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Sep 16, 2009

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Sexual and gender based violence: everyday, everywhere, and yet …

The mathematics of contemporary sexual and gender based violence offer a grim graph of today’s world. In a number of countries, evenly distributed across the globe, up to one-third of adolescent girls report forced sexual initiation. For example, a recent study suggests that in the United Kingdom one in three teenage girls has suffered sexual abuse from a boyfriend, one in four has experienced violence in a relationship, one in six has been pressured into sexual intercourse, one in sixteen say they had been raped. Mass rape of women and girls continues to be seen as somehow a legitimate military weapon. Reports suggest that, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in a war that lasted a mere three years, somewhere between 10,000 and 60,000 women and girls were raped. Sexual violence against men and boys continues undaunted, unreported, understudied, and too often a source of ridicule and derision. According to a number of studies, somewhere between 5 and 10% of adult males report having been sexually abused in their childhood. Women suffer violence in health care settings, “including sexual harassment, genital mutilation, forced gynecological procedures, threatened or forced abortions, and inspections of virginity.” Sexual violence in schools is off the charts. In Canada, 23% of girls experience sexual harassment.

In Iraq, which is engaged in a so-called nation-building exercise, part of that nation-building seems to involve, or require, sexual and gender based violence: “An increase in “honor” killings currently haunts the Iraqi political landscape but is receiving little U.S. media attention. Such killings are rooted in ancient patriarchal culture and represent the most severe expression of a rebellion against modernity, the secularism of the global market. They bespeak Iraq’s mounting social crisis.” Women’s corpses, and some men’s, are the collateral damage, not of warfare but of so-called peacetime reconciliation and reconstruction. If this is peace, what constitutes war?

Meanwhile, the engineer of that nation-building project, the United States, experienced a 25% rise in rape and sexual assaults between 2005 and 2007: “Among all violent crimes, domestic violence, rape, and sexual assault showed the largest increases. Except for simple assault, which increased by 3 percent, the incidence of every other crime surveyed decreased.” From this perspective, which is the developed and which the developing country?

Across the border, women, especially low-income women workers, disappear, repeatedly and violently. The State finally calls it femicide and passes a law. Women continue to disappear. Over 400 women have been murdered in the border city of Ciudad Juarez. The numbers of women, mostly low-income workers, who have been murdered in the state of Chihuahua, where Ciudad Juarez is located, qualifies the entire state as a femicide hotspot. And it’s not alone. In Mexico, Baja California, had 105 women murder victims in 2006 – 2007. Chihuahua counted 84. Since 2005, over 650 women have been murdered in Mexico State, and the state of Guerrero has the highest murder rate of any state in Mexico, 5 of every 100,000 women.

And Guatemala continues to experience a femicide crisis. In 2007, over 700 women and girls were reported murdered.

Around the world, the numbers speak for themselves, but to whom do they speak, and who is listening, who is taking the count and who is assessing accountability? It seems the whole globe, in its entirety and in each of its parts, is haunted by sexual and gender-based violence. Around and about the world daily, reports and studies on sexual and gender based violence are published.

Other reports look at the ways in which sexual and gender based violence spike in conflict zones and persist in post-conflict zones.

Some consider institutions. For example, many, and yet not enough, consider prison rape. There are reports of rape of juvenile offenders, rape of immigrant detainees, rape of remand prisoners, rape of convicted prisoners. And rape is only a small, if critical, part of the picture of sexual and gender based violence. Others look at workplace violence, such as sexual violence against domestic workers. There’s sexual and gender based violence in schools, schools of all sorts. Physical households as well as family and kin structures are sites of sexual and gender based violence. The public is regularly scandalized, or not, by clerics and clergy of any and all denominations engaged in sexual and gender based abuse, of parishioners, of acolytes, of one another. Women in the military generally suffer sexual and gender based violence. Women in offices, women on farms, women on streets, women on public transport suffer sexual violence, suffer gender based violence.

Women, gay men, lesbians, transgenders, transexuals, intersex, girls, boys around the world suffer sexual and gender based violence because of their attire. In some places, it’s State policy. Wear a burqa, suffer both humiliation and State sanctions. In other States, don’t wear a veil and you could end up in jail … or worse. In other places, it’s culture. Wear a short skirt, and be prepared for violence. Be prepared to be treated as a sex worker, because of course violence against sex workers is, if not acceptable, understandable.

Honor killings haunt the world, although they’re not always referred to as such. Indigenous women disappear, other women disappear as well. This is but a partial picture, but it will suffice.

There is no geographical border to sexual and gender-based violence. It happens everywhere, and all the time. This is neither paranoia nor dystopia, nor is it an invitation to panic or despair. It is merely descriptive, and, again, barely so. If sexual and gender based violence is so prevalent, can it really be said to haunt the world, or is that statement itself a specimen of naive optimism? Perhaps it should be said to constitute the world. Either way, whether a specter or a basic element, or both, the absolute ordinariness, the everydayness and everywhereness, of sexual and gender based violence suggests many questions, many avenues for research, many possibilities for collaboration and action.

Do sexual and gender based violence have a history, globally? It’s one thing to say that in a particular place at a particular time, there was an increase or an abatement in sexual and gender based violence. It’s quite another to look across the expanse of the world, or even a continent.

And what if that continent were Africa?

This Bulletin began in response to news reports of “corrective” and “curative” gang rapes of lesbians in South Africa. These were then followed by news reports of a study in South Africa that found that one in four men in South Africa had committed rape, many of them more than once. We wanted to bring together concerned Africa scholars and committed African activists and practitioners, to help contextualize these reports. We wanted to address the ongoing situation of sexual and gender based violence on the continent, the media coverage of sexual and gender based violence in Africa, and possibilities for responses, however partial, that might offer alternatives to the discourse of the repeated profession of shock or the endless, and endlessly reiterated, cycle of lamentation.

To that end, we have brought together writers of prose fiction (Megan Voysey-Braig), lawyer-advocates (Salma Maoulidi, Ann Njogu), poets (Chinwe Azubuike), trauma scholars (Sariane Leigh), human righs and women’s rights advocates (Michelle McHardy), gender and transgender advocates (Liesl Theron), activist researchers (Sasha Gear). These categories are fluid, since every writer here is involved in various activist projects, advocates in many ways. The writers do not pretend to `cover Africa’, and neither does the collection of their writings. The writings treat South Africa, Nigeria, Zanzibar, Kenya, Sierra Leone. They are meant to continue certain conversations, to initiate others.

Methodologically, the authors argue for the importance of respecting the multiple intersections and convergences, the multiple layerings, that underwrite and comprise any single event of sexual or gender based violence, and that necessarily complicate any discussion of these at a broader level. For example, the study that reported that one in four South African men had raped women or girls, the study the news media reduced to that simple formula, actually was a research report that attempt to understand men’s health and the use of violence in the context of the interface of HIV and rape in South Africa. In the end, the report came up with three sensible recommendations: “1. Rape prevention must focus centrally on changing social norms around masculinity and sexual entitlement, and addressing the structural underpinnings of rape. 2. Post-exposure prophylaxis is a critical dimension of post-rape care, but it is just one dimension and a comprehensive care package needs to be delivered to all victims and should include support for the psychological responses to rape. 3. HIV prevention must embrace and incorporate promoting more gender equitable models of masculinity. Intervention that do this effectively must be promoted as part of HIV prevention” That is, sexual and gender based violence begins and ends at the intersection of sexual inequality and gender inequality. Health and well-being begin with the work of transformation.

From varied perspectives and in different genres, each of the authors speaks a single truth. Conjuring away the specter of sexual and gender based violence is not good enough. Professing shock at the discovery of sexual and gender based violence is worse yet. Treating sexual and gender based violence as exceptional likewise leaves the conditions and situation intact. The work of transformation, in Africa as around the world, is slow, long, and necessary.

About the author

Daniel Moshenberg is the Director of the Women’s Studies Program of the George Washington University, Washington, DC, and Co-convener of Women In and Beyond the Global. He has taught at the University of the Western Cape and the University of Cape Town. With Shereen Essof, he has co-edited Searching for South Africa, forthcoming from UNISA Press.

From ACAS Bulletin 83: Sexual and gender based violence in Africa

Sep 16, 2009

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To be a woman in Kenya: a look at sexual and gender-based violence

In 2006, the Centre for Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW) – a non-governmental organization promoting gender equality and justice through the empowerment of women and elimination of discrimination and violence – took on the case of a woman who was brutally attacked while waiting for a bus at the country’s capital, Nairobi. She was dragged behind a bush and gang raped by 10 men for several hours. Later, in the public hospital, she was asked by the attending doctor (who said that he did not have gloves) to insert her fingers into her vagina and remove the semen with her own fingers and place it on the doctor’s laboratory slab for examination.[1] Still ashamed, embarrassed, and sore from the attack, this completely inappropriate act by the doctor violated her all over again. It was as if she was attacked twice in one night.

Now in 2009, three years later, despite the Sexual Offences Act having been passed into law, similar stories are still being heard. A rape survivor, having actually won her court case against her attacker, found herself back in court on an appeal by the convicted perpetrator who she had positively identified, and who had been convicted on the basis of all the compelling evidence that was adduced in the lower court. The High Court Judge, Justice Makhandia sitting in court in Nyeri, quashed the conviction on the basis that since she had neither told her mother, teachers or to her church leaders, of her rape ordeal , it was unlikely that she had been raped as alleged. This in spite of the incontrovertible medical evidence and witness testimonies, including her report to the police that she had been raped and the basis upon which the lower court had found the perpetrator guilty of the charge of rape.[2] Just like the previous incident, this woman was violated twice – only this time it was once by her rapist and once by the court of “justice”.[3]

Are these isolated instances of violation, trivialization of sexual violence by duty bearers in the country and or what then is the prevalence of sexual violence in the country? Have attitudes necessarily changed since the enactment of the Sexual Offences Act or are we still a country in denial?

The recent upheaval in response to the national sex boycott called by the G 10 women’s movement placed this issue in the spotlight. The women’s movement under the banner of the Gender 10 (G10), recently led a seven day sex boycott across Kenya demanding an accountable, responsible and issue driven leadership from the grand coalition partners in government – namely the President and his Prime minister.[4] According to the G10, the clear lack of leadership by the two was unacceptable in a country that barely survived the post election crisis and violence in post 2007, a country struggling to deal with severe famine, extra-judicial killings, Vigilante mass killings and insecurity, assassinations of human rights defenders, attempts by the government to control the media, land feuds, and high crime rates. The G10 therefore called for the Sex Boycott as a means of not only calling for the entire country’s reflection into the leadership crisis, but to also re-focus the country’s leadership on the critical issues facing the Nation. This action was not only successful in gaining awareness about problems within the executive, in parliament and in society but also in getting the two principals and their cabinet to sit down and discuss the issues raised, it was also successful in raising awareness about women’s rights.

Once the ban was launched, it was incredible to observe the most chauvinistic statements from some who categorically stated that women had no business saying no over matters of their own sexuality. Some even threatened to beat up their wives into sexual submission; others said that sex was a taboo issue in Africa and must not be discussed in the open- this despite the wanton rapes, defilements and HIV prevalence in the country. Some groups were also mobilized by politicians to condemn the sex boycott while journalists in some leading media houses called the members of the G10 some unpalatable names and wrote extremely demeaning articles.[5]

However, there were also very incredible and powerful articles and debates on all media , amongst people from all tribes, background, diversity, in schools, in churches and on the streets on this issue that brought out questions of marital rape, gender based violence, women’s position in society, and even those that brought home the concepts of the “Personal being Political”.

Despite the operationalization of the Sexual Offences Act – an act that provides the strictest penalties for sexual offences in Kenya’s history – the level of violence against women is still very prevalent if not on the rise. While the passage of the Act was a major milestone, several issues require urgent attention. One such issue is the glaring inclusion of Sec. 38 of the Act that states that if one reports a crime of rape, and the perpetrator is found not guilty by the court, then such a person would be liable for malicious prosecution and once found guilty would serve a court sentence equivalent to the sentence the perpetrator would have served if he had been found guilty by the said court. Kenya becomes the only country in the world, where a victim of rape could end up being a criminal serving a sentence issued by a court of justice. The most ridiculous part of this law is that, the victims of such crime as rape are not in charge of any part of the criminal justice system, yet a very heavy responsibility and burden is placed on their shoulders by the same law that ought to be their shield and defender. This proviso thus acts as barrier for victims of rape to seek access to justice for fear of prosecution.

Continued resistance from the government to pass legislation and policies that protect and secure the place of women and the clear lack of enforcement and or political will has greatly hindered the efforts to protect the women and children of Kenya. The police department has yet to customize their stations to accommodate sexual violence victims and many times those who go to report a crime turned away.[6] In addition, the government has not only refused to domesticate international law, such as ratification of the African Union’s Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, but has greatly procrastinated in the creation of their own legislation. There are several very important bills fundamental to the fight against gender-related injustices, known as the “Gender Bills”, including the Domestic Violence Bill (a.k.a. Family Protection Bill), Equal Opportunities Bill, Marriage Bill, and the Matrimonial Property Bill that have yet to be passed – some of which have been pending since 2001 for enactment. These behaviors are evidence of a government and legislature that is not committed to combating SGBV , women’s rights and protecting its citizens.

The height of all these inequalities and injustices was experienced during the post-election violence that occurred in 2007-2008 after the legitimacy of the presidential elections result was highly disputed. With the incumbent administration and opposition party failing to reach an agreement over the stolen election, the country plunged into absolute mayhem. Divisions along political lines began to emphasize divisions along cultural lines, and a form of ethnic cleansing began to take place, pushing the country to the brink of civil war. Thousands of people were killed and hundreds of thousands were injured and/or displaced. Women and girls paid the highest price for a failed government and faced a significantly increased risk of physical and sexual violence and sexual attacks. Gang rape, forced marriage to enemy soldiers, sexual slavery, and forced mutilation were commonplace and most survivors did not have access to adequate medical care or nay care or at all. According to the Gender Violence Recovery Centre in Nairobi, a total of 650 survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) related to the crisis were treated, with nearly 450 being seen in a short period of two months immediately after the election. These numbers, as shocking as they are, merely represent statistics from one hospital in Nairobi and consist only of those that were actually reported to this hospital at the time of the said crisis. More than a year has passed since the destructive uproar of the post-election violence ripped the country apart – we still have internally displaced persons in the camps.

SGBV includes such acts as, rape and defilement, wife inheritance, dowry-related violence, domestic abuse, and female genital mutilation (FGM), and all of these violations are still rampant throughout the country today. A woman recalls how she was brutally attacked in her own home during the crisis :

They accused my husband of being a traitor, and they dragged the two of us out of the house. They then took us to the forest and raped me for days, taking it in turns and saying that I would pay the price on behalf of my husband, forgetting that they had already killed him. He was beheaded as I watched, and they buried him.[8]

While this story is particularly brutal, women across the country continue to fear violence everyday and feel as if they have no control over what happens to them or to their bodies. It is estimated that a woman in Kenya is sexually violated every 30 minutes, with survivors ranging in age from 5 months to 82 years.[9] In Kuria district alone, more than 200 girls are forced to undergo circumcision (Female Genital Mutilation) everyday.[10] The sexual, economic and social inequalities that exist in Kenya have come to be somewhat accepted and even seen as normal. Today, violence is seen as an acceptable way of disciplining women and maintaining a sense of order and control in the household, especially when a woman refuses sex, disobeys orders, or asks questions considered to be none of their concern, such as family finances.

SGBV has become deeply entrenched in Kenyan culture through rites and traditions that are not only physically and psychologically harmful, but instill the perception that women are objects to be used, abused, or misused. Bride price and wife inheritance are two such traditions that perpetuate these beliefs and contribute to increased rates of marital rape, domestic violence, and the overall poor economic status of women. A woman tells such a story:

My brother in-law, who inherited me after the death of my husband, would come home late at night very drunk and demand sex…I had a friend who refused to be inherited and was forced out of the home with her children. She never returned and she died and suffered the ultimate insult of being denied burial in her home village. I did not want to subject myself and my children to such extremes.[11]

Sadly, due to social stigma, fear of reprisal, ignorance of the law and one’s rights, insensitive medical procedures, inefficient judiciary, and stigma associated with most crimes against the person, very few cases are officially reported and even fewer are successfully tried in court. Feeling trapped and often helpless, women feel as if they have nowhere to turn and often suffer in silence.

The expounding nature of patriarchal ideology has not only consumed the majority of households in Kenya (95% of all land in Kenya is owned by men[12] ), but has also reached other basic institutions, making it difficult to push for the protection of the rights women deserve. With women holding less than 9% of the parliamentary seats, they are often belittled and insulted, such as when fellow MPs declare on national television that when women say “no” they actually mean “yes”.[13] With current legislation acting as a “window-dressing”, the fact that things on the ground and in the courts are really no better than they were three years ago is overlooked. Women need to be placed in positions of power and have a direct hand in instituting reforms.

Although the situation in Kenya may seem dire and overwhelming, Kenyan women have not given up hope. Taking the Swahili saying “Msilale wanawake” (Women – do not fall asleep) to heart, women are “waking up” and taking a stand. They are banding together in record numbers and continuing to increase public awareness and advocate for change. Movements like the G10 that seek to re-define the political space and put people at the centre of leadership are gathering momentum. While it is important that change come from within Kenya and be implemented with the unique Kenyan dynamics in mind, continued international support for Kenyan women’s efforts and international pressure on the government to combat SGBV and other social ills is critical. The path to a free life in which everyone’s rights are respected and protected is a long and difficult one, but the women of Kenya are committed to making sexual and gender-based violence a thing of the past.

About the authors

Ann W. Njogu is a highly motivated, creative and versatile Executive with over 18 years of experience in senior management in successful and fast growing organizations. She is a Co-founder and the Executive Director of the Center for Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW), as well as a lawyer, human right advocate, and women human rights activist. She obtained her law degree from the University of Nairobi and sat the Bar exam from the Kenya School of Law to qualify as an advocate of the High Court of Kenya. She is also a duly qualified and registered Certified Public Secretary (CPS) K, as well as an Associate and Member of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, London.

Michelle L. McHardy is a young Canadian woman currently living in Kenya, beginning her career in the field of human rights. Having graduated with Honours from the Langley Fine Arts School in Canada as a Visual Arts and Photography Major in 2003, Michelle travelled to Kenya to volunteer for six months. Living with a local family in an impoverished village, she taught English to orphans and other underprivileged children. Her experience was so profound, she returned to Kenya in 2005.

Notes

1. Ann Njogu, personal interview, 29 May 2009

2. As reported in the Daily Nation , 24th February, 2007

3. Just this week, ( June, 20 2009), a lady in the company of one prominent personality, was taken through a gruesome ordeal of intimidation, coercion, violation and abuse. According to reports in the press, the Prominent personality was car jacked and the thugs shot him, took off with the young woman, who was allegedly raped before being abandoned in yet another stolen vehicle. She went to report the incident to the police and was promptly arrested, kept in police custody for days, denied medical treatment within the mandatory 72 hours for the Post Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP). The women’s movement in following through this case with the government agents including the police demanded to know what offence the lady was being held for and owing to the immense pressure from the women advocates, she was taken to the Gender Violence Recovery Centre (GVRC) where she denied ever having been raped, violated, or ever having been in the presence of the prominent personality. Worse still she denied that she had ever been arrested. She was then whisked away under heavy police security and only released from custody the following day and asked to leave town. To date, no one knows if indeed she received medical assistance and or her whereabouts!

4. Bornice Biomndo, “Women Now Turn the Heat on Politicians,” Daily Nation (29 April 2009)

5. A collection of articles available on request.

6. George Ochich and Ekuru Aukot, 2008 Human Rights Report (Nairobi: The Law Society of Kenya, 2008), 6.

7. CREAW, Women Paid the Price!!! Sexual and Gender-based Violence in the 2007 Post-election Conflict in Kenya (Nairobi: CREAW, 2008), 3-5.

8. “Kenya: Battle for Land Fought Over Women’s Bodies,” IRIN News (17 December 2008), http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=81998

9. George Ochich and Ekuru Aukot, 2008 Human Rights Report (Nairobi: The Law Society of Kenya, 2008), 10.
10. “Girls Flee Circumcision in Kenya,” BBC News (5 December 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7766806.stm

11. CREAW, Wife Inheritance: A Death Sentence Behind the Mask of Culture (Nairobi: CREAW, 2008), 25.

12. Kenya Women’s Manifesto (Nairobi: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and The League of Kenya Women Voters, n.d.), 17.

13. Joyce Mulama, “RIGHTS: Kenya’s Parliament Hears That Women Who Say ‘No’ Often Mean ‘Yes’,” IPS News (27 April 2009), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=33033

Jun 02, 2009

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AFRICOM and the Geopolitics of African Oil

On 1 October 2008, the new Africa Command (AFRICOM) officially became operational as America’s newest combatant command, with its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, to oversee U.S. military activities on the continent. Until the creation of AFRICOM, U.S.-African military relations was conducted through three different commands: the European Command, which had responsibility for most of the continent; the Central Command, which oversaw Egypt and the Horn of Africa region along with the Middle East and Central Asia; and the Pacific Command, which administered military ties with Madagascar and other islands in the Indian Ocean. This reflected the fact that Africa was chiefly viewed as a regional theater in the global Cold War, or as an adjunct to U.S.-European relations, or—as in the immediate post-Cold War period—as a region of little concern to the United States.

But since the late 1990s, Africa has become an increasingly important source of American oil imports. World oil production has peaked and, as production from older fields declines, there are only two parts of the world where significant new fields will come into production over the next 10-15 years: Central Asia and Africa. Africa now supplies more oil to the United States than the Middle East; it currently provides some 15-20% of total U.S. oil imports and is expected to provide at least 25% by 2015. In 2002, the Bush administration declared that access to Africa’s oil supplies would henceforth be defined as a “strategic national interest” of the United States. As a result, Africa’s status in U.S. national security policy and military affairs rose dramatically.

Administration officials have sought to portray AFRICOM as a demonstration of America’s commitment to help Africa and its benign intentions toward the continent. But the military officers who will run AFRICOM are under no illusions about the purposes of the new command. According to General William Ward and Vice Admiral Robert Moeller—the commander and deputy commander of AFRICOM respectively—the primary mission of AFRICOM are to protect access to oil and other resources, to make Africa a major front in the Global War on Terrorism, and to counter China’s growing economic and political involvement in Africa.

The creation of AFRICOM, thus, represents the globalization of the “Carter Doctrine,” the pledge made by President Carter in his final State of the Union Address in 1980 that the United States would use all necessary means “including the use of military force” to ensure the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. This pledge has now been extended to the entire world, driving the growing U.S. military presence not only in Africa, but in South America, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia as well. It is important to recognize that the United States is not the only country that is responsible for the militarization of African oil production and that China, India, Russia, and other countries are also playing significant roles.

So, what will AFRICOM actually do to fulfill its mission? When AFRICOM became operational in October it took over the implementation of a wide range of ongoing military, security cooperation, and security assistance programs that have already led to a series of U.S. air raids on Somalia as well as the establishment of a new U.S. military base in Africa—located at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti—and a vastly enlarged U.S. naval presence, particularly in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea. It will also manage the delivery of increasing quantities of U.S. arms to Africa and a host of new programs that have been created in recent years to provide weaponry and military training to African allies. Over the past seven years, the value of U.S. security assistance to Africa has risen from about $100 million each year to an annual level of approximately $800 million.

The Pentagon would like to avoid direct military intervention in Africa whenever possible, preferring to bolster the internal security capabilities of its African friends and to build up the military forces of key states that can act as surrogates for the United States. But it is also preparing for the day when a disruption of oil supplies or some other crisis will lead to further direct military intervention. Washington has substantially increased the size and frequency of U.S. military exercises in Africa and has negotiated agreements to guarantee that U.S. troops will be able to use local military bases in a number of African countries, including Algeria, Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, Namibia, Sao Tome, Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia.

It is now up to the Obama administration to decide whether or not to follow the path marked out by the Bush administration—a strategy based on a determination to depend upon the use of military force in Africa and elsewhere to satisfy America’s continuing addiction to oil—or to chart a new path based on an international and multi-lateral partnership with African nations and with other countries that have a stake in the continent (including China and India) to promote sustainable economic development, democracy, and human rights in Africa and a new global energy order based on the use of clean, safe, and renewable resources.

Daniel Volman (dvolman@igc.org) is the Director of the African Security Research Project in Washington, DC, and a member of the Board of Directors of the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars (www.concernedafricascholars.org). He is a specialist on U.S. military policy toward Africa and African security issues and has been conducting research and writing on these issues for more than thirty years.

From The Geopolitics of Petroleum ACAS Blog Series

Jul 08, 2008

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Bush administration Security Assistance Programs for Africa

For Fiscal Year 2009 (which begins on 1 October 2008), the Bush administration is asking Congress to approve the delivery of some $500 million worth of military equipment and training to Africa (including both sub-Saharan Africa and north Africa) in the budget request for the State Department for Fiscal Year (FY) 2009. The administration is also asking for up to $400 million for deliveries of equipment and training for Africa funded through the Defense Department budget and another $400 million to establish the headquarters for the Pentagon’s new Africa Command (Africom).

The State Department budget request includes funding for major new arms deliveries and increased military training to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Botswana, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, and Uganda. It will be channeled through a variety of programs, including a number of new programs initiated by the Bush administration as part of the “Global War on Terrorism.” These include the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership, the East African Regional Security Initiative, and the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program. The U.S. government is also expected to license up to $100 million worth of private commercial sales of military and police equipment through the State Department’s Direct Commercial Sales program in FY 2009.

The following description is based on information contained in the State Department Budget Justification for Foreign Operations for FY 2009 (released by the State Department in March 2008) and the Defense Department Summary Justification for the Budget Request for FY 2009 (released in February 2008).

STATE DEPARTMENT PROGRAMS

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement

The budget includes funding for the continued expansion of the U.S. civilian police contribution to UNMIL in Liberia, which rose from $1 million in FY 2007 to an estimated $4.096 million in FY 2008, and the administration is requesting $4.130 for FY 2009. The budget also includes funding for the continued expansion of law enforcement programs conducted by the U.S. as part of the implementation of the Sudan peace accords; these rose from $9.8 million in FY 2007 to an estimated $13.578 million in FY 2008, and the administration is requesting $24 million requested for FY 2009. And the budget contains funds to continue new program for law enforcement assistance to the Democratic Republic of Congo; these were initiated with an initial appropriation of an estimated $1.488 million in FY 2008 and the administration is requesting $1.7 million for FY 2009.

Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs

The budget includes funding for the continued expansion of U.S. Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) programs in Africa, particularly by expanding the Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) program in sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa and increasing funding for the East Africa Regional Strategy Initiative (EARSI) in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. For all programs throughout the world, ATA received $185.1 million in FY 2007 and an estimated $153.8 million in FY 2008; the administration is requesting $160 million FY 2009. It is difficult to know what proportion of this funding will be used in Africa, but it is reasonable to assume that approximately $40-50 million will be spent on African programs.

Foreign Military Financing

One of the most significant FMF programs in Africa is providing funding for increased arms sales to the Democratic Republic of the Congo; funding rose from nothing in FY 2007 to $397,000 in FY 2008, and the administration is requesting $600,000 in FY 2009. The budget contains money for major increases in FMF funding for Ethiopia; after receiving $1.9 million in FY 2007, funding for Ethiopia was reduced to $843,000 in FY 2008, but the administration is requesting $4 million in FY 2009. It continues funding for Djibouti—which fell from $3.8 million in FY 2007 to $2 million in FY 2008, but which the administration wants to increase back to $2.8 million in FY 2009. It also includes funding to continue programs in Liberia—which received $1.5 million in FY 2007, then just $298,000 in FY 2008, but which will receive $1.5 million in FY 2009 under the new budget. And it contains funding for the continued expansion of arms sales to Nigeria, with FMF funding rising from $1 million in FY 2007, to $1.3 million in FY 2008, to a requested $1.35 million in FY 2009.

International Military Education and Training

One noteworthy new program is the one for Libya; initiated in FY 2008 with $333,000, Libya will receive $350,000 worth of training in FY 2009 under the new budget. The budget also contains funding for significant increases in training programs for military officers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (which received $263,000 in FY 2007, another $477,000 in FY 2008, and is expected to receive $500,000 in FY 2009); Ethiopia (472,000 in FY 2007, $620,000 in FY 2008 and $700,000 in the request for FY 2009); Guinea Bissau ($454,000 in FY 2007, $524,000 in FY 2008, and $750,000 in the request for FY 2009); South Africa (just $48,000 in FY 2007, but $857,000 in FY 2008, and $850,000 in the request for FY 2009); and Uganda ($283,000 in FY 2007, $477,000 in FY 2008, and $500,000 in the request for FY 2009). And it includes money to continue major programs for Botswana ($600,000 in the request for FY 2009), Ghana ($600,000 in the request for FY 2009), Nigeria ($800,000 in the request for FY 2009), and Senegal ($1 million in the request for FY 2009).

Peacekeeping Operations

The budget includes money to continue increases in funding in FY 2009 for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which includes the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA). In addition to ACOTA, most of the rest of the GPOI funding will also go to Africa-related programs, amounting to an estimated total of $80 million worth of security assistance. GPOI rose from $81 million in FY 2007 to $96.4 million in FY 2008, and the administration is requesting $106.2 million in FY 2009. The budget also maintains recent levels of funding for the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which got $13.75 million in FY 2007 and $9.9 million in FY 2008; for FY 2009, the administration is requesting $15 million. The administration is also requesting $7.5 million for the first time in FY 2009 to launch the East Africa Regional Security Initiative—modeled on the TSCTP—to provide counter-terrorism training and equipment to military forces in the East Africa region (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi).

The budget contains funding to continue the administration’s new program to provide training, equipment, and infrastructure improvements to the Democratic Republic of the Congo; presumably much of this will be supplied to the forces deployed in the eastern part of the country. Funding for this program began with $5.5 million in FY 2008 and the administration is requesting another $5.5 million for the Democratic Republic of the Congo in FY 2009. It also includes money to continue providing training, equipment, and infrastructure improvements to the Liberian military, which received $53.25 million in FY 2007 and $51.7 million in FY 2008; the administration is requesting $49.6 million in FY 2009. And it contains funding to continue providing training, equipment, and infrastructure facilities to the Sudanese military to help integrate former combatants from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. Programs in Sudan received $54 million in FY 2006—including $20 transferred from the Department of Defense and $70.8 million in FY 2008; the administration is requesting $30 million for these programs in FY 2009.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PROGRAMS

Building Partnership Capacity

The budget contains $800 to substantially expand funding for the Global Equip and Train program ($500 million for this program which was established by FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act Section 1206), the Security and Stabilization Assistance program ($200 million for this program which was established by FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act Section 1207), and the Combatant Commanders’ Initiative Fund ($100 million for this program established by FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act Section 902). Of this, an estimated $300-$400 million will go to provide training and equipment to military, paramilitary, and police forces in Africa.

Establishment of new Africa Command (Africom)

The budget contains $398 million to set up the headquarters for the new Africa Command (Africom) in Stuttgart, Germany. This money will be used to pay for the operating costs of Africom over the coming year. This will include the cost of creating an Africom intelligence capability, including a Joint Intelligence Operations Center; launching a stand-alone Theater Special Operations Command for Africom; deploying support aircraft to Africa; building a limited presence on the African continent that is expected to include the establishment of two of five regional offices projected by Africom; and conducting training, exercises, and theater security cooperation activities.

* Daniel Volman is the Director of the African Security Research Project in Washington, DC (www.concernedafricascholars.org/african-security-research-project), and a member of the Board of Directors of the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars. He is a specialist on U.S. military activities in Africa and the author of numerous articles and research reports.

Jul 08, 2008

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AFRICOM: The New U.S. Military Command for Africa

On 6 February 2007, President Bush announced that the United States would create a new military command for Africa, to be known as Africa Command or Africom. Throughout the Cold War and for more than a decade afterwards, the U.S. did not have a military command for Africa; instead, U.S. military activities on the African continent were conducted by three separate military commands: the European Command, which had responsibility for most of the continent; the Central Command, which oversaw Egypt and the Horn of Africa region along with the Middle East and Central Asia; and the Pacific Command, which administered military ties with Madagascar and other islands in the Indian Ocean.

Until the creation of Africom, the administration of U.S.-African military relations was conducted through three different commands. All three were primarily concerned with other regions of the world that were of great importance to the United States on their own and had only a few middle-rank staff members dedicated to Africa. This reflected the fact that Africa was chiefly viewed as a regional theater in the global Cold War, or as an adjunct to U.S.-European relations, or—as in the immediate post-Cold War period—as a region of little concern to the United States. But when the Bush administration declared that access to Africa’s oil supplies would henceforth be defined as a “strategic national interest” of the United States and proclaimed that America was engaged in a Global War on Terrorism following the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, Africa’s status in U.S. national security policy and military affairs rose dramatically.

According to Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs—the highest ranking Defense Department official with principal responsibility for Africa at the Pentagon, who has supervised U.S. military policy toward Africa for the Bush administration—Africom attained the status of a sub-unified command under the European Command on 1 October 2007, and is scheduled to be fully operational as a separate unified command no later than 1 October 2008. The process of creating the new command will be conducted by a special transition team—which will include officers from both the State Department and the Defense Department—that will carry out its work in Stuttgart, Germany, in coordination with the European Command.

Africom will not look like traditional unified commands. In particular, there is no intention, at least at present, to assign the new command control over large military units. This is in line with ongoing efforts to reduce the presence of large numbers of American troops overseas in order to consolidate or eliminate expensive bases and bring as many troops as possible back to the United States where they will be available for deployment anywhere in the world that Washington wants to send them. Since there is no way to anticipate where troops will be sent and the Pentagon has the ability to deploy sizable forces over long distances in a very short time, Washington plans to keep as many troops as possible in the United States and send them abroad only when it judges it necessary. This, however, was exactly the intention when the Clinton and Reagan administrations created the Central Command and based it in Tampa, Florida; and now the Central Command is running two major wars in southwest Asia from headquarters in Qatar.

Africom will also be composed of both military and civilian personnel, including officers from the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the commander of the new command will have both a military and a civilian deputy. On 10 July 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced that the President had nominated four-star General William E. “Kip” Ward to be the commander of Africom. General Ward, an African-American who was commissioned into the infantry in 1971, is currently serving as the deputy commander of the European Command. Previously he served as the commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) in Mogadishu, Somalia during “Operation Restore Hope” in 1992-1994, commander of the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia during “Operation Joint Forge” in 2002-2003, and chief of the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation at the American Embassy in Cairo, Egypt. The novel structure of the new command reflects the fact that Africom will be charged with overseeing both traditional military activities and programs that are funded through the State Department budget (see below for details on these programs).

The Bush administration has emphasized the uniqueness of this hybrid structure as evidence that the new command has only benign purposes and that and that, in the words of Theresa Whelan, while “there are fears that Africom represents a militarization of U.S. foreign policy in Africa and that Africom will somehow become the lead U.S. Government interlocutor with Africa. This fear is unfounded.” Therefore, Bush administration officials insist that the purpose of Africom is misunderstood.

On closer examination, however, the difference between Africom and other commands—and the allegedly “unfounded” nature of its implications for the militarization of the continent—are not as real or genuine as the Bush administration officials would have us believe. Of course Washington has other interests in Africa besides making it into another front in its Global War on Terrorism, maintaining and extending access to energy supplies and other strategic raw material, and competing with China and other rising economic powers for control over the continent’s resources; these include helping Africans deal with the HIV/AIDS epidemic and other emerging diseases, strengthening and assisting peacekeeping and conflict resolution efforts, and responding to humanitarian disasters. But it is simply disingenuous to suggest that accomplishing these three objectives is not the main reason that Washington is now devoting so much effort and attention to the continent. And of course Washington would prefer that selected friendly regimes take the lead in meeting these objects, so that the United States can avoid direct military involvement in Africa, particularly at a time when the U.S. military is so deeply committed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and preparing for possible attacks on Iran. The hope that the Pentagon can build up African surrogates who can act on behalf of the United States is precisely why Washington is providing so much security assistance to these regimes and why it would like to provide even more in the future. Indeed, as argued below, this is actually one of the main reasons that Africom is being created at this time.

So why is Africom being created and why now? I would argue that the answer to this question is twofold. First, the Bush administration would like to significantly expand its security assistance programs for regimes that are willing to act as surrogates, for friendly regimes—particularly in countries with abundant oil and natural gas supplies—and for efforts to increase its options for more direct military involvement in the future; but it has had difficulty getting the U.S. Congress and the Pentagon to provide the required funding or to devoting the necessary attention and energy to accomplish these tasks. The creation of Africom will allow the administration to go to the U.S. Congress and argue that the establishment of Africom demonstrates the importance of Africa for U.S. national security and the administration’s commitment to give the continent the attention that it deserves. If Africa is so important and if the administration’s actions show that it really wants to do all sorts of good things for Africa, it hopes to be in a much stronger position to make a convincing case that the legislature must appropriate substantially greater amounts of money to fund the new command’s operations. And within the Pentagon, the establishment of Africom as a unified command under the authority of a high-ranking officer with direct access to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will put the new command in a much stronger position to compete with other command for resources, manpower, and influence over policymaking.

Secondly, key members of the Bush administration, a small, but growing and increasingly vocal group of legislators, and influential think tanks have become more and more alarmed by the growing efforts of China to expand its access to energy supplies and other resources from Africa and to enhance its political and economic influence throughout the continent. These “alarmists” point to the considerable resources that China is devoting to the achievement of these goals and to the engagement of Chinese officials at the highest level—including President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, both of who have made tours of the continent and have hosted high-level meetings in Beijing with African heads of state—as evidence of a “grand strategy” on the part of China that jeopardizes U.S. national security interests and that is aimed, ultimately, at usurping the West’s position on the continent. The creation of Africom, therefore, should be seen as one element of a broad effort to develop a “grand strategy” on the part of the United States that will counter, and eventually defeat, China’s efforts. It should also be understood as a measure that is intended to demonstrate to Beijing that Washington will match China’s actions, thus serving as a warning to the Chinese leadership that they should restrain themselves or face possible consequences to their relationship with America as well as to their interests in Africa.

So, what will Africom actually do when it becomes fully operational? Basically, it will take over the implementation of a host of military, security cooperation, and security assistance programs, which are funded through either the State Department or the Defense Department. These include the following:

Bilateral and Multilateral Joint Training Programs and Military Exercises

The United States provides military training to African military personnel through a wide variety of training and education programs. In addition, it conducts military exercises in Africa jointly with African troops and also with the troops of its European allies to provide training to others and also to train its own forces for possible deployment to Africa in the future. These include the following:

Flintlock 2005 and 2007

These are Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises conducted by units of the U.S. Army Special Forces and the U.S. Army Rangers, along with contingents from other units, to provide training experience both for American troops and for the troops of African countries (small numbers of European troops are also involved in these exercises). Flintlock 2005 was held in June 2005, when more than one thousand U.S. personnel were sent to North and West Africa for counter-terrorism exercises in Algeria, Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad that involved more than three thousand local service members. In April 2007, U.S. Army Special Forces went to Niger for the first part of Flintlock 2007 and in late August 2007, some 350 American troops arrived in Mali for three weeks of Flintlock 2007 exercises with forces from Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, Burkina Faso, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Both Flintlock exercises were conducted as part of Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) which now links the United States with eight African countries: Mali, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Nigeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. In 2004, the TSCTP was created to replace the Pan-Sahel Counter-Terrorism Initiative, which was initiated in 2002. The TSCTP also involves smaller, regular training exercises conducted by U.S. Army Special Forces throughout the region. Although changing budgetary methodology makes it difficult to be certain, it appears that the TSCTP received some $31 million in FY 2006, nearly $82 million in FY 2007, and is expected to receive approximately $100 million annually from FY 2008 through FY 2013.

Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA)

This program, which began operating in 2002, replaces the African Crisis Response Initiative launched in 1997 by the Clinton administration. In 2004, it became part of the Global Peace Operations Initiative. ACOTA is officially designed to provide training to African military forces to improve their ability to conduct peacekeeping operations, even if they take place in hostile environments. But since the training includes both defensive and offensive military operations, it also enhances the ability of participating forces to engage in police operations against unarmed civilians, counter-insurgency operations, and even conventional military operations against the military forces of other countries. By FY 2007, nineteen African countries were participating in the ACOTA program (Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia). New budgetary methodology makes it impossible to ascertain the levels of funding for ACOTA, since the program’s funding is subsumed within the budget for the Global Peace Operations Initiative.

International Military Education and Training Program (IMET)

The IMET program brings African military officers to military academies and other military educational institutions in the United States for professional training. Nearly all African countries participate in the program—including Libya for the first time in FY 2008—and in FY 2006 (the last year for which country figures are available—it trained 14,731 students from the African continent (excluding Egypt) at a cost of $14.7 million.

Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS)

This program sells U.S. military equipment to African countries; such sales are conducted by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency of the Defense Department. The U.S. government provides loans to finance the purchase of virtually all of this equipment through the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF), but repayment of these loans by African governments is almost always waived, so that they amount to free grants. In FY 2006, sub-Saharan African countries received a total of nearly $14 million in FMF funding, and the Maghrebi countries of Morocco and Tunisia received almost another $21 million; for FY 2007, the Bush administration requested nearly $15 million for sub-Saharan Africa and $21 million for the Morocco and Tunisia; and for FY 2008, the administration requested nearly $8 million for sub-Saharan Africa and nearly $6 million for the Maghreb.

African Coastal and Border Security Program (ACBS Program)

This program provides specialized equipment (such as patrol vessels and vehicles, communications equipment, night vision devices, and electronic monitors and sensors) to African countries to improve their ability to patrol and defend their own coastal waters and borders from terrorist operations, smuggling, and other illicit activities. In some cases, airborne surveillance and intelligence training also may be provided. In FY 2006, the ACBS Program received nearly $4 million in FMF funding, and Bush administration requested $4 million in FMF funding for the program in FY 2007. No dedicated funding was requested for FY 2008, but the program may be revived in the future.

Excess Defense Articles Program (EDA)

This program is designed to conduct ad hoc transfers of surplus U.S. military equipment to foreign governments. Transfers to African recipients have included the transfer of C-130 transport planes to South Africa and Botswana, trucks to Uganda, M-16 rifles to Senegal, and coastal patrol vessels to Nigeria.

Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)

In October 2002, the U.S. Central Command played the leading role in the creation of this joint task force that was designed to conduct naval and aerial patrols in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the eastern Indian Ocean as part of the effort to detect and counter the activities of terrorist groups in the region. Based at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, long the site of a major French military base, the CJTF-HOA is made up of approximate 1,400 U.S. military personnel—primarily sailors, Marines, and Special Forces troops—that works with a multi-national naval force composed of American naval vessels along with ships from the navies of France, Italy, and Germany, and other NATO allies. The CJTF-FOA provided intelligence to Ethiopia in support of its invasion of Somalia in January 2007 and used military facilities in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya to launch its own attacks against alleged al-Qaeda members involved in the Council of Islamic Courts in Somalia in January and June of 2007. The command authority for CJTF-HOA, currently under the U.S. Central Command, will be transferred to Africom by 2008.

Joint Task Force Aztec Silence (JTFAS)

In December 2003, the U.S. European Command created this joint task force under the commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet (Europe) to carry out counter-terrorism operations in North and West Africa and to coordinate U.S. operations with those of countries in those regions. Specifically, JTFAS was charged with conducting surveillance operations using the assets of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and to share information, along with intelligence collected by U.S. intelligence agencies, with local military forces. The primary assets employed in this effort are a squadron of U.S. Navy P-3 “Orion” based in Sigonella, Sicily. In March 2004, P-3 aircraft from this squadron and reportedly operating from the southern Algerian base at Tamanrasset were deployed to monitor and gather intelligence on the movements of Algerian Salafist guerrillas operating in Chad and to provide this intelligence to Chadian forces engaged in combat against the guerrillas.

Naval Operations in the Gulf of Guinea

Although American naval forces operating in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea and other areas along Africa’s shores are formally under the command of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, based in the Mediterranean, and other U.S. Navy commands, Africom will also help coordinate naval operations along the African coastline. As U.S. Navy Admiral Henry G. Ulrich III, the commander of U.S. Naval Forces (Europe) put it to reporters at Fort McNair in Washington, DC, in June 2007, “we hope, as they [Africom] stand up, to fold into their intentions and their planning,” and his command “will adjust, as necessary” as Africom becomes operational. In a significant expansion of U.S. Navy operations in Africa, the U.S.S. Fort McHenry amphibious assault ship will begin a six-month deployment to the Gulf of Guinea in November 2007. The ship will carry 200-300 sailors and U.S. Coast Guard personnel and will call at ports in eleven countries (Angola, Benin, Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, and Togo). Its mission will be to serve as a “floating schoolhouse” to train local forces in port and oil-platform security, search-and rescue missions, and medical and humanitarian assistance. According to Admiral Ulrich, the deployment matches up perfectly with the work of the new Africa Command. “If you look at the direction that the Africa Command has been given and the purpose of standing up the Africom, you’ll see that the (Gulf of Guinea) mission is closely aligned,” he told reporters.

Base Access Agreements for Cooperative Security Locations and Forward Operating Sites

Over the past few years, the Bush administration has negotiated base access agreements with the governments of Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, Namibia, Sao Tome, Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia. Under these agreements, the United States gains access to local military bases and other facilities so that they can be used by American forces as transit bases or as forward operating bases for combat, surveillance, and other military operations. They remain the property of the host African government and are not American bases in a legal sense, so that U.S. government officials are, technically, telling the truth when they deny that the United States has bases in these countries. To date, the United States has done little to improve the capabilities of these facilities, so that there is little or no evidence of an American military presence at these locations.

In addition to these publicly acknowledged base access agreements, the Pentagon was granted permission to deploy P-3 “Orion” aerial surveillance aircraft at the airfield at Tamanrasset in southern Algeria under an agreement reportedly signed in during Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s visit to Washington in July 2003. The Brown and Root-Condor, a joint venture between a subsidiary of the American company, Halliburton, and the Algerian state-owned oil company, Sonatrach, is currently under contract to enlarge military air bases at Tamanrasset and at Bou Saada. In December 2006, Salafist forces used an improvised mine and small arms to attack a convoy of Brown and Root-Condor employees who were returning to their hotel in the Algerian town of Bouchaaoui, killing an Algerian driver and wounding nine workers, including four Britons and one American.

Over the course of the next eighteen months, there is one major issue related to the new command that remains to be resolved: whether and where in Africa will Africom establish a regional headquarters. A series of consultations with the governments of a number of African countries—including Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Djibouti, Kenya—following the announcement of Africom found than none of them were willing to commit to hosting the new command. As a result, the Pentagon has been forced to reconsider its plans and in June 2007 Ryan Henry, the Principal Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy told reporters that the Bush administration now intended to establish what he called “a distributed command” that would be “networked” in several countries in different regions of the continent. Under questioning before the Senate Africa Subcommittee on 1 August 2007, Assistant Secretary Whelan said that Liberia, Botswana, Senegal, and Djibouti were among the countries that had expressed support for Africom—although only Liberia has publicly expressed a willingness to play host to Africom personnel—which clearly suggests that these countries are likely to accommodate elements of Africom’s headquarters staff when they eventually establish a presence on the continent sometime after October 2008.

_______________
* This article is a revised and shortened version of an article that will be published in a forthcoming issue of The Review of African Political Economy.

Daniel Volman is the director of the African Security Research Project in Washington, DC, and the author of numerous articles on US security policy and African security issues.

Jan 05, 2008

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ACAS Press Statement on the Crisis in Kenya

Association of Concerned Africa Scholars
January 5, 2008

The Association of Concerned Africa Scholars (ACAS), an organization of United States-based academics and activists, today rejected superficial and misleading popular and media portrayals of the post-electoral violence in Kenya as “tribal.”

We are equally concerned about the role of the U.S. government — far from a neutral player — both before and after the elections.

More than 300 people have been killed in the crisis related to the legitimacy of the December elections.

ACAS calls for the U.S. and other Western governments to honor initiatives and mediation by the African Union as well as by Kenyans themselves.

ACAS calls for a speedy, independent re-examination of the electoral results or another election for President.

ACAS condemns and calls for an end to:
• the widespread violence by the principal Kenyan political actors

• restrictions on the right to assemble and demonstrate peacefully and non-violently

• recently declared restrictions on press freedoms

Brief Background:

The Current Crisis represents the dominant class’s attempt to secure power and maintain social and political control over the majority who are denouncing the electoral process. The ability of Kenyan politicians to exploit cleavages between the haves and have-nots contributes to the violence and marginalizes the majority from the political process.

The U.S. contribution to the crisis. Seeing it as a key ally in the “war on terror,” the Bush Administration has built a close military relationship with the Kibaki government; The U.S. has played a central role in building up Kenya’s weaponry and internal security apparatus, now being deployed in the crisis. Current U.S.-Kenyan relations are a product of 24 years of U.S. support to the Daniel arap Moi dictatorship that jailed, exiled or disappeared those opposed to the regime. The legacy of these politics remains institutionalized within the political process itself and creates huge barriers to democratic freedom and political participation. Overall, the current turmoil in Kenya is the clear result of colonial rule, external intervention, and detrimental foreign aid policies.

For more information on ACAS, see https://concernedafricascholars.org

ACAS has three prominent Kenya experts that available for comment or to provide contextualization to the media:

Kenya Experts:
•Frank Holmquist, Political Scientist, Hampshire College, 413-256-0726 (home), 413-335-5620 (cell), 413-559-5377 (office)

•Edwin S. Segal, Anthropologist, University of Louisville, 502-836-9598.

•Ann Seidman, co-director of the Boston University School of Law Program on Legislative Drafting for Democratic Social Change. 617-361-6786.

ACAS Board of Directors:
Ousseina Alidou, Merle Bowen, Horace Campbell, Imani Countess, Asma Abdel Halim, Frank Holmquist, Gerald Horne, Al Kagan, Sidney Lemelle, William Martin, Bill Minter, James Mittelman, Prexy Nesbitt, Joel Samoff, Elizabeth Schmidt, Ann Seidman, Meredith Turshen, Daniel Volman, Immanuel Wallerstein, David Wiley, Noah Zerbe, and Jennifer Davis.

Jan 05, 2008

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U.S. Military Activities in Kenya

Now that President George Bush’s special envoy to the Kenyan crisis, Jendayi Fraser (US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs) has admitted that the elections in Kenya were seriously flawed (a polite way of saying they are fraudulent) and ordered President Mwai Kibaki to meet the opposition leader, Raile Odinga, it is easy to forget that the United States Ambassador in Kenya only weeks ago declared the elections free and fair.

But neither position is contradictory as the US is heavily invested in stability in Kenya.

Kenya has long been a key military partner of the United States and a major African recipient of U.S. military assistance.

The Pentagon gave Kenya $1.6 million worth of weaponry and other military assistance in 2006 and an estimated $2.5 million in 2007 through its Foreign Military Sales Program. In 2008 the Bush Administration expects to provide Kenya with $800,000 in Foreign Military Financing Program funds to pay for further arms purchases. Kenya has also been permitted to make large arms deals directly with private American arms producers through the State Department’s Direct Commercial Sales Program. Kenya took deliver of $1.9 million worth of arms this way in 2005, got an estimated $867,000 worth in 2007, and is expected to receive another $3.1 million worth this year.

In addition, the Bush Administration intends to spend $550,000 in 2008 to train Kenyan military officers in the United States through the International Military Education and Training Program at military academies and other military educational institutions in the United States.

The United States is also providing training and equipment to Kenya’s military, internal security, and police forces through several global and regional programs. These include, the:

• The East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative established in 2003 as a multi-year program with $100 million in funding to provide training to Kenya as well as to Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia.

• The Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program was created in 1983—under the administration of the State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security—to provide training, equipment, and technology to countries all around the world to support their participation in America’s Global War on Terrorism. The largest ATA program in Africa is targeted at Kenya, where it helped created the Kenyan Antiterrorism Police Unit (KAPU) in 2004 to conduct anti-terrorism operations, the Joint Terrorism Task Force in 2004 to coordinate anti-terrorism activities (although the unit was disbanded by the Kenyan government in 2005, and is now training and equipping members of a multi-agency, coast guard-type unit to patrol Kenya’s coastal waters. Between 2003 and 2005 (the most recent years for which this information is available), ATA provided training both in Kenya and in the United States to 454 Kenyan police, internal security, and military officers.

The creation of the KAPU was financed with $10 million IN 2003, along with $622,000 from ATA; the ATA spent $21 million on training for Kenya in 2004, $3.5 in 2005, and another $3.2 in 2006. The Bush administration requested $2.9 for 2007 and an additional $5.5 in 2008.

• The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was created in October 2002 to conduct naval and aerial patrols in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the eastern Indian Ocean as part of the effort to detect and counter the activities of terrorist groups in the region. The CJTF-FOA used military facilities in Kenya as well as in Djibouti and Ethiopia to launch air and naval strikes against alleged al-Qaeda members involved in the Council of Islamic Courts in Somalia in January and June of 2007.

In addition, the Bush administration has negotiated base access agreements with the government of Kenya—along with the governments of Gabon, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, Namibia, Sao Tome, Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia—that will allow American troops to use their military facilities (know as Cooperative Security Locations and Forward Operating Sites) whenever the United States wants to deploy its own troops in Africa.

The Bush Administration has built a close military relationship with the government of Mwai Kibaki and has played a central role in the creation of his internal security apparatus, now being deployed with such bloody results throughout Kenya.

The United States, thus, has a direct responsibility for what is going on in Kenya and for bringing it to an end. Jendayi Frazer has certainly surprised many outside the US with her most recent comments, but one can be sure that also has US military priorities in mind when she urges Kenyans to end the violence.

Daniel Volman is Director of the African Security Research Project in Washington, DC, and a member of the Board of Directors of the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars. He is a specialist on U.S. military policy toward Africa and African security issues.

Dec 01, 2007

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U.S. Military Activities in Kenya

Once President George Bush’s special envoy to the Kenyan crisis, Jendayi Fraser (US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs) has admitted that the elections in Kenya were seriously flawed (a polite way of saying they are fraudulent) and ordered President Mwai Kibaki to meet the opposition leader, Raile Odinga, it was easy for the corporate Western media to forget that the United States Ambassador in Kenya only weeks earlier had declared the elections free and fair. Bush and Fraser’s hands were pushed by the emerging evidence that the elections were illegitimate and that the violence, on both sides, had been orchestrated.1 Maintaining a lopsided alliance with the Kibaki government would not be so easy in the glare of public opinion, now cast briefly on the Kenyan nation, and so we saw a total flip-flop in US policy.

But neither position is contradictory as the US is heavily invested in stability in Kenya.

Kenya has long been a key military partner of the United States and a major African recipient of U.S. military assistance. This strong Western loyalty starts in Kenya’s settler-colonial roots. Kenya’s first President, Jomo Kenyatta famously promised close allegiance with Great Britain before the former colonial power agreed to release him from jail and grant independence with him and his party cleared to take the helm. This neo-colonial relationship shifted during the Cold War to a closer Kenyatta/US relationship which was cemented by his successor, Daniel arap Moi, in 1978. So close was this relationship that Moi’s tenure as a ruthless one-party dictator – replete with political detention, publicly acknowledged torture facilities in Nyayo House [the seat of KANU party rule and the largest skyscraper in Nairobi], and quasi-open assassination of political rivals2 – was characterized by republican and democratic US governments alike as a stable democracy and a reliable trading partner.

US military assistance was indirectly present and crucial to the maintenance of the Moi regime and its domestic suppression of opposition and multiple party politics, most notably in 1992 when the government was implicated in fomenting ethnic violence to destabilize the country, sabotage the elections, and legitimize authoritarian rule. Kenya also played a crucial role in US-sponsored Cold War regional geopolitics, and continues to do so in the War-on-Terror era today. When opposition party politics finally resulted in Mwai Kibaki of the NARC coalition being elected in 2002, the US gradually reoriented its relationship with Kenya, tentative at first, but gradually resuming its patron-client trajectory in recent years.

This can be seen in recently uncovered weapons trade statistics, which have now returned to and surpassed Moi-era levels. The Pentagon gave Kenya $1.6 million worth of weaponry and other military assistance in 2006, and an estimated $2.5 million in 2007, through its Foreign Military Sales Program. In 2008, the Bush Administration expects to provide Kenya with $800,000 in Foreign Military Financing Program funds to pay for further arms purchases. Kenya has also been permitted to make large arms deals directly with private American arms producers through the State Department’s Direct Commercial Sales Program. Kenya took delivery of $1.9 million worth of arms this way in 2005, got an estimated $867,000 worth in 2007, and is expected to receive another $3.1 million worth this year.

In addition, the Bush Administration intends to spend $550,000 in 2008 to train Kenyan military officers in the United States through the International Military Education and Training Program at military academies and other military educational institutions in the United States.

The United States is also providing training and equipment to Kenya’s military, internal security, and police forces via several global and regional programs. These include, the:

• The East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative established in 2003 as a multi-year program with $100 million in funding to provide training to Kenya as well as to Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia.

• The Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program was created in 1983—under the administration of the State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security—to provide training, equipment, and technology to countries all around the world to support their participation in the US’s Global War on Terrorism. The largest ATA program in Africa is targeted at Kenya, where it helped created the Kenyan Antiterrorism Police Unit (KAPU) in 2004 to conduct anti-terrorism operations, the Joint Terrorism Task Force in 2004 to coordinate anti-terrorism activities (although the unit was disbanded by the Kenyan government in 2005), and is now training and equipping members of a multi-agency, coast guard-type unit to patrol Kenya’s coastal waters. Between 2003 and 2005 (the most recent years for which this information is available), ATA provided training both in Kenya and in the United States to 454 Kenyan police, internal security, and military officers. Much like School of the Americas trained troops and officers in Latin America, these [in part] US-trained forces in Kenya were deployed against their own civilians during the post-elections violence and electoral controversy in early 2008, discussed further below.(3)

The creation of the KAPU was financed with $10 million in 2003, along with $622,000 from ATA; the ATA spent $21 million on training for Kenya in 2004, $3.5 in 2005, and another $3.2 in 2006. The Bush administration requested $2.9 for 2007 and an additional $5.5 in 2008.

• The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was created in October 2002 to conduct naval and aerial patrols in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the eastern Indian Ocean as part of the effort to detect and counter the activities of terrorist groups in the region. The CJTF-FOA used military facilities in Kenya as well as in Djibouti and Ethiopia to launch air and naval strikes against alleged al-Qaeda members involved in the Council of Islamic Courts in Somalia in January and June of 2007. The Kenyan port of Mombasa is central to US naval operations in East Africa, and is believed to have been involved in the US missile strike against suspected terrorists in Somalia on March 2nd, when one or more Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired from a US naval submarine into a remote area of southern Somalia on the border with Kenya.4

In addition, the Bush administration has negotiated base access agreements with the government of Kenya—along with the governments of Gabon, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, Namibia, Sao Tome, Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia—that will allow American troops to use their military facilities (known as Cooperative Security Locations and Forward Operating Sites) whenever the United States wants to deploy its own troops in Africa.

Since 2002, the Bush Administration has built a close military relationship with the government of Mwai Kibaki and has played a central role in the creation of the very internal security apparatus that was deployed with such bloody results throughout Kenya. In the midst of the worst of the post-election violence, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, the acclaimed Kenyan writer and activist whose latest novel, The Wizard of the Crow, allegorically foretold many of these events, presciently stated: “Ethnic cleansing is often instigated by the political elite of one community against another community. It is premeditated – often on order from political warlords.” He then went on to locate such premeditation in both the government and the opposition, and called for external investigations.5

The United States, thus has a direct responsibility for the post-election violence in Kenya during the beginning of 2008, and for bringing it to an end. Jendayi Frazer certainly surprised many outside the US with her reconciliatory comments, but one can be sure that she also has US military priorities in mind when she urged Kenyans to end the violence. In the end, the US role was less in finding the path to peace than in containing and waiting the conflict out so its business as usual could resume with whichever government of, by and for the elite emerged. The use of divide-and-conquer government-fomented ethnic violence has rarely stopped the United States from building its alliances in Africa or the rest of the world.

*(From ACAS Bulletin 78)

References:

1. Jeffrey Gettleman, “Signs in Kenya that Killings were planned,” New York Times, January 21, 2008.
2. David William Cohen and E. S. Atieno Odhiambo, The Risks of Knowledge: Investigations into the Death of the Hon. Minister John Robert Ouko in Kenya, 1990, Ohio University Press, 2004.
3. Amnesty International Condemns Lethal Force by Police in Kenya; Death Toll in Protests Rises to 12, Press Release, Amnesty International, January 18, 2008.
4. Pauline Jelinek, “US Strikes Somali Town, Targets al-Qaida,” Associated Press, March 3, 2008.
5. Ngugi wa Thiong’o, “Nhugi Laments Kenya Violence,” BBC News, January 10, 2008, accessed at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/7180946.stm.

Jan 14, 2005

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Action Alert : Ngugi and Njeeri Wa Thiongo Wa Ngugi

Association of Concerned African Scholars
January 14, 2005

Dear Friends,

As you may already know, world renowned Kenyan playwright, novelist and social critic Ngugi Wa Thiong’o and his wife Njeeri Wa Ngugi were brutally attacked on August 11, 2003 in an apartment in Nairobi, Kenya. Ngugi was severely beaten and burned with cigarettes, and his wife, Njeeri, was raped in the ordeal.

Subsequently, several people were arrested in conjunction with the attack, and it is becoming increasingly clear that this was a politically motivated assault on a leading international intellectual and his wife. It was the first time that Ngugi had returned to his home country after 22 years of political exile.

We are writing to ask you to take a few minutes of your time to send a letter to the addresses appended below to encourage the Kenyan courts and government to take this attack seriously, and to prosecute not only the direct attackers, but all those involved in the attack. This is not only an issue of paramount importance for political liberties and the rights of intellectuals. It is also a critical test case for overcoming a culture of silence and impunity surrounding violence against women in Kenya (and, in many ways, the world at large).

We have included a letter, both in the body of this mail and as an attachment, that exemplifies the spirit of the pressure that we believe it is necessary to put on the Kenyan government to insure that these attacks are treated in the most appropriate and deliberate matter. We fear that without this pressure, the political forces behind this attack may go unpunished, and the issue of rape glossed over. A letter of any length, either in your own words or borrowing from the language of the one included here, would make an immense difference. Please send your letters to as many of the appended addresses as you wish and also forward our call to others who might want to join our efforts. If the Kenyan government in compelled to see the overall importance of this trial, we will win an overwhelming victory in our struggle against violence against women and for the rights of public intellectuals. Thank you for your time.

Sincerely,

Gabriele Schwab

On behalf of The Ngugi and Njeeri Solidarity Committee
Board Members:

Gabriele Schwab, Chair
Chancellor’s Professor of English and Comparative Literature
University of California-Irvine

E. Ann Kaplan,
Professor of English and Comparative Literature and
Director of the Humanities Center at SUNY Stony-Brook

Simon J. Ortiz,
Poet and Writer,
Professor of Native American Studies and Creative Writing,
University of Toronto

Manuel Schwab,
Writer

Gayatri Spivak,
Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities
Director, Center for Comparative Literature and Society,
Columbia University

Please forward additional copies of the letters you send to ngugisolidarity@gmail.com for our records.

Please write to one or more of the following contacts:

1. Kiraitu Murungi
Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs
State Law Office, Harambee Avenue
P O Box 40112,
Nairobi
Tel: +254 20 227461
Minister’s email: minister-justice@skyweb.co.ke

Permanent Secretary: Dorothy Angote
PS Justice & Constitutional Affairs
Please use fax: 254 20 316317
psjustice@africaonline.co.ke

2. Attorney General
State Law Office
P O Box 40112-00100, Nairobi
Tel: 254 20 227411
no email address.
Please use fax: 254 20 315105

3. First Lady Lucy Kibaki
State House
P O Box 40530-00100, Nairobi
Tel: +254 20 227436
oafla@statehousekenya.co.ke

4. John Githongo
State House
P O Box 40530-00100, Nairobi
Tel: +254 20 227436
contact@statehousekenya.co.ke

5. Office of President
State House
P O Box 30510-00200, Nairobi
Tel: +254 20 227411
pps@statehousekenya.co.ke

6. Hon. Ayang Nyong’o, Minister
Ministry of Planning & National Development
Treasury Building
P O Box 30007-00100, Nairobi
Tel: +254 20 252299
mopnd@treasury.go.ke

7. Phillip Murgor
Director of Public Prosecution
State Law Office
P O Box 40112-00100, Nairobi
Tel: 254 20 227411
no email address at DPP but personal through his law firm: murgor@nbi.ispkenya.com

Please forward a copy of all letters you send to the following addresses as well:

1. Federation of Women Lawyers Kenya
Amboseli Road off Gitanga Rd.
P.O. Box 46324 Nairobi, Kenya
info@fida.co.ke

Jane Onyango, Executive Director:
jonyango@fida.co.ke

Hellen Kwamboka
hellen@fida.co.ke

2. The Ngugi and Njeeri Solidarity Committee
ngugisolidarity@gmail.com

3. Kenya Human Rights Commission
P.O. Box 41079-00100
Nairobi, Kenya
admin@khrc.or.ke

Thank You
The Ngugi and Njeeri Solidarity Committee.

* * *

[Sample Letter]

January 14, 2005
To Whom It May Concern:

We are writing to appeal to the Kenyan government to react appropriately and with all deliberate speed to the brutal attack on Ngugi Wa Thiong’o and Njeeri Wa Ngugi and the rape of Njeeri. We write to stress the urgency of an appropriate response that will hold accountable not only the direct attackers, but all those responsible for what we see as a politically motivated attack by enemies of what Professor Ngugi Wa Thiong’o stands for in Kenya, Africa and the world.

The world community continues to watch this case closely, first and foremost because we are shocked by the brutality of this attack and rape, but also because of the grave implications impunity for the perpetrators would have. International organizations, including women’s groups, civil liberties organizations, and organizations of writers and intellectuals are but a few of the members of the international community deeply invested in how the present administration will respond to this attack.

It is critical for the Kenyan government to rebuff this grave attack against an internationally celebrated public intellectual whose commitment to his country and the empowerment of ordinary people has been unwavering. If this attack on the occasion of his first return to his home country, after 22 years in forced exile, is not condemned, and all those responsible pursued for their crimes, a chilling blow to intellectual liberty will have been dealt. Such blows have impact the world over. This one, in particular, would send a sad message regarding Kenya’s capacity to overcome its political past. This government must respond firmly to demonstrate a commitment to the political future of the country.

It is equally critical to demonstrate a willingness on the government’s part to respond to the full gravity of the rape of Njeeri Wa Ngugi. The culture of silence around violence against women in Kenya fosters repeated and widespread abuses against the human rights of women. A full length Amnesty International report on violence against women in Kenya (March 8, 2002) cites several national and international instruments that hold governments responsible for failures to prosecute with “due diligence” any violence against women. We want to express our unconditional solidarity with Njeeri Wa Ngugi in her ongoing struggle to stand publicly against the epidemic of violence against women. We believe that the government of Kenya has both the opportunity and the responsibility to meet the challenge of supporting her. This challenge consists in bringing all those responsible for this attack on Njeeri Wa Ngugi and Ngugi Wa Thiong’o to justice. But steps must also be taken to end the conditions that foster this culture of silence. Systems must be put in place, as in other countries, for women to anonymously identify their attackers. Every form of sexual violence against women must be treated as a crime of the gravest consequence. The victims cannot be left to fight alone. To that end, we hope that this administration will not set the precedent of allowing Njeeri Wa Ngugi to stand alone.

At a time like this, when we are seeing political violence erode so many countries in Europe, North America, Africa, and indeed on every continent, it is doubly important for people in positions of power to stand against the impunity of perpetrators. We hope that with your actions, you will set an example for Kenya and the world.

Mar 08, 1998

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The Case Against the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act

Association of Concerned Africa Scholars
March 8, 1998

The Case Against the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (H.R. 1432)

Since the end of the Cold War, US policy toward Africa has drifted and become increasingly erratic. ACAS thus welcomes new thinking and initiatives. Unfortunately our analysis suggests that the new Africa Growth and Opportunity Act does not represent a step forward in US-African relations. And many Africans agree.

The Act does break new ground: it proposes, along with other initiatives, to shift our relationship with Africa from aid to trade. This recognizes a reality: US aid to Africa has been steadily declining since the early 1990s. Many, most notably the Congressional Black Caucus, have called for aid to be restored to the levels of the early 1990s, including the restoration of earmarked sums as is still provided for Eastern Europe, Israel/Egypt, etc. The President’s proposed 1998 budget continues the downward trend with slight increases only in military training and debt relief.

To replace this faltering commitment the Act proposes to promote African exports to the US and US investment in Africa. Promoters of the Act, however, have been unable to demonstrate how African producers will benefit, beyond possibly some slight increases in textile exports from Kenya and Mauritius–and even these, as US trade unions point out, may simply be transshipments from Asia. How producers of other manufactures, much less raw materials–and particularly oil which is 70% of US imports from Africa–might benefit is not at all evident.

Those who will benefit from this change in administration policy are obvious. As reported in the South African business magazine, Finance Week: “the prime beneficiaries of the Clinton African plan are the major American corporations” (June 5-11, 1997:17). Hundreds of millions of dollars in guarantees are specifically allocated to insure US investment, particularly those who reap the rewards of the forced privatization of African telecommunications and infrastructure.

The rules are of course quite different for African governments: to qualify for any assistance, particularly in the crucial area of debt relief, African governments must accept structural adjustment and free market provisions. NAFTA-like provisions to link US-African markets likewise target independent African regional market initiatives.

African trade unions, church groups, women’s organizations and a broad coalition of groups representing civil society have all raised serious questions about these provisions, which have most often meant cutting education and social programs while exacerbating inequality. Organizations representing these African forces have even persuaded the World Bank to engage in a joint, two year long study of the effect of these programs in four African countries to better understand and critique the consequences of these programs.

In short, while the bill’s promoters speak of assisting Africans, African-Americans, and women, the only group targeted for assistance are the multinationals who largely control Africa’s trade and access to rich markets.

For over two decades we have witnessed the US, the IMF, and the World Bank insist on structural adjustment, foreign investment, and export promotion as the solution to Africa’s development crisis–and reject real debt relief while cutting aid levels. It is time to recognize that these policies have failed, and led not to growth but inequality and increasing poverty.

Those seeking more equitable and beneficial relationships with Africa might consider:

· Reducing multinational corporations’ control over African exports and markets,

· Promoting fair prices for Africa’s exports, particularly raw materials and processed goods,

· Supporting African democratic movements, and human and academic rights,

· Setting aside structural adjustment policies–as is being discussed in Asia, and

· Providing more equitable, earmarked aid–as is done for other areas of the world.

ASSOCIATION OF CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS
8 March 1998