busy running with the conspiracy angle while Sikhanyiso Ndlovu is singing the hymn about British biological warfare.

Point? Who is behind the people who spread the cholera? Who is behind the people who tried to kill Shiri? One answer: They will say it is the MDC. That’s what Mugabe did to Joshua Nkomo. Our answer lies in the abductions. If the abductees are killed, there won’t be any evidence. So they will not be killed—yet. They will be tortured and made to admit that they were preparing the factual case for external military intervention, spreading cholera, and training in Botswana and possibly spying. Some will be made to confess that they attempted to kill Shiri. They will then be tried and sent either to jail or to heaven (God bless their innocent souls).

The idea is to soil the reputation of the MDC and Botswana in the region, not only as lackeys of the West and a destabilizing force in SADC. The ultimate aim is to make it appear moral in the eyes of Africa that it is right to destroy the MDC. It’s an appetizing prospect: Each country has its own MDC. The ANC has COPE and the DA, Mozambique Renamo—you get the picture. Several ANC members including in particular Blade Nzimande, have already labeled COPE “the modern face of counter-revolution” which is being paid to destroy the overwhelming majority of the ANC’s support. ANC secretary-general Gwede Mantashe has used similar words.

Mugabe is playing into the ANC’s own uncertainty and its search for alibis going into the 2009 elections. He knows that Pretoria will “persuade” him and will not take the route of sanctions or military intervention, as Mantashe himself declared a few days ago.

Therefore, it is a very realistic agenda to incriminate the MDC—with Botswana as a dangerous force for instability—as a prelude to disqualifying it from running if and when he calls an election. Who will speak for the MDC if the SADC’s Troika on Defense and Politics finds the evidence that Botswana is training insurgents? By Chinamasa’s own admission, the evidence he is relying on to make the charges of MDC training was unearthed by officers who went in disguised as defectors, before turning loose and betraying the plot to Harare. So suppose the “evidence” of the training is found, what is to stop us from saying that just as such spies could come and go to collect evidence, they were also capable of coming in to plant evidence which the troika will find?

Whatever the case, it may not be far-fetched to say that plans are already underway to create a diversionary “opposition” in any future election in which the MDC is banned from contesting because it is a terrorist organization. This is the internal settlement election of 1978 all over again, when Smith banned the “terrorist organizations” Zapu and Zanu from contesting and went ahead with Muzorewa, Sithole, Chirau, and Ndiweni.

This is where the “Zapu revival” must raise suspicion for each and every one of us. It is comforting to say that this development is a sign of Zanu (PF) disintegration. So people sing and dance, oblivious to the fact that the people who are leading it are the very same ones who said nothing and in fact defended the status quo under their bogus “unity accord”. They invaded farms together, orchestrated the burning alive of people like Chiminya. All of a sudden they come round and say, “Mugabe is a violent man”. Yah right.

It’s called being “sold a dummy” in football. The idea seems to be that all Ndebele people will vote for Zapu and then Zanu (PF) sweeps Matabeleland, and then the two parties strike a deal, with the MDC completely out of the equation.

If one is more charitable, one might say that the MDC will be severely weakened but not outlawed. The question then is: Which of the two parties, the MDC or Zanu (PF), will benefit from a Zapu “revival”? You guessed right: Zanu (PF), realizing that the individual MPs in the MDC-Mutambara faction have not cooperated as well as they should with Mutambara himself in swinging to Zanu (PF), has every need for a more usable front. The Mavambo project failed to do that with MDC’s urban electorate, so Zapu might do it with those who “think tribally”.

After all, this is the same thing that happened with Jonathan Moyo in Tsholotsho, is it not?
It’s much more serious than that. The idea is to incriminate the MDC and declare it a criminal or “terrorist” organization and ban it from contesting any election. Like he has done in the past, Mugabe will then sweeten the “shelf company” party as his contestants. Who will then say he competed alone? Zapu would step into the breach and “win” Matabeleland, with Mugabe winning Mashonaland.

The sort of planning that seems to have gone into this survival plot is more sophisticated than the one preceding Gukurahundi. One associate of Jestina Mukoko’s says “she had catalogued thousands of incidents of murder, assault, ?torture, arson, and who the perpetrators are. The work was so meticulous it ?could stand up in any court”. Hopefully the Zimbabwe Peace Project was smart enough to have back-up databases out of the country, where none of those abducted had any passwords.

What Zimbabweans have not realized in the battle against Mugabe is the role of information technology in unhinging a dictatorship. Anybody can be turned into a journalist simply because Zimbabwe has one of the highest numbers of cell phone users in Africa. It means that while journalists are the traditional sources of information, they are not the only sources of information that internet publishers can turn to. Nor do editors necessarily have to initiate the story; their websites are only warehouses to which citizens are depositing their keen observations on the ground.

In the next few days we will begin to see the “compelling evidence” of MDC “bandits” being paraded before ZBC and occupying even the sports sections of The Herald and The Sunday Mail. The venom in Chinamasa’s words is designed to rouse (Southern) Africa into a pan-Africanist defense of Mugabe against Botswana, which has “rendered itself a surrogate ?of Western imperial powers… has decided to be a destabilizing ?factor in the region”.

The plot is designed to re-brand Zanu (PF) as a dove while MDC is the hawk. Again, listen to Chinamasa: “As far as we are concerned as Zanu PF, we have done all we can ?to ensure peace and stability in the country which are prerequisites for ?economic recovery. MDC-T, on the other hand, is bent on foisting war on the ?country and the region. It has become evident that MDC-T is negotiating in ?bad faith and has engaged in dialogue as a ploy to string us along. They lack sincerity.

“We now have evidence that while they were talking peace they have been ?preparing for war and insurgency, as well as soliciting the West to invade ?our country on the pretext of things like cholera.

“We can look our people in the eye and say ‘enough is enough’. Our backs are ?now to the wall and a day may soon come when each and every one of us may be ?called to defend our revolutionary gains and our sovereignty.”

In other words, prepare for a formal declaration of a state of emergency and a draft to defend ‘your country’—code for Zanu (PF).

The World Cup as a Weapon Against Mugabe

All of the ingredients Mugabe has put into his plot have potential to backfire. SA President and SADC chair Kgalema Motlante has said the regional body does not believe that Botswana is plotting. Yet his country blocked the Security Council from taking action on Zimbabwe just yesterday, thereby continuing the policy Mbeki has followed since 2000.

It is crucial to note that begging South Africa to take action is not going to cut it. Pretoria must be forced into taking action. It is incumbent upon all concerned to now make the Zimbabwe issue “Issue # 1” in the forthcoming South African presidential elections, because this is now a domestic issue for all South Africans as well. It is now time to launch a “Get Mugabe Out Or No 2010 World Cup” campaign. SA has already sunk in billions into the tournament, all of which will go to waste if it loses the right to host this cup. There is no bigger issue upon which an entire world is united than soccer, the Fifa World Cup in particular.

It is THE pressure point diplomats and ordinary citizens all over the world who want Mugabe to go will unite on. Imagine at every match in Europe, Africa, US, Canada, Asia, and Australia placards demanding action: “Get Mugabe Out Or No World Cup”. Imagine the public in South Africa demanding: “Get Mugabe Out Or No World Cup”. Everywhere, there is a possibility of what Pele called “The Beautiful Game” saving the people of Zimbabwe from the tyranny executed in the name of liberation. Of course, if South Africa takes the sort of decisive action that South Africa, Zambia, and Kenya are talking about, by all means let us descend on every stadium to cheer Bafana Bafana. But when a soccer ball is what may be required to get the politicians to act, so be it.

This is a program of action which can be easily communicated to the South African public to take up without conflict. The xenophobic violence last year was triggered by accusations that foreigners are “taking away South African jobs”. It may be time to convince the South African public that it is within the power of their government to free up such employment opportunities by defusing the flood of immigrants. Zimbabweans would rather much stay in Zimbabwe and rebuild their own country, but they are not doing so because the SA government is unnecessarily protecting the illegal regime in Zimbabwe.

If the South African government is convinced that it is doing the right thing on Zimbabwe, how about putting the issue of intervention—by sanctions or force—to a referendum so that South African citizens can guide their government on the issue? As it is, Pretoria is simply acting on politicians’ opinions, even defying very glaring evidence of wheels that have come off in Harare. The World Cup is one way of putting the necessary pressure on Pretoria, while also making in clear that there are hefty rewards that lie in doing the right thing. Interactions with SA citizens reveal their disgust at Mugabe’s treatment of his own people, so from whom is Pretoria taking its cue?

The populist message is that the 2010 World Cup is going to relieve grassroots poverty. Yet the big contracts for stadium construction, tourism lodges, advertising and suchlike have already gone to the capitalist fat cats and party-connected Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) sharks. It will hurt their pocket if the cup is withdrawn. It might hurt the poor, but they are getting poorer still even with the cup. At least if the cup is used as a leverage, the Zimbabwean crisis will be solved and South Africans citizens don’t have to compete with the entire able-bodied Zimbabwean population for jobs and health services.

Turning Mugabe’s plotting on its head

It is positive, therefore, that Pretoria has seen what journalists and political analysts had already foreseen: that Mugabe is trying to ‘cook up’ a coup in a teacup to declare a state of emergency. To me, the exposure of this plot by Zimbabwe’s info-savvy public is a sign that citizens are exploiting the loopholes in Mugabe’s ‘go-for-broke’ strategy. Now is the time for Zimbabweans to start exposing those loopholes and exploiting them to turn the tables on the dictatorship.

President Motlante’s words must be seen by all Zimbabweans as an invitation to put forward a case for regional sanctions or the use of force. This is what he said today: “It’s really not for us,” he said when asked whether SA should force Mugabe out. “I mean I don’t know if the British feel qualified to impose that on the people of Zimbabwe but we feel that we should really support and take our cue from what they want.”

One doubts if the horror pictures of cholera, abductions, and his own confirmation of the “plot” as a farrago of nonsense isn’t enough message of a regime emasculating a clear message Zimbabwe have been sending out since March 29 and before.

Still, the question now is what we, as Zimbabweans, should do to communicate to President Motlante that we want him, and other SADC heads, to do. It is a call to intensify the methods we have been using to get the message across not just ourselves, but people within SADC, so that as a regional coalition of peoples tired of one man destabilizing the entire region while lying about land, we can communicate that message. It is a battle that will require the dissemination of information on a massive scale, as well as a more strategic assessment of means of communication.

Anti-Imperialism and Schizophrenic revolutionaries in Zimbabwe

‘We shall be doing this (negotiating) as Zimbabweans, entirely as Zimbabweans, with the help of South Africa. There will be no European hand here.’
—Robert Mugabe, 21 July 2008

The above statement at the signing ceremony of the Thabo Mbeki-birthed Memorandum of Understanding hints at the deep and intense struggles that underlie the Zimbabwe crisis. Robert Mugabe claims that the ghosts of colonialism have come to haunt Zimbabwe and caused unforetold suffering to Zimbabweans through western imposed sanctions, and with the MDC the west is the major culprit for calling for sanctions. This attempt to reinvent the political and economic history of Zimbabwe has been discussed in academic circles; thus, Professor David Moore notes the emergence of Agrarian nationalists or what Terence Ranger terms patriotic history. This illusion has informed many policy and position debates on Zimbabwe at regional and international fora as various interested stakeholders seek to unlock the Zimbabwe logjam. However this elisionistic interpretation of the Zimbabwe crisis has been allowed at the expense of Zimbabweans’ quest for change. Exhausted nationalism and anti-imperialism rhetoric has been used by the geriatric regime to gloss over the horrendous atrocities and human rights abuses it has been committing. The maiming, torture, rape, deprivation, murder and arson committed by ZANU PF becomes sanitized as a revolution brewing in Harare or what Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros terms a radicalized state seeking to undo the vestiges of colonialism. In all this blind sheepish intellectualism Mugabe emerges a hero of Black Africa.

The inaction from African institutions despite the flagrant violations of charters and declarations that they have authored reinforces the notion of a dark continent. The Banjul Charter stressing that:

The Member States of the Organization of African Unity parties to the present Charter shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Chapter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them (Article 1).

Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status (Article 2).

Therefore, given the centuries of slavery and colonialism in Africa, observance of these noble articles ranging from 1-62 is seen as an unnecessary luxury by Most African heads of states. The end justified the means and democracy and human rights had to be sacrificed to defend the revolution. What remains unanswered is which and whose revolution: when was it threatened and by whom? It is in attempting to answer this question that one can appreciate the emasculation of a people’s quest for a decent meal that they end up with anti-imperialism for dinner on the table. Therefore despite all the hardships the general populace is expected to “Rambai Mkashinga [keep on persevering]” — as Jonathan Moyo’s infamous jingle would implore people every 15 minutes on Zimbabwe Broadcasting Television and Radio.[1]

A closer introspection of Zimbabwe’s economic history reveals Mugabe was the blue-eyed boy of the West in Africa. At the height of the 1980s’ madness Mugabe was knighted by the queen and showered with many awards and honorary degrees by universities in the West. Therefore his recent tantrums about imperialism and anti-western diatribes are just grapes that have gone sour. In essence Mugabe has to be grateful to imperialism and the west for having allowed him to ascend to the position where he is now. Heidi Holland, author of the book “Dinner with Mugabe” remarks that:

…whites because they were grateful to be out of range of fire; the British government because it had to stand by its man up north while trying to bring majority rule to apartheid South Africa; the international media because it backed Mugabe to the hilt could not contemplate its flawed judgment (in Mawowa 2007)

Definitely Mugabe’s misadventures with the west are just chickens coming back home to roost. In addition, there has been a tendency to confuse nationalism with anti-imperialism within the third world analysis albeit the two concepts being not synonymous. For example, the ‘Vashandi’ [workers’] [2] movement that attempted to unite the Zimbabwe African Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) into the Zimbabwe Integrated People’s Army (ZIPA). However Mugabe and his cohorts quashed this movement, which points out one of several contradictions that undermine his self-acclaimed anti-imperialist credentials. Kriger observes that the elimination of Vashandi was an ideological coup marking the beginning of a political culture of leftist rhetoric that has characterised post independence Zimbabwe (in Mawowa 2007). Claims from the supra-Africanists and pseudo-communists that Mugabe is a fighter of imperialism cannot be vindicated by the evidence of history. The regime’s leftist rhetoric is meant to appeal to the ordinary and poor since it captures their aspirations. The self-proclaimed super patriots also claim that Africa has been a communist or socialist society. However, Mugabe’s strong taste for an opulent western lifestyle is no secret as seen in his love for fine suits and shopping at Harrods. Heidi Holland records Dennis Norman alluding to Mugabe’s love for bourgeoisie paraphernalia, insisting ministers put on suits (in Mawowa 2007). Furthermore, Mawowa in his review of Holland’s book observes that:

The man in most respects seems to still subscribe to his western learning even now at the height of his populist authoritarian rule that includes attacks in the west. He still retains his knighthood and one needs to see his entourage during the opening of parliament to observe that the man has lost none of his love for the western representations (2007:5).

Mugabe’s life history and action do not at all point to a person who has always detested western values in spite of how he has re-branded himself.

The emergence of the Movement for Democratic Change has led to ZANU PF reviving the liberation war rhetoric and ‘we freed you syndrome’ and led to what Bond (2003) calls exhausted nationalism. By reviving liberation rhetoric, the ZANU PF regime is reminding the people to be grateful that they were freed from colonialism and cannot therefore make demands to the state. However, such a fallacy is a misconstruction of Zimbabwe’s history for the liberation war was never a monopoly of one party. A closer inspection of ZANLA’s strategies will show that even ordinary people played a crucial role in the liberation war, thus realising Mao’s strategy ‘the people are the sea and the freedom fighters are the fish’. Moreover, there were some liberation songs such as ‘Gandanga haridye derere mukoma rinorutsa’ which paint a different picture of the liberation struggle. Loosely translated this chorus means “a freedom fighter does not eat okra or vegetables; he or she will vomit my brother.” Thus the goats, chickens and cows which the ordinary people slaughtered and other food and material support they provided were never paid for.

In the 2000 film ‘Never The Same Again’ Emerson Mnangagwa, when interviewed about the use of the Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA), a relic of colonial piece of legislation, retorted, “I do not like the Law and Order Maintenance Act, but sometimes it is handy”. As the Minister of Home Affairs Mnangagwa had invoked state of emergency powers provided under LOMA that saw the army resorting to heavy handedness such as the use of tankers and armoured vehicles on civilians, during the 1998 food riots in Chitungwiza, Harare, Bulawayo and other cities in Zimbabwe. Interestingly Mnangagwa had been detained and incarcerated under the same law by the Colonial Ian Smith regime during the days of the nationalist struggles and war of liberation. Therefore taking Mnangagwa’s assertion it can be safely concluded that ZANU PF’s claims of being inimical to imperialism is a farce.

In spite of Harare’s puffing of anti-colonial rhetoric Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka commented on the irony of the laws used to implement Murambatsvina, in which:

the Regional, and Town Planning Act, and attendant municipal bylaws emanating from the colonial era meant to keep Africans out of the cities [set] very high housing and development standards beyond the reach of the majority of the people.[3]

Resorting to colonial pieces of legislation that does not account for the people’s historical material conditions raises fundamental questions of the Zimbabwean government’s nationalist and historicist rhetoric. ZANU PF as a ruling party has lacked a coherent ideological underpinning, reducing it to its current condition as a schizophrenic citadel in terms of both members and policies. Towards the preparations for the hosting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in 1991 in Harare, The Herald reported that the Harare City Council through Town Clerk Edward Kanengoni made submissions to Justice Robinson to the effect that the demolition of squatters’ houses was to avoid embarrassing the queen.[4] Interestingly in his judgment Justice Robinson observed:

In any case, perhaps the applicant (the City of Harare) and other who are so anxious to sweep the respondents (the squatters) under the red carpet to be rolled out for her Majesty’s visit to Mbare need to be reminded that the liberation war in Zimbabwe was fought over the issue of land primarily combined with the goal of justice for all. [5]

This obsession with pleasing the queen unmasks the deception that Mugabe has managed to lull the African continent and the developing world with.

In the early 1980s, in a swoop at the destitute and homeless through ‘Operation Chinyavada’, MOTO observes the government’s use of the infamous Vagrancy Act of 1960, a remnant colonial piece of legislation designed to segregate black people from cities and white areas (December/January, 1984: 5). In carrying out the operations, government evoked nationalism, justifying its actions as being in the interest of the country and at the same trying to rehabilitate economic and political saboteurs. In spite of its jaundiced nationalist rhetoric it has never dawned on the ZANU PF-led government that all along they have failed to define the nature, form, content and genesis of the ‘so-called’ saboteurs. It is poverty, stupid! Therefore the anti-colonial and imperialism lectures that Mugabe has been delivering at the United Nations summit are a red herring. The real issues in Zimbabwe are about a liberation movement that has turned into a vampire regime. Interestingly Mugabe has become popular for lashing out World Bank and IMF policies, as undermining the sovereignty of third world governments — yet its Reserve Bank governor, Gideon Gono’s made strenuous efforts in 2005 not to be kicked out of the IMF and World Bank system. Mugabe’s anti-imperialist outbursts are not informed by any revolution as most people in Africa have been made to believe but rather by anger and the history of having tasted the sweets of imperialism. In reviewing the Economic Structural Adjustment Policy, in 1995, the IMF and World Bank gave Zimbabwe the ‘highly satisfactory’ rating. As Patrick Bond noted in 2000 “Indeed, just five years ago, Zimbabwe was Washington’s newest African ‘success story,’ as Harare adopted economic policies promoted by Bank and IMF lenders, and even conducted joint military exercises with the Pentagon.”[6] All these points raise questions about Mugabe’s commitment to the anti-imperialist cause.

Understanding the Zimbabwe crisis needs a careful revisiting of Zimbabwe’s economic history and juxtaposing of ZANU PF’s rhetoric against its actions and policies in government. Evidence at hand undermines the regime’s claims of fighting imperialism. The Zimbabwe case is a good example of a government that seeks to divert attention from its failure by regurgitating anti-imperialist rhetoric. However, the schizophrenic nature of the ZANU PF regime has neared its endgame as its true colours are laid bare with every second that ticks.

Notes

From ACAS Bulletin 80

1. “Rambai Makashinga” is the name of one of Jonathan Moyo’s propaganda jingles meant to drum up support for Robert Mugabe.

2. This was a movement established by the young radicals in ZANU who sought to establish a Marxist/Socialist state in Zimbabwe and it was led by the likes of Wilfred Mhanda, aka Dzinashe Machingura.

3. Report of the Fact Finding Mission to Zimbabwe, to assess the Scope and the Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements issues in Zimbabwe: 56, http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/zimbabwe_rpt.pdf, Accessed on 02 September 2006.

4. The Herald September 1991: 1.

5.The Herald September 13 1991:1

6.Patrick Bond, “Zimbabwe’s Crisis Showcases Reasons for Bank/IMF Protest”, http://www.africaaction.org/docs00/zim0005b.htm

References

Bond P, and Manyanya M, Zimbabwe’s Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism and the Search for Social Justice University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, Merlin Press, Weaver Press and Africa World Press, 2003, 2002

David Moore, ‘Marxism and Marxist Intellectuals in Schizophrenic Zimbabwe: How Many Rights for Zimbabwe’s Left?’ Historical Materialism, Vol 12, Issue 4, 2004, pp 405-425.

Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros, “Radicalised State: Zimbabwe’s Interrupted Revolution”, Review of African Political Economy – Vol. 34 No. 111, March 2007), pp103-121

Showers Mawowa, “The Told Untold Story” 2007, a book review of Heidi Holland’s Dinner with Mugabe.

Terence Ranger, “The rise of patriotic journalism in Zimbabwe and its possible implications”, Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture (University of Westminster, London), Special Issue, November 2005: 8-17. ISSN 1744-6708 (Print); 1744-6716 (Online)

The Glass Fortress: Zimbabwe’s Cyber-Guerrilla Warfare

Contrary to the gun battles we are accustomed to, we now have cyber-warfares fought from one’s comfort zone, be it bedroom, office, swimming pool, etc but with deadly effects.
—Dr. Olivia Muchena, Zanu (PF) Secretary for Science and Technology

e-Ntroduction

By the time Russia ‘e-nvaded’ Georgia and paralyzed its security with cyber-weaponry in August-September 2008, Zimbabwe was in its fifth year of cyber-guerrilla warfare. Using interception gadgets, the Zanu (PF) government of Robert Mugabe jammed radio signal and web traffic that sympathized with the opposition. Online newspapers and internet radios had been using the internet to attack the Mugabe dictatorship for the past four years. Government and anti-Mugabe hackers had been trading long-range artillery fire for three decades.

This is a story of the way internet has brought together print and audio into a diverse bouquet of weapons, giving birth to the cyber-guerrilla. It is a story that must start with Strive Masiyiwa, the man who brought the internet to Zimbabwe. A former engineer with the state-owned Posts and Telecommunications Corporation (PTC), in 1994 Masiyiwa established Econet Wireless (Pvt) Ltd. amid red-faced resistance from the regime. The state refused to grant him a license, but in 1997 the Supreme Court declared the state’s telecommunications monopoly unconstitutional. Only the intervention of Vice President and Zapu supremo Joshua Nkomo prevented Mugabe from further emasculating Masiyiwa’s project.

In July 1998, Econet opened for business. In just three months, it had eclipsed the PTC’s own cellular network, Net One. The licensing of Econet was a direct threat to Zanu (PF) in three ways. First, it enabled customers to bypass wire tapping by the state. Second, it led to the creation of wireless and dial-up internet connectivity. And third, Strive Masiyiwa would become the publisher of the country’s only daily independent, The Daily News, which pricked Zanu (PF)’s corrupt feet to no end.

Snooping

Inevitably, the government started using presidential powers to crack down on internet, mobile and fixed phone users “circulating subversive e-mail inciting the public to oust President Mugabe from office”. In late 2003, fourteen people were arrested for this ‘offense’.

But in March 2004, the Supreme Court declared the presidential powers unconstitutional. The full bench upheld the Law Society of Zimbabwe’s argument that the presidential powers violated section 20 of the Constitution regarding freedom of expression and rendered it redundant. Mugabe could not be above the constitution.

The Supreme Court ruling did not stop the government from drafting new regulations requiring all Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to censor and report all anti-Mugabe communications. Some ISPs like MWeb agreed to comply. But others refused to accept a requirement the Supreme Court had tossed out as unconstitutional.

The state could yet illegally compel ISPs to open locally registered domains (ending with ‘.zw’) that the national internet registry, the Zimbabwe Internet Service Providers Association (ZISPA), administered under Zimbabwean law. However the state could not snoop into non-local domains like ‘.net’, ‘.com’, ‘co.za’, and ‘.co.uk’ whose e-mail servers were located in foreign cities and owned by giants like yahoo, google, or hotmail.

In October 2004, Mugabe used the Tel One and Zimpost industrial strike as an excuse to deploy army and police spooks at the telecommunication and postal companies respectively. Despite the Supreme Court decision, civic groups were worried the government was snooping anyway. In one instance, Movement of Democratic Change President Morgan Tsvangirai conceded shock when Mugabe repeated “almost word for word a conversation he had had with British Prime Minister Tony Blair”.

At the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) in Tunis in November 2005, Mugabe tore into the US monopoly of the internet addressing system. He was much more worried about the role of internet in loosening his grip on power. The monopoly he was condemning internationally, Mugabe was consolidating internally. In February 2006, the Interception of Communications Bill, first introduced in 2000 as an amendment to the PTC Act, was modified and re-tabled to legalize the presidential powers the Supreme Court had already overruled.

The Interception Bill would empower government to establish a monitoring center to peep into phones and e-mails on the pretext of “protecting national security”. A cosmetic provision was inserted allowing citizens to challenge the “monitoring warrants” in court.

Meanwhile, people were already complaining that some ISPs like Telconet, Mango, Mweb and Zimbabwe Online were blocking e-mails with political content. The central bank installed a “mail content manager” to block its employees from receiving any e-mails with words like “Morgan Tsvangirai” or “MDC”. The e-mail bounced back to the sender with the message:

MailMarshal has not delivered the following message: From…. To…. Subject: Morgan Tsvangirai….?This is due to automatic rules that have determined that the intended recipient is not authorized to receive messages that have political content.

The central bank routed mail through the internet hub of the state-owned Tel One.

Meanwhile, the state also jammed the medium wave signal of the US-based Voice of America station Studio 7 and the UK-based SW Radio Africa. The jamming signal was quite strong and located within or near Harare. Sources told reporters that the government had acquired equipment and training from China to jam the stations in 2005.

In August 2006, Transport and Communication Minister Christopher Mushowe justified the Interception Bill as legislation to curb cyber crime. The state painted internet as a dangerous conveyor-belt for money laundering, terrorism, extortion, and hacking. The draft designated the Minister as the first and last point of appeal.

The state called in soldiers, intelligence operatives, and police officers to sing hymns in praise of the bill. Army Colonel Livingstone Chineka criticized the licenses of all three mobile phone providers for compromising state security and the Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (POTRAZ) for using the wrong statute to grant the licenses. The permits had been issued under section 34 of the PTC Act that only had provisions for fixed telephones, not section 31 which required mobile service providers to use the state-owned Tel One as a gateway for international calls. Chineka recommended that Telecel and Econet be given just 30 days to switch to Net One’s gateway. The High Court had already dismissed that argument in November as tantamount to subsidizing Tel One.

In June 2007, Zanu (PF) used its parliamentary majority to pass the bill into law, leaving only the small issue of Mugabe’s signature. A year later Colonel Chineka, a serving member of the army, was chosen Zanu (PF)’s parliamentary candidate in Zaka East.

Even before the ink had dried on Mugabe’s signature on the Interception of Communications Act in August 2007, Chinese-trained internet spooks had deployed at Mazoe Earth Satellite station, the country’s gateway to Intelsat, the world’s largest commercial satellite communications services provider. It seemed the best place to set up the envisaged interception center. But experts doubted the ten spies could track “everyone’s” communication short of summoning the entire state security apparatus. The real intention was to rule with fear—to make the technology work through fear, not materiality—and make an example of one or two people.

The Interception Act compelled ISPs to install the equipment themselves at their own expense. Failure to comply would be “an offence and liable to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years or to both”.

By September 2007 ISPs and mobile phone providers had started installing surveillance equipment to comply with the snooping law. SW Radio reported that DHL’s Harare offices were delisting from e-mail listservs that purveyed political content. ISPs like Econet’s Ecoweb, Tel One’s Com One, and Telecontract’s Telconet were reportedly installing surveillance equipment routing via the state’s interception center at Mazoe. So too were the country’s three mobile phone companies Econet, Telecel, and Net One.

Technological Convergence: internet (and) radio

After being fired for taking phone-calls from an irate public protesting the violent crushing of the 1997 food riots, ZBC freelancer Gerry Jackson set up an independent station named Capital Radio. It was promptly shut down despite securing a broadcasting license. In 2001, Jackson established SW Radio Africa in London with fellow former ZBC journalists. USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) was allegedly funding this ‘peace and democracy’ initiative, but the US embassy in Harare refused to deny or confirm this. The BBC refuted claims by Information Minister Jonathan Moyo that SW Radio was using its studios, transmitters and frequencies.

The US Government could not deny its funding of Studio 7, a VOA radio program broadcasting and streaming to Zimbabweans at home and abroad. The program started airing in 2003, growing rapidly to reach nearly one million radio and internet listeners in 2006. Its staff includes experienced print journalist and novelist Raymond Choto, former popular ZBC Radio 2 disc jockey Brenda Moyo, and Zimbabwe Independent reporter Blessing Zulu. USAID funds Studio 7 under its Zimbabwe Project, while VOA manages and operates the programming.

Because SW Radio and VOA broadcast only for a few hours on shortwave and medium wave, and considering that they can only stream podcasts, some former journalists came up with the idea of internet radio which often combines with news websites. In August 2004, a group of DJs calling themselves Africa Media Association (AMA) started a 24-hour independent internet radio station, streaming from ‘somewhere in London’. Afro-Sounds FM’s mission was to “entertain and inform”, to fill the void the closure of the independent print and electronic media had left in Zimbabwe. The group was composed of former ZBC-TV journalists.

Also in 2004, another internet radio called Zimnetradio began live streaming from ‘studios’ in North America, UK, Egypt and South Africa to audiences in different time zones. Listeners ‘tuned in’ via www.zimdaily.com, clicked the Zimnetradio link, and upon reaching it logged into the chat room and discussion forums to meet ‘cyber-family’. Over time Zimnetradio has become perhaps the most popular live phone-in, music, and news ‘combo’ online.

The internet has enabled exiled musicians critical of Mugabe to become journalists, activists, and disc jockeys. For example, on 18 April 2008 Canadian-based “musical critic” Viomak created Voto (Voices of the Oppressed), a radio station dedicated to protest music, message, and news. The musician says she is following in the footsteps of the Voice of Zimbabwe radio, Zanu (PF)’s popular guerrilla war broadcast courtesy of Radio Maputo, as well as Zapu’s People’s Voice radio from Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Cairo, and Moscow in the 1970s.

The shortwave and internet radios from the diaspora have put the state on both technological defensive and offensive. As suburbanites turned to satellite television signals to outflank the toxic ZBC-TV propaganda, the state mooted “Operation Dzikisai Madhishi” (Take Down Dishes). Meanwhile the rural folk had turned to shortwave radios to receive SW Radio and Studio 7, whereupon state militias moved in demanding owners of these sets to surrender them or be killed. Neither action achieved its ends.

Realizing the futility of physically stopping signals, the state joined in to send its own. In May 2007, it tried to launch a new shortwave radio to “provide factual information about the reality… in Zimbabwe” as a corrective to the SW Radio and Studio 7 “anti-Zimbabwean propaganda”. The plan failed to take off for financial reasons. Mugabe’s regime also struck a deal with a Dubai-based IT firm JumpTV to stream its ZBC-TV mouthpiece live on the internet beginning 22 June 2007. Initially, the station offered the service free to registered users, but began charging a monthly fee of US$9.95 starting 15 July. ZBC radio stations National FM, Power FM, Radio Zimbabwe, and SFM would be added to the project in due course.

e-Newspaper

Strive Masiyiwa went into publishing at just the time world-acclaimed journalist Geoffrey Nyarota had become fed up with teaching journalism at the Nordic SADC Journalism Center in Maputo. In 1997, Nyarota packed his bags for Harare—at just the time that Econet started transmitting its signal. The result was The Daily News two years later and eclipsed the state-owned Herald. After efforts to force the paper to tone down, the state became more aggressive. On 28 January 2001, a bomb ripped The Daily News press into smithereens, days after Moyo had promised to “silence” it. In 2003, the paper was officially banned as Nyarota was hounded out of Zimbabwe.

From 2004 the concept of ‘online newspapers’ began to inspire a number of vibrant projects. New Zimbabwe.com was Zimbabwe’s first news website and discussion forum. The editorial staff steered the newspaper away from its initial pro-opposition outlook to a rather ambiguous middle ground often bordering on an anti-Tsvangirai and pro-Ndebele tone supportive of the MDC-Mutambara faction.

ZimOnline.co.za began publishing the same year with the objective of filling the vacuum the banning of The Daily News had left. It styled itself as a news agency where articles about Zimbabwe could be channeled to other publications for reproduction in different countries.

Also in 2004, a group of Zimbabweans in the US, UK, and Canadian diaspora formed an independent political website, Zimdaily.com, which published daily. The paper styles itself as “a force that President Robert Mugabe… cannot stop”. Zimdaily is best known for Fair Deal, an online project started in April 2007 to flush out children (and spouses) of Zanu (PF) officials and get them deported from western countries. After all, Zanu (PF) ‘hates the West’ and castigates those who leave land redistribution and go West. The project has been a huge success.

In October 2006, Nyarota established the TheZimbabweTimes.com targeting the diaspora and people at home with internet access. The materiality might have changed, but The Daily News principle of “telling it like it is” has remained a major selling point. In time, the ‘paper’ has attracted serious public intellectuals not necessarily aligned to the MDC, but committed to freedom and a more plural society.

Wilf Mbanga was a founding managing editor of The Daily News. With the constriction of a free press he relocated to the United Kingdom. In 2005 he founded The Zimbabwean—an online weekly critical of Mugabe’s regime that aspired to have a print circulation in the UK, South Africa—and Zimbabwe. Starting with an initial print run of 20,000, Mbanga hoped to raise the bar to 120,000 copies. The paper has thrived despite state harassment.

In all their various shades, online newspapers have distinguished themselves as a virtual reconfiguration of what Jürgen Habermas called “the public sphere”.

Hacktivism

Having failed with cyber-infiltration, the state resorted to blocking access to these websites using the filters it had forced ISPs to install. More ominously it has resorted to hacking, but the fight has been anything but one-sided.

In 2005, hackers had burgled into the government website www.gta.gov.zw. A person claiming to be one of the hackers later contacted New Zimbabwe.com from Leicester, England, to tell them about the breach:

The idea was to hack into the website and replace everything there with slogans like ‘Robert Mugabe is a tyrant’…. We were about to achieve our goal when the whole thing crashed…. We will keep trying—the security is clearly lax.

The hacker found it ironic that the regime had coughed up public funds to install cyber-offensive weaponry, yet its databases were virtually defenseless against counter-attack.

Subsequent targets were not so lucky. On Saturday,10 May 2008, a hacker using the user name r4b00f ‘got into’ the state-owned Zanu (PF) website for three days. Only the next Monday did staffers formally admit the intrusion. The hacker had replaced all headlines with the word ‘Gukurahundi—Mugabe’s bloody campaign which left 20,000 supporters of Joshua Nkomo dead.

Five days after the Herald hacking, ‘r4b00f’ attacked the Financial Gazette website using the same tactics, this time posting the words “Mugabe Must Go! Free Zim” and redirecting visitors to the website of the civic action group Sokwanele. IT Business Edge magazine summed up r4b00f’s modus operandi as “just another example of hacktivism”. The Financial Gazette was initially Zimbabwe’s premier independent weekly before it succumbed to what media sources concluded to be a state-intelligence buyout.

Here is the interesting point: the idea of attacking without being seen, to the point where the hacker knew where the government could be found, even as the government could not find the hacker. So the state unleashed its fury on a visible figment of what it perceived as the enemy. On 9 June, malicious software was found on the MDC web site www.mdc.co.zw. A google-search of the words “Movement for Democratic Change” returned a warning that the website was a suspicious site and could harm one’s computer. Search engines usually do this to sites they have analyzed and found to contain viruses installed by third parties to discredit the site. Two Trojans and a scripting exploit had been installed to infect the visitor’s computer and trigger it into running 15 new processes simultaneously, thereby disabling the machine. These viruses and script had only been tagged onto one of the website’s 63 pages and was being hosted on two China-based domains, killpp.cn and nihao112.com. Google certified www.mdc.co.zw as not an intermediary—a site that is used as a warehouse for onward dissemination of viruses online. Therefore, the site had been cyber-hijacked by hackers. It was vulnerable because it was using a local domain name (.co.zw).

TheZimbabweTimes.com was next. On Tuesday 15 July 2008 it came under severe Denial of Service (DOS) attacks. After yet another cyber-attack, the news website took extra measures to fortify its security. The website assured readers it did not think their security or identity had been compromised, and that the hackers’ aim had been merely to disrupt news and information distribution and comments from readers. The paper had taken “the most stringent security measures available… to screen and distinguish between authentic comments and malicious scripts”. Henceforth the editors would deny access to users suspected of malicious intent.

Conclusion: those who live in glass houses

The cyber-guerrilla has proved elusive, communicating via secure e-mail and free platforms like Hushmail, S-Mail.com and KeptPrivate.com. The monitoring equipment has affected public internet cafés that used unsecured e-mail, but the guerrilla has taken cover by clothing the computer with ‘anonymizing software’ to shield his or her identity from snooping. Users have switched to platforms like Yahoo, Hotmail and G-mail since they use remote servers in UK or the US. They have bypassed the filters using proxies capable of hiding their actual IP address. They visit websites that are not blocked, and from there leapfrog into the blocked ones. Or they ‘instant message’ with Skype, MSN or Yahoo Messenger which the state’s filters cannot not read without the user’s password.

With internet, the state now lives in a glass fortress with the tainted side inside, behind a firewall impervious to hackers. The cyber-guerrillas can see the state clearly; the state cannot see them. Those who live in glass fortresses cannot throw stones, not just because they have no armor, but because they cannot find their enemies.

Notes

1. Lance Guma, “Mugabe regime draws up list of blacklisted websites”, SW Radio, 10 August 2007.

2. “Joyce Mujuru Runaida Mugari, AfroAmerica Network Black Woman of the Year 2004”, http://www.afroamerica.net/pages/2/MujuruZimbabwe12242004.html

3. Cris Chinaka, “Now e-mails are banned”, New Zimbabwe.com, 21 November 2003.

4. “Supreme Court bars Mugabe e-mail snooping”, New Zimbabwe, 16 March 2004.

5. “MWeb ‘will obey’ Zim e-mail snooping laws”, Newzimbabwe.com, 2 June 2004

6. Tendai Maphosa, “Some Internet Service Providers Opt Out of Zimbabwe Government Effort to Spy on Citizens”, VOANews, 2 June 2004.

7. Robert Ndlovu, “What Mugabe can and cannot do with your e-mails”, New Zimbabwe.com, 2 June 2004.

8. “Mugabe’s spies monitoring your calls, mail”, New Zimbabwe.com, 13 October 2004.

9. “Mugabe wants US to shed internet control”, New Zimbabwe.com, 16 November 2005.

10. Tererai Karimakwenda, “Government to legalise interception of private communications”, SW Radio, 20 March 2006.

11. Lance Guma, “Government unveils phone and e-mail snooping laws”, SW Radio, 29 May 2006.

12. Lance Guma, “Internet Service Providers block e-mails with political content”, SW Radio, 22 June 2006.

13. Violet Gonda, “Zimbabwe government jams radio stations”, SW Radio, 27 June 2006.

14. Violet Gonda, “Zimbabwe bugging bill heavily criticised at public hearing”, SW Radio,?31 August 2006.

15. Lance Guma, “Army says mobile phone companies compromising state security”, SW Radio, 28 November 2006.

16. Lance Guma, “Army says mobile phone companies compromising state security”, SW Radio, 28 November 2006.

17. Lance Guma, “Opposition poll boycott rattles Zanu PF”, SW Radio, 15 May 2007.

18. Lance Guma, “Too much to monitor for snooping squads”, SW Radio, 7 August 2007.

19. Lance Guma, “Too much to monitor for snooping squads”, SW Radio, 7 August 2007.

20. Lance Guma, “Experts say ‘don’t panic’ as snooping equipment is installed”, SW Radio, 6 September 2007.

21. Chris McGreal, “US Funds Penetrate Zimbabwe Airwaves”, The Guardian, 24 January 2002.

22. http://www.nehandaradio.com/voazimbabwe220807.html

23. http://www.afrosoundsfm.com/test/about_us.htm

24. “Zimbabwe radio station goes live on internet”, New Zimbabwe.Com, 1 October 2004.

25. http://www.zimnetradio.com/

26. Harriet Chigege, “Protest musician launched internet radio on Zimbabwe Independence Day”, www.kubatana.net/html/archive/artcul/080507hc.asp?sector=ARTCUL 7 May 2008.

27. “Is Zimbabwe on the verge of cyber war?” http://www.thezimbabwetimes.com/?p=924, 18 June 2008.

28. “Launch of Zimbabwean radio station “postponed indefinitely”, www.blogs.rnw.nl/medianetwork/?p=8066 Saturday, May 26, 2007

29. Lebo Nkatazo, “ZBC TV goes live on the internet”, New Zimbabwe.com, 17 July 2007.

30. Winston W. Wiley, “A defiant voice: African journalist delivers news from afar”, Telegram & Gazette, Dec 24, 2006; Alvin Powell, “Zimbabwean journalist Nyarota finds sanctuary at Harvard: Years of uncovering corruption brought threats, arrest”, Harvard Gazette, 17 April 2003
http://www.hno.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/04.17/03-nyarota.html

31. http://www.zimonline.co.za/AboutUs.aspx

32. Gift Phiri, “Independent news websites mushroom”, The Zimbabwe Independent, http://www.theindependent.co.zw/news/2004/October/Friday29/911.html, October 29, 2004.

33. “Online highlights – The fair deal campaign”, Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ), Extracted from Weekly Media Update 2007-33: Monday August 20th 2007 – Sunday August 26th 2007. www.kubatana.net

34. “Australia finally deports Zanu-PF officials Children”, http://dniinoi.wordpress.com/2007/09/07/, September 7, 2007; Tamuka Ngwenya, “FAIR DEAL: The Re-Launch”, Zimdaily, 15 July 2008.

35. Wilf Mbanga, “Newspaper Truck Set on Fire”, The Zimbabwean, 26 May 2008.

36. Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a category of Bourgeois Society. Trans. Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).

37. Lance Guma, “Mugabe regime draws up list of blacklisted websites”, SW Radio, 10 August 2007.

38. “Hackers break into Zimbabwe government website”, New Zimbabwe.Com, 2 February 2005.

39. “Hackers Take Down Zimbabwe’s Herald”, Technology News, 13 May 2008.

40. “Hackers Target the Financial Gazette Website”, The Zimbabwe Guardian (London), 15 May 2008.

41. “Is Zimbabwe on the verge of cyber war?” http://www.thezimbabwetimes.com/?p=924, 18 June 2008.

42. “The Zimbabwe Times under attack”, http://www.thezimbabwetimes.com/?p=1637, 16 July 2008.

43. Lance Guma, “Mugabe snooping law exposes increased repression”, SW Radio, 6 August 2007.

44. Lance Guma, “Experts says ‘don’t panic’ as snooping equipment is installed”, SW Radio, 6 September 2007.

45. Lance Guma, “Mugabe regime draws up list of blacklisted websites”, SW Radio, 10 August 2007.