Reader’s Guide: Crude Democracy

Reader’s Guide: ‘Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes‘ by Thad Dunning (Cambridge University Press, 2009)

I apologize for recommending this book to you since it isn’t really on our topic of the impact of oil on American foreign policy (this is, of course, what comes of recommending books that you haven’t read). Nonetheless, since it is an important book I thought I would prepare a fairly short summary of the major points and allow those of you who want to dig deeper to do so on your own.

The central argument of the book is that resource revenues (including but not limited to oil) can support as well as undermine democracy. This, of course, runs directly contrary to the current accepted wisdom of the resource curse, that countries with substantial resources can generate sufficient rents to function as states, often including substantial payoffs to well-connected individuals, without having to get their populations to agree to pay taxes to support them; such efforts would presumably have involved some sort of accountability to the population, leading to democracy.

The central metaphor of the book is a game-theoretic model of elites and masses in a democracy, where elites have to decide whether the benefits of a successful coup are more than the costs and risks involved; the question is how those payoffs change if the state generates significant resource rents. He argues that such rents, on the one hand, generate direct pressures supporting the coup (increased wealth of the state makes it a more attractive target, and masses cannot plausibly commit themselves not to increase future taxes on the elites), and on the other hand generate indirect pressures against coups (the rents make it easier for the government to give benefits for the masses without raising taxes on elites and less likely that masses will feel impelled to tax the elites in the future). He contends, not that this balance always tips one way or the other, but that it varies systematically, depending on certain conditional factors. In particular he theorizes that the democratic effects will be stronger in states which are less economically dependent on the resource (reducing the value of capturing the state and allowing the elites to derive income from other sources) and those which have high inequality (sic) in the non-resource economy (since resource rents can reduce the costs of redistribution for the elites). He then suggests that these conditions are more likely to be found in certain Latin American countries than those of Africa, for example.

The remainder of the book is devoted to testing these notions. Chapter two expands the theoretical argument. Chapter three develops two game-theoretic models from the theory. The first centers on when elites in a democratic state with resource rents will find the risks of staging a coup attractive while the second considers how elites in an authoritarian state with resource rents are likely to respond to the threat of revolutionary change. Chapter four uses cross-national time-series statistics to test the theories. Dunning finds that inequality does indeed predict democracy both globally and within Latin America (“the most unequal region in the world”). He also shows that different operationalizations of the key concepts and adding various control variables do not have much impact on the relationship.

Chapters five and six are devoted to studies of cases where the theory predicts the democratic effects will be strong: Venezuela, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Botswana. Here Dunning looks, not at the outcome (which he already knows), but for the mechanisms which have been predicted in the theory. For example, the theory predicts that domestic conflict over redistribution should increase as rents decline and decrease as rents increase.
Dunning argues that in Venezuela the rents from oil reduced the incentives for the elites to oppose democracy, not because they gained directly from the oil, but because those rents nearly eliminated any pressure for redistribution of wealth from the elites; the drop in oil prices in the 1980s, however, put the democratic government under increasing pressure. He also argues that the increase in oil prices explains why there has been so little opposition to Chavez’ regime, which he contends has not in fact done much in the way of actual redistribution since the social programs have been funded by oil.

In the case of Chile, Dunning argues that the decline in prices for nitrates in the late 1920s explains the upsurge of internal conflict there. The 1973 coup is a challenge to the theory since copper prices were fairly high; he makes an interesting counterfactual argument that without resource rents the conflict would actually have been more intense. In Bolivia the effects are not felt until the form of ownership changes: because the tin mines were originally owned by a small elite, the revenues did not flow as rent to the state but instead to these individuals. Thus the elites were fiercely opposed to any redistribution of wealth. He argues that after Bolivia nationalized the mines in 1952, rents from tin and later oil helped stabilize democracy there. However, the regional nature of Bolivia has increasingly made oil resources a basis for internal conflict.

In Ecuador Dunning argues that the 1972 coup, which occurred just as oil production was increasing rapidly, was carried out in order to avoid redistribution; however, he contends that Ecuador redemocratized later in the decade, using oil rents for social programs. He also notes the problems of basing democracy on oil, citing the price drops in 1986 with subsequent cutbacks in social programs and considerable unrest until prices rose again a few years later. Botswana is an African case where the resource is diamonds. Dunning notes that the interest in cattle ranching, the main alternative industry, is highly concentrated in the hands of elite members and that they have used income from the diamond mines to support social programs.

Dunning concludes this analysis by arguing that there are crude democracies just as there are crude autocracies, that the differences between them are systematic rather than random, and that therefore we should be able to make reasonable predictions about the kind of political systems most likely to emerge in particular areas. He also discusses a number of cases which present challenges to his theory, including the Soviet Union and Indonesia, and perhaps Iraq. This is, I think, one of the most important challenges to the easy generalizations of the “resource curse” literature that I have yet seen.

Prepared by Roy Licklider for Geopolitics of Petroleum Faculty Cluster, Rutgers University, spring 2009

From The Geopolitics of Petroleum ACAS Blog Series

Bush administration Security Assistance Programs for Africa

For Fiscal Year 2009 (which begins on 1 October 2008), the Bush administration is asking Congress to approve the delivery of some $500 million worth of military equipment and training to Africa (including both sub-Saharan Africa and north Africa) in the budget request for the State Department for Fiscal Year (FY) 2009. The administration is also asking for up to $400 million for deliveries of equipment and training for Africa funded through the Defense Department budget and another $400 million to establish the headquarters for the Pentagon’s new Africa Command (Africom).

The State Department budget request includes funding for major new arms deliveries and increased military training to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Botswana, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, and Uganda. It will be channeled through a variety of programs, including a number of new programs initiated by the Bush administration as part of the “Global War on Terrorism.” These include the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership, the East African Regional Security Initiative, and the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program. The U.S. government is also expected to license up to $100 million worth of private commercial sales of military and police equipment through the State Department’s Direct Commercial Sales program in FY 2009.

The following description is based on information contained in the State Department Budget Justification for Foreign Operations for FY 2009 (released by the State Department in March 2008) and the Defense Department Summary Justification for the Budget Request for FY 2009 (released in February 2008).

STATE DEPARTMENT PROGRAMS

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement

The budget includes funding for the continued expansion of the U.S. civilian police contribution to UNMIL in Liberia, which rose from $1 million in FY 2007 to an estimated $4.096 million in FY 2008, and the administration is requesting $4.130 for FY 2009. The budget also includes funding for the continued expansion of law enforcement programs conducted by the U.S. as part of the implementation of the Sudan peace accords; these rose from $9.8 million in FY 2007 to an estimated $13.578 million in FY 2008, and the administration is requesting $24 million requested for FY 2009. And the budget contains funds to continue new program for law enforcement assistance to the Democratic Republic of Congo; these were initiated with an initial appropriation of an estimated $1.488 million in FY 2008 and the administration is requesting $1.7 million for FY 2009.

Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs

The budget includes funding for the continued expansion of U.S. Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) programs in Africa, particularly by expanding the Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) program in sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa and increasing funding for the East Africa Regional Strategy Initiative (EARSI) in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. For all programs throughout the world, ATA received $185.1 million in FY 2007 and an estimated $153.8 million in FY 2008; the administration is requesting $160 million FY 2009. It is difficult to know what proportion of this funding will be used in Africa, but it is reasonable to assume that approximately $40-50 million will be spent on African programs.

Foreign Military Financing

One of the most significant FMF programs in Africa is providing funding for increased arms sales to the Democratic Republic of the Congo; funding rose from nothing in FY 2007 to $397,000 in FY 2008, and the administration is requesting $600,000 in FY 2009. The budget contains money for major increases in FMF funding for Ethiopia; after receiving $1.9 million in FY 2007, funding for Ethiopia was reduced to $843,000 in FY 2008, but the administration is requesting $4 million in FY 2009. It continues funding for Djibouti—which fell from $3.8 million in FY 2007 to $2 million in FY 2008, but which the administration wants to increase back to $2.8 million in FY 2009. It also includes funding to continue programs in Liberia—which received $1.5 million in FY 2007, then just $298,000 in FY 2008, but which will receive $1.5 million in FY 2009 under the new budget. And it contains funding for the continued expansion of arms sales to Nigeria, with FMF funding rising from $1 million in FY 2007, to $1.3 million in FY 2008, to a requested $1.35 million in FY 2009.

International Military Education and Training

One noteworthy new program is the one for Libya; initiated in FY 2008 with $333,000, Libya will receive $350,000 worth of training in FY 2009 under the new budget. The budget also contains funding for significant increases in training programs for military officers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (which received $263,000 in FY 2007, another $477,000 in FY 2008, and is expected to receive $500,000 in FY 2009); Ethiopia (472,000 in FY 2007, $620,000 in FY 2008 and $700,000 in the request for FY 2009); Guinea Bissau ($454,000 in FY 2007, $524,000 in FY 2008, and $750,000 in the request for FY 2009); South Africa (just $48,000 in FY 2007, but $857,000 in FY 2008, and $850,000 in the request for FY 2009); and Uganda ($283,000 in FY 2007, $477,000 in FY 2008, and $500,000 in the request for FY 2009). And it includes money to continue major programs for Botswana ($600,000 in the request for FY 2009), Ghana ($600,000 in the request for FY 2009), Nigeria ($800,000 in the request for FY 2009), and Senegal ($1 million in the request for FY 2009).

Peacekeeping Operations

The budget includes money to continue increases in funding in FY 2009 for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which includes the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA). In addition to ACOTA, most of the rest of the GPOI funding will also go to Africa-related programs, amounting to an estimated total of $80 million worth of security assistance. GPOI rose from $81 million in FY 2007 to $96.4 million in FY 2008, and the administration is requesting $106.2 million in FY 2009. The budget also maintains recent levels of funding for the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which got $13.75 million in FY 2007 and $9.9 million in FY 2008; for FY 2009, the administration is requesting $15 million. The administration is also requesting $7.5 million for the first time in FY 2009 to launch the East Africa Regional Security Initiative—modeled on the TSCTP—to provide counter-terrorism training and equipment to military forces in the East Africa region (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi).

The budget contains funding to continue the administration’s new program to provide training, equipment, and infrastructure improvements to the Democratic Republic of the Congo; presumably much of this will be supplied to the forces deployed in the eastern part of the country. Funding for this program began with $5.5 million in FY 2008 and the administration is requesting another $5.5 million for the Democratic Republic of the Congo in FY 2009. It also includes money to continue providing training, equipment, and infrastructure improvements to the Liberian military, which received $53.25 million in FY 2007 and $51.7 million in FY 2008; the administration is requesting $49.6 million in FY 2009. And it contains funding to continue providing training, equipment, and infrastructure facilities to the Sudanese military to help integrate former combatants from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. Programs in Sudan received $54 million in FY 2006—including $20 transferred from the Department of Defense and $70.8 million in FY 2008; the administration is requesting $30 million for these programs in FY 2009.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PROGRAMS

Building Partnership Capacity

The budget contains $800 to substantially expand funding for the Global Equip and Train program ($500 million for this program which was established by FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act Section 1206), the Security and Stabilization Assistance program ($200 million for this program which was established by FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act Section 1207), and the Combatant Commanders’ Initiative Fund ($100 million for this program established by FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act Section 902). Of this, an estimated $300-$400 million will go to provide training and equipment to military, paramilitary, and police forces in Africa.

Establishment of new Africa Command (Africom)

The budget contains $398 million to set up the headquarters for the new Africa Command (Africom) in Stuttgart, Germany. This money will be used to pay for the operating costs of Africom over the coming year. This will include the cost of creating an Africom intelligence capability, including a Joint Intelligence Operations Center; launching a stand-alone Theater Special Operations Command for Africom; deploying support aircraft to Africa; building a limited presence on the African continent that is expected to include the establishment of two of five regional offices projected by Africom; and conducting training, exercises, and theater security cooperation activities.

* Daniel Volman is the Director of the African Security Research Project in Washington, DC (www.concernedafricascholars.org/african-security-research-project), and a member of the Board of Directors of the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars. He is a specialist on U.S. military activities in Africa and the author of numerous articles and research reports.

AFRICOM: The New U.S. Military Command for Africa

On 6 February 2007, President Bush announced that the United States would create a new military command for Africa, to be known as Africa Command or Africom. Throughout the Cold War and for more than a decade afterwards, the U.S. did not have a military command for Africa; instead, U.S. military activities on the African continent were conducted by three separate military commands: the European Command, which had responsibility for most of the continent; the Central Command, which oversaw Egypt and the Horn of Africa region along with the Middle East and Central Asia; and the Pacific Command, which administered military ties with Madagascar and other islands in the Indian Ocean.

Until the creation of Africom, the administration of U.S.-African military relations was conducted through three different commands. All three were primarily concerned with other regions of the world that were of great importance to the United States on their own and had only a few middle-rank staff members dedicated to Africa. This reflected the fact that Africa was chiefly viewed as a regional theater in the global Cold War, or as an adjunct to U.S.-European relations, or—as in the immediate post-Cold War period—as a region of little concern to the United States. But when the Bush administration declared that access to Africa’s oil supplies would henceforth be defined as a “strategic national interest” of the United States and proclaimed that America was engaged in a Global War on Terrorism following the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, Africa’s status in U.S. national security policy and military affairs rose dramatically.

According to Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs—the highest ranking Defense Department official with principal responsibility for Africa at the Pentagon, who has supervised U.S. military policy toward Africa for the Bush administration—Africom attained the status of a sub-unified command under the European Command on 1 October 2007, and is scheduled to be fully operational as a separate unified command no later than 1 October 2008. The process of creating the new command will be conducted by a special transition team—which will include officers from both the State Department and the Defense Department—that will carry out its work in Stuttgart, Germany, in coordination with the European Command.

Africom will not look like traditional unified commands. In particular, there is no intention, at least at present, to assign the new command control over large military units. This is in line with ongoing efforts to reduce the presence of large numbers of American troops overseas in order to consolidate or eliminate expensive bases and bring as many troops as possible back to the United States where they will be available for deployment anywhere in the world that Washington wants to send them. Since there is no way to anticipate where troops will be sent and the Pentagon has the ability to deploy sizable forces over long distances in a very short time, Washington plans to keep as many troops as possible in the United States and send them abroad only when it judges it necessary. This, however, was exactly the intention when the Clinton and Reagan administrations created the Central Command and based it in Tampa, Florida; and now the Central Command is running two major wars in southwest Asia from headquarters in Qatar.

Africom will also be composed of both military and civilian personnel, including officers from the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the commander of the new command will have both a military and a civilian deputy. On 10 July 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced that the President had nominated four-star General William E. “Kip” Ward to be the commander of Africom. General Ward, an African-American who was commissioned into the infantry in 1971, is currently serving as the deputy commander of the European Command. Previously he served as the commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) in Mogadishu, Somalia during “Operation Restore Hope” in 1992-1994, commander of the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia during “Operation Joint Forge” in 2002-2003, and chief of the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation at the American Embassy in Cairo, Egypt. The novel structure of the new command reflects the fact that Africom will be charged with overseeing both traditional military activities and programs that are funded through the State Department budget (see below for details on these programs).

The Bush administration has emphasized the uniqueness of this hybrid structure as evidence that the new command has only benign purposes and that and that, in the words of Theresa Whelan, while “there are fears that Africom represents a militarization of U.S. foreign policy in Africa and that Africom will somehow become the lead U.S. Government interlocutor with Africa. This fear is unfounded.” Therefore, Bush administration officials insist that the purpose of Africom is misunderstood.

On closer examination, however, the difference between Africom and other commands—and the allegedly “unfounded” nature of its implications for the militarization of the continent—are not as real or genuine as the Bush administration officials would have us believe. Of course Washington has other interests in Africa besides making it into another front in its Global War on Terrorism, maintaining and extending access to energy supplies and other strategic raw material, and competing with China and other rising economic powers for control over the continent’s resources; these include helping Africans deal with the HIV/AIDS epidemic and other emerging diseases, strengthening and assisting peacekeeping and conflict resolution efforts, and responding to humanitarian disasters. But it is simply disingenuous to suggest that accomplishing these three objectives is not the main reason that Washington is now devoting so much effort and attention to the continent. And of course Washington would prefer that selected friendly regimes take the lead in meeting these objects, so that the United States can avoid direct military involvement in Africa, particularly at a time when the U.S. military is so deeply committed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and preparing for possible attacks on Iran. The hope that the Pentagon can build up African surrogates who can act on behalf of the United States is precisely why Washington is providing so much security assistance to these regimes and why it would like to provide even more in the future. Indeed, as argued below, this is actually one of the main reasons that Africom is being created at this time.

So why is Africom being created and why now? I would argue that the answer to this question is twofold. First, the Bush administration would like to significantly expand its security assistance programs for regimes that are willing to act as surrogates, for friendly regimes—particularly in countries with abundant oil and natural gas supplies—and for efforts to increase its options for more direct military involvement in the future; but it has had difficulty getting the U.S. Congress and the Pentagon to provide the required funding or to devoting the necessary attention and energy to accomplish these tasks. The creation of Africom will allow the administration to go to the U.S. Congress and argue that the establishment of Africom demonstrates the importance of Africa for U.S. national security and the administration’s commitment to give the continent the attention that it deserves. If Africa is so important and if the administration’s actions show that it really wants to do all sorts of good things for Africa, it hopes to be in a much stronger position to make a convincing case that the legislature must appropriate substantially greater amounts of money to fund the new command’s operations. And within the Pentagon, the establishment of Africom as a unified command under the authority of a high-ranking officer with direct access to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will put the new command in a much stronger position to compete with other command for resources, manpower, and influence over policymaking.

Secondly, key members of the Bush administration, a small, but growing and increasingly vocal group of legislators, and influential think tanks have become more and more alarmed by the growing efforts of China to expand its access to energy supplies and other resources from Africa and to enhance its political and economic influence throughout the continent. These “alarmists” point to the considerable resources that China is devoting to the achievement of these goals and to the engagement of Chinese officials at the highest level—including President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, both of who have made tours of the continent and have hosted high-level meetings in Beijing with African heads of state—as evidence of a “grand strategy” on the part of China that jeopardizes U.S. national security interests and that is aimed, ultimately, at usurping the West’s position on the continent. The creation of Africom, therefore, should be seen as one element of a broad effort to develop a “grand strategy” on the part of the United States that will counter, and eventually defeat, China’s efforts. It should also be understood as a measure that is intended to demonstrate to Beijing that Washington will match China’s actions, thus serving as a warning to the Chinese leadership that they should restrain themselves or face possible consequences to their relationship with America as well as to their interests in Africa.

So, what will Africom actually do when it becomes fully operational? Basically, it will take over the implementation of a host of military, security cooperation, and security assistance programs, which are funded through either the State Department or the Defense Department. These include the following:

Bilateral and Multilateral Joint Training Programs and Military Exercises

The United States provides military training to African military personnel through a wide variety of training and education programs. In addition, it conducts military exercises in Africa jointly with African troops and also with the troops of its European allies to provide training to others and also to train its own forces for possible deployment to Africa in the future. These include the following:

Flintlock 2005 and 2007

These are Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises conducted by units of the U.S. Army Special Forces and the U.S. Army Rangers, along with contingents from other units, to provide training experience both for American troops and for the troops of African countries (small numbers of European troops are also involved in these exercises). Flintlock 2005 was held in June 2005, when more than one thousand U.S. personnel were sent to North and West Africa for counter-terrorism exercises in Algeria, Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad that involved more than three thousand local service members. In April 2007, U.S. Army Special Forces went to Niger for the first part of Flintlock 2007 and in late August 2007, some 350 American troops arrived in Mali for three weeks of Flintlock 2007 exercises with forces from Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, Burkina Faso, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Both Flintlock exercises were conducted as part of Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) which now links the United States with eight African countries: Mali, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Nigeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. In 2004, the TSCTP was created to replace the Pan-Sahel Counter-Terrorism Initiative, which was initiated in 2002. The TSCTP also involves smaller, regular training exercises conducted by U.S. Army Special Forces throughout the region. Although changing budgetary methodology makes it difficult to be certain, it appears that the TSCTP received some $31 million in FY 2006, nearly $82 million in FY 2007, and is expected to receive approximately $100 million annually from FY 2008 through FY 2013.

Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA)

This program, which began operating in 2002, replaces the African Crisis Response Initiative launched in 1997 by the Clinton administration. In 2004, it became part of the Global Peace Operations Initiative. ACOTA is officially designed to provide training to African military forces to improve their ability to conduct peacekeeping operations, even if they take place in hostile environments. But since the training includes both defensive and offensive military operations, it also enhances the ability of participating forces to engage in police operations against unarmed civilians, counter-insurgency operations, and even conventional military operations against the military forces of other countries. By FY 2007, nineteen African countries were participating in the ACOTA program (Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia). New budgetary methodology makes it impossible to ascertain the levels of funding for ACOTA, since the program’s funding is subsumed within the budget for the Global Peace Operations Initiative.

International Military Education and Training Program (IMET)

The IMET program brings African military officers to military academies and other military educational institutions in the United States for professional training. Nearly all African countries participate in the program—including Libya for the first time in FY 2008—and in FY 2006 (the last year for which country figures are available—it trained 14,731 students from the African continent (excluding Egypt) at a cost of $14.7 million.

Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS)

This program sells U.S. military equipment to African countries; such sales are conducted by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency of the Defense Department. The U.S. government provides loans to finance the purchase of virtually all of this equipment through the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF), but repayment of these loans by African governments is almost always waived, so that they amount to free grants. In FY 2006, sub-Saharan African countries received a total of nearly $14 million in FMF funding, and the Maghrebi countries of Morocco and Tunisia received almost another $21 million; for FY 2007, the Bush administration requested nearly $15 million for sub-Saharan Africa and $21 million for the Morocco and Tunisia; and for FY 2008, the administration requested nearly $8 million for sub-Saharan Africa and nearly $6 million for the Maghreb.

African Coastal and Border Security Program (ACBS Program)

This program provides specialized equipment (such as patrol vessels and vehicles, communications equipment, night vision devices, and electronic monitors and sensors) to African countries to improve their ability to patrol and defend their own coastal waters and borders from terrorist operations, smuggling, and other illicit activities. In some cases, airborne surveillance and intelligence training also may be provided. In FY 2006, the ACBS Program received nearly $4 million in FMF funding, and Bush administration requested $4 million in FMF funding for the program in FY 2007. No dedicated funding was requested for FY 2008, but the program may be revived in the future.

Excess Defense Articles Program (EDA)

This program is designed to conduct ad hoc transfers of surplus U.S. military equipment to foreign governments. Transfers to African recipients have included the transfer of C-130 transport planes to South Africa and Botswana, trucks to Uganda, M-16 rifles to Senegal, and coastal patrol vessels to Nigeria.

Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)

In October 2002, the U.S. Central Command played the leading role in the creation of this joint task force that was designed to conduct naval and aerial patrols in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the eastern Indian Ocean as part of the effort to detect and counter the activities of terrorist groups in the region. Based at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, long the site of a major French military base, the CJTF-HOA is made up of approximate 1,400 U.S. military personnel—primarily sailors, Marines, and Special Forces troops—that works with a multi-national naval force composed of American naval vessels along with ships from the navies of France, Italy, and Germany, and other NATO allies. The CJTF-FOA provided intelligence to Ethiopia in support of its invasion of Somalia in January 2007 and used military facilities in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya to launch its own attacks against alleged al-Qaeda members involved in the Council of Islamic Courts in Somalia in January and June of 2007. The command authority for CJTF-HOA, currently under the U.S. Central Command, will be transferred to Africom by 2008.

Joint Task Force Aztec Silence (JTFAS)

In December 2003, the U.S. European Command created this joint task force under the commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet (Europe) to carry out counter-terrorism operations in North and West Africa and to coordinate U.S. operations with those of countries in those regions. Specifically, JTFAS was charged with conducting surveillance operations using the assets of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and to share information, along with intelligence collected by U.S. intelligence agencies, with local military forces. The primary assets employed in this effort are a squadron of U.S. Navy P-3 “Orion” based in Sigonella, Sicily. In March 2004, P-3 aircraft from this squadron and reportedly operating from the southern Algerian base at Tamanrasset were deployed to monitor and gather intelligence on the movements of Algerian Salafist guerrillas operating in Chad and to provide this intelligence to Chadian forces engaged in combat against the guerrillas.

Naval Operations in the Gulf of Guinea

Although American naval forces operating in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea and other areas along Africa’s shores are formally under the command of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, based in the Mediterranean, and other U.S. Navy commands, Africom will also help coordinate naval operations along the African coastline. As U.S. Navy Admiral Henry G. Ulrich III, the commander of U.S. Naval Forces (Europe) put it to reporters at Fort McNair in Washington, DC, in June 2007, “we hope, as they [Africom] stand up, to fold into their intentions and their planning,” and his command “will adjust, as necessary” as Africom becomes operational. In a significant expansion of U.S. Navy operations in Africa, the U.S.S. Fort McHenry amphibious assault ship will begin a six-month deployment to the Gulf of Guinea in November 2007. The ship will carry 200-300 sailors and U.S. Coast Guard personnel and will call at ports in eleven countries (Angola, Benin, Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, and Togo). Its mission will be to serve as a “floating schoolhouse” to train local forces in port and oil-platform security, search-and rescue missions, and medical and humanitarian assistance. According to Admiral Ulrich, the deployment matches up perfectly with the work of the new Africa Command. “If you look at the direction that the Africa Command has been given and the purpose of standing up the Africom, you’ll see that the (Gulf of Guinea) mission is closely aligned,” he told reporters.

Base Access Agreements for Cooperative Security Locations and Forward Operating Sites

Over the past few years, the Bush administration has negotiated base access agreements with the governments of Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, Namibia, Sao Tome, Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia. Under these agreements, the United States gains access to local military bases and other facilities so that they can be used by American forces as transit bases or as forward operating bases for combat, surveillance, and other military operations. They remain the property of the host African government and are not American bases in a legal sense, so that U.S. government officials are, technically, telling the truth when they deny that the United States has bases in these countries. To date, the United States has done little to improve the capabilities of these facilities, so that there is little or no evidence of an American military presence at these locations.

In addition to these publicly acknowledged base access agreements, the Pentagon was granted permission to deploy P-3 “Orion” aerial surveillance aircraft at the airfield at Tamanrasset in southern Algeria under an agreement reportedly signed in during Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s visit to Washington in July 2003. The Brown and Root-Condor, a joint venture between a subsidiary of the American company, Halliburton, and the Algerian state-owned oil company, Sonatrach, is currently under contract to enlarge military air bases at Tamanrasset and at Bou Saada. In December 2006, Salafist forces used an improvised mine and small arms to attack a convoy of Brown and Root-Condor employees who were returning to their hotel in the Algerian town of Bouchaaoui, killing an Algerian driver and wounding nine workers, including four Britons and one American.

Over the course of the next eighteen months, there is one major issue related to the new command that remains to be resolved: whether and where in Africa will Africom establish a regional headquarters. A series of consultations with the governments of a number of African countries—including Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Djibouti, Kenya—following the announcement of Africom found than none of them were willing to commit to hosting the new command. As a result, the Pentagon has been forced to reconsider its plans and in June 2007 Ryan Henry, the Principal Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy told reporters that the Bush administration now intended to establish what he called “a distributed command” that would be “networked” in several countries in different regions of the continent. Under questioning before the Senate Africa Subcommittee on 1 August 2007, Assistant Secretary Whelan said that Liberia, Botswana, Senegal, and Djibouti were among the countries that had expressed support for Africom—although only Liberia has publicly expressed a willingness to play host to Africom personnel—which clearly suggests that these countries are likely to accommodate elements of Africom’s headquarters staff when they eventually establish a presence on the continent sometime after October 2008.

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* This article is a revised and shortened version of an article that will be published in a forthcoming issue of The Review of African Political Economy.

Daniel Volman is the director of the African Security Research Project in Washington, DC, and the author of numerous articles on US security policy and African security issues.

Call for Papers: African Customary Law Revisited

The Role of Customary Law in the 21st Century
October 23-24, 2008

New: Conference website: www.customarylawrevisited.com

A Project of the Leitner Center for International Law and Justice at Fordham Law School The sponsoring organization of African Customary Law Revisited: The Role of Customary Law in the 21st Century invites submissions and participant nominations for a collaborative exchange and discussion at a two-day conference to take place on October 23-24, 2008 in Botswana. The conference working language will be English. The conference will include paper presentations on topics detailed below and will also include working group discussions with a broad range of stakeholders, including, for example, traditional leaders, members of the judiciary, representatives of non-governmental organizations and other interested persons, on topics related to customary law.

Customary law, the traditional law indigenous to a region, continues to regulate many areas of people’s lives in Africa. For example, some African constitutions now enshrine the right to culture and oblige courts to apply customary law where applicable. Elsewhere, constitutional and statutory law have superseded most or all customary law. Yet, even in situations where constitutional law, statutory law and common law have largely superseded it, customary law may nevertheless govern in certain areas, such as family relations. For example, in many places, the requirements for marriage, the rights and duties of husbands and wives, the obligations toward and custody of children, the ownership of property acquired during marriage, and many other aspects of family life are governed by customary law. Moreover, even where conflicting constitutional or statutory law exists, lack of access to legal resources may mean that, as a practical matter, customary law still governs.

Finally, the persistence of longstanding expectations and social practices informed by customary law has given rise to many problems in enforcing contradictory statutory law.

Notwithstanding the significant role customary law continues to play in people’s lives, there has been a notable lack of research and formal scholarly exchange on the topic. As detailed further below, the African Customary Law Revisited conference will attempt to fill this gap by exploring the nature, substance and role of customary law in Africa in the 21st Century.

Transportation to the conference venue, lodging, meals and transportation at the venue will be subject to arrangement between the sponsoring organizations and the event participants.

CALL FOR PAPERS

Twenty papers will be selected for presentation at the conference by a Steering Committee comprised of members from the sponsoring organization. All proposals should include a project description and the applicant’s curriculum vitae. All proposals should be in English with project descriptions not to exceed 1000 words. As publication of selected papers in contemplated, submissions should describe work that has not been previously published.

Possible topics for consideration:
* What is customary law in the 21st Century
* How is customary law ascertained? What are the sources of customary
law? How is it generated? How does it change?
* The history of customary law; customary law and colonialism
* “Procedural” aspects of customary law / Venues to enforce customary law
* Traditional courts and other venues for decision
* The relationship between traditional courts or decision-makers and the
formal court system
* Evidentiary standards and methods of proving customary law
* Codification of customary law
* Substantive areas of customary law For example:
-Land tenure
-Family law
Environmental law
-Chieftancy
-Intellectual Property
-Criminal law
-Gender and customary law
-Customary law and international law

SUBMISSION DEADLINE MARCH 25, 2008. Proposals should be submitted by e-mail to leitnercenter@law.fordham.edu . Participants will be notified in April 2008 that their papers have been accepted for presentation at the
conference. The papers will be published together in a book after the conference and will be posted on this website. Publication is contingent on producing a final paper of publishable quality.

CALL FOR NOMINATIONS

The sponsoring organizations invite nominations of traditional leaders, members of the judiciary or other persons or organizations who may be interested in attending the conference to participate in the working group discussions and discussion of papers. Persons may self-nominate or nominate others with expertise in matters related to customary law.

Nominations should include:

* The title and address of person or organization nominated.

* An explanation of the reasons for the nomination (500-word limit)
including:

* What is the person or organization’s role with respect to customary
law? What is the basis for the person or organization’s expertise in
this area?

* Why, specifically, do you believe this person or organization should
be included in the conference?

* What areas or issues related to customary law would the person or organization be most interested in discussing?

* Submitter information: Your name, mailing address, phone number and e-mail address.

NOMINATION DEADLINE MARCH 25, 2008. Proposals should be submitted by
e-mail to leitnercenter@law.fordham.edu
Nominated persons and
organizations who are accepted to participate in the conference will be
notified in April 2008.