Biden – Association of Concerned Africa Scholars

Biden Responds to the Collapse of US Counterterrorism Strategy in Niger

By Daniel Volman*

*Daniel Volman is the Director of the African Security Research Project in Washington, DC (www.africansecurity.org), and a specialist on US security policy toward Africa and African security issues.

For two months after the coup in Niger on 26 July 2023, the Biden administration refrained from calling or chose not to call it a “coup” because that would have triggered American legislation that would have required it to suspend security cooperation and most other forms of assistance to the junta. It hoped that by maintaining relations with the junta, it could make a deal with them to permit 1,100 US troops to remain at two Nigerien military bases (at Niamey and the drone operation facility constructed by the United States at a cost of some $110 million at Agadez).

On 10 October 2023, after two months of frustration, the Biden administration declared that there had been a coup and the legislation took effect. To date, the junta has not taken any action regarding the presence of US troops. Some US personnel have been withdrawn from Niger and the remaining troops have been consolidated in Agadez. They continue to conduct drone surveillance and reconnaissance flights, but only to monitor threats to their own security, which means they are no longer conduction useful counterterrorism operations in the Sahel.

However, the Biden administration has not given up on its strategy of relying on military force to create security, build democratic institutions, and establish political stability in the Sahel and other parts of Africa. Instead, it has decided to doubled down on this strategy by escalating or expanding US military operations in Africa and strengthening US security relationships or cooperation with political leaders and military officers in Nigeria (current chair of ECOWAS), Ghana, Senegal, Chad, and other key African partners or proxies. And it keeps trying to reach an agreement with the junta that will allow it to keep American troops based in the country and to resume military cooperation with Niger.

At the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on “Instability in the Sahel and West Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy,” on 24 October 2023, Phee declared that there’s also a significant risk that violent extremist organizations might expand their influence or capabilities in the region. “The coups that have occurred recently in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and now Niger,” she said, “illustrate the democratic regression that threatens not only the people of the Sahel but their neighbors and our partners in coastal west Africa.”

In the case of Niger, Phee testified, “we are working with the regional organization ECOWAS. The African Union and Africa’s regional economic commissions are essential partners in advancing democracy and peace. That is why – although we promptly paused the majority of U.S. assistance for Niger after the coup – we delayed at the request of our African partners the formal assessment that the outcome constituted a coup while they sought to restore President Bazoum to office. Acting Deputy Toria Nuland traveled to Niamey in August to try and convince the generals to restore constitutional order. I later traveled to west Africa to consult on how to engage a quick and credible restoration of democratic rule. Secretary Blinken met with ECOWAS Foreign Ministers at the recent UN General Assembly to propose a phased approach to resuming U.S. assistance based on concrete actions to return the country to democratic rule.”

On 3 December 2023, Kathleen FitzGibbon, the newly-appointed US Ambassador handed her credentials to the foreign ministry in Niamey, Niger. Ms. FitzGibbon formerly served as Division Chief, West and Southern Africa, and then as Director of the Office of Africa Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, at the State Department in Washington, DC.

On 4 December 2023, the US Special Operations Command Africa began a weeklong conference on counterterrorism in Africa, called “Silent Warrior ’23” and held in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The conference involved military officers from more than twenty African countries and over a dozen other nations with interests on the continent. According to a story on the conference in Stars and Stripes, “at the top of the agenda were deep dives into the major extremist threats in Africa: al-Shabab in Somalia, affiliates of ISIS and al-Qaida in the Sahel, and ISIS in Mozambique.” In his opening statement to the conference, General Michael Langley, commander of Africom, didn’t directly address the situation in Niger, according to the story; but he alluded to it when he stressed the need for militaries to respect civilian authority. “Good governance is a key to countering violent extremist organizations,” General Langley said. “Yes, we’ve had some challenges across the continent . . . We know that civilian government, they’re the boss. We [the military] execute the missions.”

On 5 December 2023, Celeste Wallander, the US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, testified before the Africa subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee at a hearing on “The Sahel in Crisis: Examining U.S. Policy Options.” According to Ms. Wallander, “In the short and medium term, we will support African-led counterterrorism operations to disrupt the most acute threats, with a particular emphasis on those targeting U.S. interests. In the long term, we will emphasize bilateral security assistance to African defense and security forces in order to build their own homegrown capacity to counter these threats without extensive external assistance.”

She noted that military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have resulted in restrictions on military cooperation, led to increased attacks by jihadists, and opened the way for greater Russian influence and military involvement. “Violent extremist organizations thrive in areas of instability and seek to leverage that instability for their own ends, as evidenced by the attacks we’ve seen in Niger since the coup,” she said.

“Given this elevated threat environment, the Department of Defense is committed to working with our interagency partners to continue to monitor and disrupt the violent extremist organization threats, while constructively engaging with regional states to restore productive, democratic governance in those countries,” Wallander said. “In doing so, we are consistently working to strike a balance between offering the practical assistance that our African partners need to face emerging threats, while reinforcing our professional values to help them build strong, resilient institutions that will reinforce not only their physical security, but their democratic stability.”

The Pentagon’s requirement “to monitor indications and warnings of violent extremist organization activity in the Sahel has not changed,” she insisted. “For the last ten years, our posture in Niger has proven critical to this effort. Moving forward, we have worked side by side with the Department of State and other interagency partners to define conditions for restoring our activities and operations in Niger. Nigerian officials must quickly and credibly transition back to democratically elected, civilian led government.”

Testifying at the same hearing, Molly Phee noted the threat that violent extremist violence posed to the countries of coastal west Africa, “including Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo.”

On 6 December 2023, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, met with Nigerian Minister of Defense Mohammed Badaru Abubakar and Ghanaian Minister of Foreign Affairs Shirley Ayorkor Botchwey in New York City, New York to discuss UN peacekeeping operations in Mali and Sudan, and the coup in Niger. On 7 December 2023, she gave an interview to Thomas Naadi of BBC News in Accra, Ghana. When he asked her if the US was “now recognizing the military junta in Niger as the legitimate authority?” she said “Look, what we’re trying to do is get to a solution that will shorten the transition back to civilian government. So, we’re engaging with this military [in Niger] to put pressure on them and to urge that they return to a civilian government. We’re also working closely with our regional partners. We’re working with ECOWAS.” And, she went on to announce “we’re working to find new ways of providing support, new ways of providing training and equipment to governments on this continent, and particularly in this region.”

On that same day, 7 December 2023, US President Joe Biden issued a Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and President pro tempore of the Senate regarding the War Powers Report, to inform them about deployments of US military forces equipped for combat, including operations in Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti, in the East Africa Region, and in Niger and other countries in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel Region. The administration, Biden stated, “continues to work with partners around the globe, with a particular focus on the United States Central and Africa Commands’ areas of responsibility. In this context, the United States has deployed forces to conduct counterterrorism operations and to advise, assist, and accompany security forces of select foreign partners on counterterrorism operations.”

In the East Africa Region, he reported, “United States Armed Forces continue to counter the terrorist threat posed by ISIS and al-Shabaab, an associated force of al-Qa’ida. Since the last periodic report, United States Armed Forces have conducted a number of airstrikes in Somalia against al-Shabaab in defense of our Somali partner forces. United States Armed Forces remain prepared to conduct airstrikes in Somalia against ISIS and al-Shabaab terrorists. United States military personnel conduct periodic engagements in Somalia to train, advise, and assist regional forces, including Somali and African Union Transition Mission in Somalia forces, in connection with counterterrorism operations. United States military personnel are deployed to Kenya to support counterterrorism operations in East Africa. United States military personnel continue to partner with the Government of Djibouti, which has permitted use of Djiboutian territory for basing of United States Armed Forces. United States military personnel remain deployed to Djibouti, including for purposes of staging for counterterrorism and counter-piracy operations in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, and to provide contingency support for embassy security augmentation in East Africa, as necessary.”

And in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel Region, he reported, “United States military personnel in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel Region continue to conduct airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations and to provide support to African and European partners conducting counterterrorism operations in the region, including by advising, assisting, and accompanying these partner forces. Approximately 648 United States military personnel remain deployed to Niger.”

In fact, according to Africom, force levels are holding steady at about 1,000 American military personnel in Niger. This includes both uniformed service members and military-affiliated civilians.

On 8 December 2023, Molly Phee, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, traveled to Nigeria to meet with regional leaders at the ECOWAS Heads of State Summit on 10 December 2023 and to consult with them on Niger and the Sahel. Then, on 12 December 2023, Ms. Phee traveled to Niger for discussions with Nigerien officials, including Prime Minister Ali Mahaman Lamine Zeine. And, on 13 December 2023, she announced that the US was ready to resume security cooperation with the junta if it met certain conditions.

Ms. Phee said she had met with the top ministers in Niger’s ruling military council—the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP)—and encouraged them to announce a timeline for a swift transition back to civilian rule. The junta must announce “a deadline for a rapid and credible transition” leading to “a democratically elected government,” she told a press conference in Niamey. And “we have confirmed that we are ready to resume our cooperation if the CNSP takes the steps I have outlined.” “I encourage the CNSP to respond positively to the ECOWAS offer for negotiation; the United States supports the resolutions of the regional organization.” ECOWAS offered to ease sanctions if the junta agrees to a notably “short transition.”

“In our discussions,” she told a press conference in Niamey, “I confirmed the intent of the United States to resume security and development cooperation in phases, reciprocally as the CNSP takes action.” She went on to say that “I have made it clear to the CNSP that we want to be a good partner again, but the CNSP has to be a good partner to the United States.” And she said she urged the junta to respond positively to an offer for high-level negotiations with ECOWAS, which announced on 10 December 2023 that it would ease sanctions on Niger if talks with the military leaders went well.

Following his meeting with Ms. Phee, Prime Minister Mahaman Lamine Zeine said on 13 December 2023 that “If the Americans want to say here with their forces, they should tell us what they want to do.”

When the United States declared that a coup had taken place in Niger, it seemed almost certain that the junta would expel US troops, just as they had expelled French troops earlier. It is now clear, however, that the junta is interested in negotiating a deal with the Biden administration. It remains to be seen what conditions Washington will insist on and what concessions it will make to the Nigerien junta in order to start conducting counterterrorism operations in Niger again.

On 4 January 2024, however, the Wall Street Journal revealed that Washington is now “seeking to base military drones along the West African coast” and “is holding preliminary talks to allow American unarmed reconnaissance drones to use airfields in Ghana, Ivory Coast and Benin.” According to the report, retired US Air Force Major General Mark Hicks, a former commander of US Special Operations forces in Africa said that “the Niger coup has forced our hand,” and “there’s really not much option other than to fall back and operate out of the coastal West African states.”

Moreover, said a senior US military official, “coastal West African countries that used to be insulated no longer are” and, according to the report, “suggest Washington believes Mali and Burkina Faso are so inundated with Islamist militants that they are beyond the reach of Western help, and that it fears Niger, which until a July coup was the staunchest American ally in the region, is now unreliable.” So, according to US and African military officers, the US has proposed basing drones at the Ghanaian Air Force base at Tamale, the airfield at Parakou in Benin, and three airfields in Cote d’Ivoire.

Dec 17, 2023

by Daniel Volman

in ACAS Review (Bulletin)

Bulletin of the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars No. 90 (December 2023) Don’t Allow a Disastrous Collapse in Sudan

Don’t Allow a Disastrous Collapse in Sudan

By Alex de Waal, the executive director of the World Peace Foundation.

Biden’s benign neglect brought the RSF to the brink of victory. Now, Washington has a chance to save Sudan.

14 December 2023

The diplomatic needle has moved on Sudan at last. There’s an opening to halt the carnage, end the famine, and save the state from collapse. An intricate diplomatic dance is underway involving African and Arab leaders as well as the United States.

Almost eight months after fighting erupted in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, followed by mass atrocities in that city and in the western region of Darfur, a serious peace initiative was finally set in motion this past weekend. A summit meeting of African leaders, held in Djibouti at the initiative of Kenyan President William Ruto, agreed on an overall formula for a cease-fire and political talks.

The two rival generals—Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemeti,” commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—both agreed. The United States and Saudi Arabia, which had suspended their long-running, unproductive talks with the warring parties a week earlier, attended the summit and backed its outcome.

The Djibouti summit comes on the heels of upgraded political attention to Sudan in Washington. On Dec. 4, the U.S. Treasury Department announced sanctions on two members of the former regime of Omar al-Bashir for their role in facilitating external support for the SAF and its Islamist backers, along with a third who is doing the same for the RSF. On Dec. 6, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken issued an atrocity determination—formally finding that the RSF is responsible for crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. He spoke of “haunting echoes of the genocide that began almost 20 years ago in Darfur.” Blinken also said that the SAF is committing war crimes.

Anyone who doubts the genocidal implications of the RSF’s military conquests need only watch the militia’s own videos of its atrocities against civilians in western Darfur. A handful have been broadcast by CNN’s Nima Elbagir and her team. Others that could never be broadcast show slaughter in graphic detail. No less horrifying than the acts themselves are insults hurled by the killers and rapists—typically “slave” or “dog”—and the whoops of celebration by onlookers. The RSF is the true heir to the notorious Darfurian Arab militia known as the janjaweed that perpetrated a genocide in that region two decades ago.

If the RSF continues its advances—and it has been fighting where it likes and usually winning in recent months—there is no doubt that mass slaughter and enslavement will follow. Ethnic cleansing may not be the RSF leaders’ main agenda—they’re after power and money above all—but they’re indelibly colored by a toxic Arab supremacist ideology.

TO UNDERSTAND THE RSF, it’s necessary to go further back than the janjaweed militias that terrorized the non-Arab communities of Darfur two decades ago. Most of those militiamen were Arabic-speaking nomads whose ancestors migrated to Darfur 300 years or so ago. Before European colonization, they were the lords of the desert, rich from trade and camel herding, regarding the darker-skinned farming peoples of the savannahs as their social inferiors, even their slaves.

New colonial boundaries and the railroad destroyed their lucrative trans-Saharan caravans. In modern times, they were among Sudan’s most deprived communities, with little education and few chances to improve their lot. Over the decades, desert-edge camel nomadism declined, as pastures dried out and migration routes to the wetter savannahs were blocked by farmers. Other janjaweed hailed from neighboring Chad and some even farther afield. Some among them nurtured dreams of turning fertile lands, such as Darfur, into their own domains.

A group known as the Arab Gathering, which met in the desert camps of Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi’s Libya in the 1980s, issued a manifesto called Quraysh charting how they would do just that. When the Darfur war erupted in 2003, they allied with Bashir to turn their Arab supremacist agenda into reality.

For the desert peoples, the RSF is an employment bureau, a protection racket, and a commercial conglomerate. It draws recruits from as far away as Niger and pays them handsomely to fight in Sudan, Libya, or Yemen. There’s money to be made protecting gold mines in Darfur and oil fields in Libya, trafficking migrants to the Mediterranean, plundering the Central African Republic in partnership with the Wagner Group, and reselling household goods and cars stolen from Khartoum to buyers in West Africa—the entrepôts are known as Dagalo markets.

The RSF’s partnership with the Wagner Group dates back to the last days of the Bashir regime, when Hemeti had just taken over Sudan’s biggest gold mines, including Jebel Amer in Darfur. Russia was interested in gold and in working alongside RSF fighters as a force multiplier. The late Wagner leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, likely recognized Hemeti as a kindred spirit—a political entrepreneur who had demonstrated the efficacy of transnational mafia-style politics in Africa. Hemeti was in Moscow to discuss signing agreements (details not made public) the day that Russia invaded Ukraine.

Until this week, Hemeti, and his brother, Abdelrahim, had led the RSF to the brink of controlling the region of Darfur and most of next-door Kordofan—with arms supplied by Russia and the United Arab Emirates. They occupy most of Khartoum. Diplomats speak of a “Libya scenario” in which Sudan is divided with the RSF controlling the capital and the regions west of the Nile, while the east falls under the SAF and the Islamists. This would be calamitous—but there’s no reason to think that the ambitions of the Dagalo brothers will stop there.

Cash is no less important than weaponry in the RSF’s progress. The Dagalo family business, al-Junaid, has a steady stream of cash from gold and other endeavors. Though the military-commercial complex around the SAF and its Islamist backers is bigger, the RSF and al-Junaid have more cash on hand. According to my sources in Sudan, they have bribed SAF officers, some of whom switch sides rather than fight. They have also bought the allegiance of tribal leaders.

The RSF is a transnational mercenary business; its paramilitaries are a looting machine. Every city it has overrun—El Geneina, Zalingei, Nyala—follows a similar pattern. RSF fighters and auxiliary militiamen go on the rampage, killing hundreds of people, raping women, and burning and pillaging houses. They ransack shops and businesses, vandalize and loot hospitals and schools. Residents who can escape as refugees do so; others are forced to become sex slaves or slave laborers.

For a time, former Darfur rebels who joined the government in 2020 remained neutral in the conflict, despite RSF atrocities against their non-Arab communities. Non-involvement became more difficult as the RSF closed on al-Fashir, the one remaining Darfuri city it has not yet overrun, and prominent former rebels declared against the RSF. A battle for al-Fashir would likely become a bloodbath for civilians.

Notwithstanding the reassuring messages put out by the RSF’s public relations consultants and boilerplate appeals for calm, Hemeti’s commanders run a pillage state. Paramilitary colonels double up as administrators, skilled only in running protection rackets. Sudanese call it the Republic of Kadamol, referring to the desert nomads’ trademark wraparound headscarf.

The cabal backing Burhan is no less venal and brutal. Its airstrikes have targeted key infrastructure such as Khartoum’s bridges, even if the SAF denies it. Some are determined that, if they cannot rule the state, it should be in ruins. In what looks like an effort to sabotage the peace process, the Foreign Ministry—controlled by Bashir loyalists—is trying to disavow Burhan’s concessions in Djibouti. There are members of the Islamic movement who want a negotiated settlement and a civilian government, but they have yet to find a platform.

Washington worries that if the RSF prevails, Russia’s Wagner Group will be in five countries stretching from Burkina Faso and Mali in West Africa to the Red Sea, and from Libya’s Mediterranean shores to the Congo basin.

NINETEEN YEARS AGO, when U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that the janjaweed were responsible for genocide, the U.S. government could set the international agenda for Sudan. That’s no longer the case. While the George W. Bush administration could successfully push for U.N. peacekeepers in Darfur, any similar proposal would face a near-certain veto by China and Russia at the U.N. Security Council.

Last month, Burhan—who still represents Sudan at the U.N.—ordered the closure of the U.N. Integrated Transitional Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), and the Security Council duly complied. No less importantly, Middle Eastern nations—including several of America’s key allies in the region—today pursue their own interests, sometimes in contradiction to U.S. policies.

Most influential is the United Arab Emirates, which has become the most active external player in the Horn of Africa over the last five years. Although Abu Dhabi denies it, evidence points to the UAE arming the RSF using a base in Chad that masquerades as a hospital for local people.

Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby, the last remaining Western ally in the region, is in grave danger. He has leaned toward Hemeti, reflecting the power of money—including a $1.5 billion loan from the UAE—and the allegiances of one part of his family. But Déby is a member of the Zaghawa ethnic group, whose leaders in Darfur are opposed to the RSF. The Chadian army is dominated by Zaghawas. Déby has neither good options nor a record of navigating such choppy waters.

UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan, known as MBZ, has used cash and arms supplies to win over Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed as well as Déby. This patronage neutralizes the African Union, whose oft-stated and increasingly rarely enforced principles include promoting democracy and preventing atrocities. The chairperson of the AU Commission is former Chadian Foreign Minister Moussa Faki, who is back on good terms with Déby after a fallout last year and will do nothing that might upset his host country, Ethiopia. MBZ is positioning himself as the kingmaker across a wide swath of Africa.

As a key U.S. ally, the Emirati leader enjoys a lot of freedom of action in his own neighborhood, including the Horn of Africa. The UAE, Russia, and Sudan are all entagled in the gold business. The RSF began dealing with the Wagner Group in the last days of the Bashir regime, after Hemeti seized control of Sudan’s biggest gold mines, which are located at Jebel Amer in Darfur. Russia arms the RSF through bases in the Central African Republic.

Criticisms of the UAE have long been muted in Washington, but this is changing. At congressional hearings last week on the Sahel and Sudan, U.S. Reps. John James and Sara Jacobs both raised concerns over the UAE. James asked, “Is UAE friend or foe in ending this conflict diplomatically?” U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Molly Phee responded, “I think the publicity of this hearing and your statement and request to the UAE to consider the detrimental impact of their support to the RSF would be very helpful.” She also said that the Emirati role in Sudan had been raised by Vice President Kamala Harris on her visit to COP28.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi backs Burhan but is worried by the SAF’s military failings and the resurgence of Sudan’s Islamists as the powerbrokers behind it, as well as the SAF’s attempts to get weapons from Iran. Egypt’s reliance on Emirati financial bailouts also constrains Sisi’s options.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu established a rapport with Burhan, who brought Sudan into the Abraham Accords but the Israeli leader shares the same worry about Iran. Sudan’s Red Sea coast looks more strategically important than ever as Yemen’s Houthis threaten any ships deemed to be interacting with Israel in the narrow waterway.

Saudi Arabia could, in theory, be the moderating influence. It shows signs of alarm over Emirati policies but hasn’t yet reined in its assertive neighbor. The Saudis also look kindly on the RSF, having employed its mercenaries to fight in Yemen.

IT’S CLEAR THAT THERE CAN’T BE PEACE IN SUDAN without the consent of Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, and Cairo, and for that reason the U.S. needs a special envoy with enough stature to sway the leaders of those states. Responding to Republican demands on a special envoy in last week’s congressional hearing, Phee said that this was “under active and serious consideration.”

The big question is whether any of this will be sufficient to sway the Sudanese parties. Up until now, Hemeti has seen no reason to compromise because he has been winning.

Burhan has not been able to offer concessions because his coalition is fractious. Veteran securocrats from Bashir’s regime are determined to even the military score before negotiating. Some generals have told me they hope that the unlikely combination of Iranian drones and Egyptian intervention might yet save the day.

The U.S. government doesn’t have easy options and is relearning that there’s no such thing as benign neglect in Africa policy. Shortchanging Sudan was shortsighted. At least the administration now recognizes that it needs to step up its engagement.

Alex de Waal is the executive director of the World Peace Foundation. His book, New Pandemics, Old Politics: Two Hundred Years of War on Disease and Its Alternatives is published by Polity this month.