Tag Archives: Morocco
The Western Sahara conflict: regional and international repercussions
The lack of resolution of the Western Sahara conflict boils down to two main points: the conflicting positions of Morocco and Western Saharan nationalists, on the one hand, and geopolitical considerations, on the other hand. These geopolitical interests have been the main impediment to the resolution of the conflict because they strengthened the obstinate position of Morocco, which argues, thanks to external support, that it will only negotiate on the basis of ‘autonomy’ within Moroccan sovereignty. This proposal currently enjoys the implicit consent of France, the United States, and Spain, regardless of UN resolutions that refute any preconditions for the current negotiations.
AFRICOM and the Geopolitics of African Oil
On 1 October 2008, the new Africa Command (AFRICOM) officially became operational as America’s newest combatant command, with its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, to oversee U.S. military activities on the continent. Until the creation of AFRICOM, U.S.-African military relations was conducted through three different commands: the European Command, which had responsibility for most of the continent; the Central Command, which oversaw Egypt and the Horn of Africa region along with the Middle East and Central Asia; and the Pacific Command, which administered military ties with Madagascar and other islands in the Indian Ocean. This reflected the fact that Africa was chiefly viewed as a regional theater in the global Cold War, or as an adjunct to U.S.-European relations, or—as in the immediate post-Cold War period—as a region of little concern to the United States.
But since the late 1990s, Africa has become an increasingly important source of American oil imports. World oil production has peaked and, as production from older fields declines, there are only two parts of the world where significant new fields will come into production over the next 10-15 years: Central Asia and Africa. Africa now supplies more oil to the United States than the Middle East; it currently provides some 15-20% of total U.S. oil imports and is expected to provide at least 25% by 2015. In 2002, the Bush administration declared that access to Africa’s oil supplies would henceforth be defined as a “strategic national interest” of the United States. As a result, Africa’s status in U.S. national security policy and military affairs rose dramatically.
Administration officials have sought to portray AFRICOM as a demonstration of America’s commitment to help Africa and its benign intentions toward the continent. But the military officers who will run AFRICOM are under no illusions about the purposes of the new command. According to General William Ward and Vice Admiral Robert Moeller—the commander and deputy commander of AFRICOM respectively—the primary mission of AFRICOM are to protect access to oil and other resources, to make Africa a major front in the Global War on Terrorism, and to counter China’s growing economic and political involvement in Africa.
The creation of AFRICOM, thus, represents the globalization of the “Carter Doctrine,” the pledge made by President Carter in his final State of the Union Address in 1980 that the United States would use all necessary means “including the use of military force” to ensure the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. This pledge has now been extended to the entire world, driving the growing U.S. military presence not only in Africa, but in South America, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia as well. It is important to recognize that the United States is not the only country that is responsible for the militarization of African oil production and that China, India, Russia, and other countries are also playing significant roles.
So, what will AFRICOM actually do to fulfill its mission? When AFRICOM became operational in October it took over the implementation of a wide range of ongoing military, security cooperation, and security assistance programs that have already led to a series of U.S. air raids on Somalia as well as the establishment of a new U.S. military base in Africa—located at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti—and a vastly enlarged U.S. naval presence, particularly in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea. It will also manage the delivery of increasing quantities of U.S. arms to Africa and a host of new programs that have been created in recent years to provide weaponry and military training to African allies. Over the past seven years, the value of U.S. security assistance to Africa has risen from about $100 million each year to an annual level of approximately $800 million.
The Pentagon would like to avoid direct military intervention in Africa whenever possible, preferring to bolster the internal security capabilities of its African friends and to build up the military forces of key states that can act as surrogates for the United States. But it is also preparing for the day when a disruption of oil supplies or some other crisis will lead to further direct military intervention. Washington has substantially increased the size and frequency of U.S. military exercises in Africa and has negotiated agreements to guarantee that U.S. troops will be able to use local military bases in a number of African countries, including Algeria, Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, Namibia, Sao Tome, Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia.
It is now up to the Obama administration to decide whether or not to follow the path marked out by the Bush administration—a strategy based on a determination to depend upon the use of military force in Africa and elsewhere to satisfy America’s continuing addiction to oil—or to chart a new path based on an international and multi-lateral partnership with African nations and with other countries that have a stake in the continent (including China and India) to promote sustainable economic development, democracy, and human rights in Africa and a new global energy order based on the use of clean, safe, and renewable resources.
Daniel Volman (dvolman@igc.org) is the Director of the African Security Research Project in Washington, DC, and a member of the Board of Directors of the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars (www.concernedafricascholars.org). He is a specialist on U.S. military policy toward Africa and African security issues and has been conducting research and writing on these issues for more than thirty years.
From The Geopolitics of Petroleum ACAS Blog Series
Making Peace or Fueling War in Africa
Coauthored with William Minter
At the end of President Barack Obama’s inauguration ceremony, civil rights leader Rev. Joseph Lowery invoked the hope of a day “when nation shall not lift up sword against nation, when tanks will be beaten into tractors.” No one expects such a utopian vision to materialize any time soon. But both Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have spoken eloquently of the need to emphasize diplomacy over a narrow military agenda. In her confirmation hearing, Clinton stressed the need for “smart power,” perhaps inadvertently echoing Obama’s opposition to the invasion of Iraq as a “dumb war.” Even top U.S. military officials, such as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen, have warned against overly militarizing U.S. foreign policy.
In practice, such a shift in emphasis is certain to be inconsistent. At a global level, the most immediate challenge to the credibility of change in foreign policy is Afghanistan, where promised troop increases are given little chance of bringing stability and the country risks becoming Obama’s “Vietnam.” Africa policy is for the most part under the radar of public debate. But it also poses a clear choice for the new administration. Will de facto U.S. security policy toward the continent focus on anti-terrorism and access to natural resources and prioritize bilateral military relations with African countries? Or will the United States give priority to enhancing multilateral capacity to respond to Africa’s own urgent security needs?
If the first option is taken, it will undermine rather than advance both U.S. and African security. Taking the second option won’t be easy. There are no quick fixes. But U.S. security in fact requires that policymakers take a broader view of Africa’s security needs and a multilateral approach to addressing them.
The need for immediate action to promote peace in Africa is clear. While much of the continent is at peace, there are large areas of great violence and insecurity, most prominently centered on Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Somalia. These crises require not only a continuing emphasis on diplomacy but also resources for peacemaking and peacekeeping. And yet the Bush administration has bequeathed the new president a new military command for Africa (the United States Africa Command, known as AFRICOM). Meanwhile, Washington has starved the United Nations and other multilateral institutions of resources, even while entrusting them with enormous peacekeeping responsibilities.
The government has presented AFRICOM as a cost-effective institutional restructuring and a benign program for supporting African governments in humanitarian as well as necessary security operations. In fact, it represents the institutionalization and increased funding for a model of bilateral military ties — a replay of the mistakes of the Cold War. This risks drawing the United States more deeply into conflicts, reinforcing links with repressive regimes, excusing human rights abuses, and frustrating rather than fostering sustainable multilateral peacemaking and peacekeeping. It will divert scarce budget resources, build resentment, and undercut the long-term interests of the United States.
Shaping a new U.S. security policy toward Africa requires more than just a modest tilt toward more active diplomacy. It also requires questioning this inherited security framework, and shaping an alternative framework that aligns U.S. and African security interests within a broader perspective of inclusive human security. In particular, it requires that the United States shift from a primarily bilateral and increasingly military approach to one that prioritizes joint action with both African and global partners.
AFRICOM: The New U.S. Military Command for Africa
On 6 February 2007, President Bush announced that the United States would create a new military command for Africa, to be known as Africa Command or Africom. Throughout the Cold War and for more than a decade afterwards, the U.S. did not have a military command for Africa; instead, U.S. military activities on the African continent were conducted by three separate military commands: the European Command, which had responsibility for most of the continent; the Central Command, which oversaw Egypt and the Horn of Africa region along with the Middle East and Central Asia; and the Pacific Command, which administered military ties with Madagascar and other islands in the Indian Ocean.
Until the creation of Africom, the administration of U.S.-African military relations was conducted through three different commands. All three were primarily concerned with other regions of the world that were of great importance to the United States on their own and had only a few middle-rank staff members dedicated to Africa. This reflected the fact that Africa was chiefly viewed as a regional theater in the global Cold War, or as an adjunct to U.S.-European relations, or—as in the immediate post-Cold War period—as a region of little concern to the United States. But when the Bush administration declared that access to Africa’s oil supplies would henceforth be defined as a “strategic national interest” of the United States and proclaimed that America was engaged in a Global War on Terrorism following the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, Africa’s status in U.S. national security policy and military affairs rose dramatically.
According to Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs—the highest ranking Defense Department official with principal responsibility for Africa at the Pentagon, who has supervised U.S. military policy toward Africa for the Bush administration—Africom attained the status of a sub-unified command under the European Command on 1 October 2007, and is scheduled to be fully operational as a separate unified command no later than 1 October 2008. The process of creating the new command will be conducted by a special transition team—which will include officers from both the State Department and the Defense Department—that will carry out its work in Stuttgart, Germany, in coordination with the European Command.
Africom will not look like traditional unified commands. In particular, there is no intention, at least at present, to assign the new command control over large military units. This is in line with ongoing efforts to reduce the presence of large numbers of American troops overseas in order to consolidate or eliminate expensive bases and bring as many troops as possible back to the United States where they will be available for deployment anywhere in the world that Washington wants to send them. Since there is no way to anticipate where troops will be sent and the Pentagon has the ability to deploy sizable forces over long distances in a very short time, Washington plans to keep as many troops as possible in the United States and send them abroad only when it judges it necessary. This, however, was exactly the intention when the Clinton and Reagan administrations created the Central Command and based it in Tampa, Florida; and now the Central Command is running two major wars in southwest Asia from headquarters in Qatar.
Africom will also be composed of both military and civilian personnel, including officers from the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the commander of the new command will have both a military and a civilian deputy. On 10 July 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced that the President had nominated four-star General William E. “Kip” Ward to be the commander of Africom. General Ward, an African-American who was commissioned into the infantry in 1971, is currently serving as the deputy commander of the European Command. Previously he served as the commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) in Mogadishu, Somalia during “Operation Restore Hope” in 1992-1994, commander of the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia during “Operation Joint Forge” in 2002-2003, and chief of the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation at the American Embassy in Cairo, Egypt. The novel structure of the new command reflects the fact that Africom will be charged with overseeing both traditional military activities and programs that are funded through the State Department budget (see below for details on these programs).
The Bush administration has emphasized the uniqueness of this hybrid structure as evidence that the new command has only benign purposes and that and that, in the words of Theresa Whelan, while “there are fears that Africom represents a militarization of U.S. foreign policy in Africa and that Africom will somehow become the lead U.S. Government interlocutor with Africa. This fear is unfounded.” Therefore, Bush administration officials insist that the purpose of Africom is misunderstood.
On closer examination, however, the difference between Africom and other commands—and the allegedly “unfounded” nature of its implications for the militarization of the continent—are not as real or genuine as the Bush administration officials would have us believe. Of course Washington has other interests in Africa besides making it into another front in its Global War on Terrorism, maintaining and extending access to energy supplies and other strategic raw material, and competing with China and other rising economic powers for control over the continent’s resources; these include helping Africans deal with the HIV/AIDS epidemic and other emerging diseases, strengthening and assisting peacekeeping and conflict resolution efforts, and responding to humanitarian disasters. But it is simply disingenuous to suggest that accomplishing these three objectives is not the main reason that Washington is now devoting so much effort and attention to the continent. And of course Washington would prefer that selected friendly regimes take the lead in meeting these objects, so that the United States can avoid direct military involvement in Africa, particularly at a time when the U.S. military is so deeply committed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and preparing for possible attacks on Iran. The hope that the Pentagon can build up African surrogates who can act on behalf of the United States is precisely why Washington is providing so much security assistance to these regimes and why it would like to provide even more in the future. Indeed, as argued below, this is actually one of the main reasons that Africom is being created at this time.
So why is Africom being created and why now? I would argue that the answer to this question is twofold. First, the Bush administration would like to significantly expand its security assistance programs for regimes that are willing to act as surrogates, for friendly regimes—particularly in countries with abundant oil and natural gas supplies—and for efforts to increase its options for more direct military involvement in the future; but it has had difficulty getting the U.S. Congress and the Pentagon to provide the required funding or to devoting the necessary attention and energy to accomplish these tasks. The creation of Africom will allow the administration to go to the U.S. Congress and argue that the establishment of Africom demonstrates the importance of Africa for U.S. national security and the administration’s commitment to give the continent the attention that it deserves. If Africa is so important and if the administration’s actions show that it really wants to do all sorts of good things for Africa, it hopes to be in a much stronger position to make a convincing case that the legislature must appropriate substantially greater amounts of money to fund the new command’s operations. And within the Pentagon, the establishment of Africom as a unified command under the authority of a high-ranking officer with direct access to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will put the new command in a much stronger position to compete with other command for resources, manpower, and influence over policymaking.
Secondly, key members of the Bush administration, a small, but growing and increasingly vocal group of legislators, and influential think tanks have become more and more alarmed by the growing efforts of China to expand its access to energy supplies and other resources from Africa and to enhance its political and economic influence throughout the continent. These “alarmists” point to the considerable resources that China is devoting to the achievement of these goals and to the engagement of Chinese officials at the highest level—including President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, both of who have made tours of the continent and have hosted high-level meetings in Beijing with African heads of state—as evidence of a “grand strategy” on the part of China that jeopardizes U.S. national security interests and that is aimed, ultimately, at usurping the West’s position on the continent. The creation of Africom, therefore, should be seen as one element of a broad effort to develop a “grand strategy” on the part of the United States that will counter, and eventually defeat, China’s efforts. It should also be understood as a measure that is intended to demonstrate to Beijing that Washington will match China’s actions, thus serving as a warning to the Chinese leadership that they should restrain themselves or face possible consequences to their relationship with America as well as to their interests in Africa.
So, what will Africom actually do when it becomes fully operational? Basically, it will take over the implementation of a host of military, security cooperation, and security assistance programs, which are funded through either the State Department or the Defense Department. These include the following:
Bilateral and Multilateral Joint Training Programs and Military Exercises
The United States provides military training to African military personnel through a wide variety of training and education programs. In addition, it conducts military exercises in Africa jointly with African troops and also with the troops of its European allies to provide training to others and also to train its own forces for possible deployment to Africa in the future. These include the following:
Flintlock 2005 and 2007
These are Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises conducted by units of the U.S. Army Special Forces and the U.S. Army Rangers, along with contingents from other units, to provide training experience both for American troops and for the troops of African countries (small numbers of European troops are also involved in these exercises). Flintlock 2005 was held in June 2005, when more than one thousand U.S. personnel were sent to North and West Africa for counter-terrorism exercises in Algeria, Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad that involved more than three thousand local service members. In April 2007, U.S. Army Special Forces went to Niger for the first part of Flintlock 2007 and in late August 2007, some 350 American troops arrived in Mali for three weeks of Flintlock 2007 exercises with forces from Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, Burkina Faso, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Both Flintlock exercises were conducted as part of Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) which now links the United States with eight African countries: Mali, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Nigeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. In 2004, the TSCTP was created to replace the Pan-Sahel Counter-Terrorism Initiative, which was initiated in 2002. The TSCTP also involves smaller, regular training exercises conducted by U.S. Army Special Forces throughout the region. Although changing budgetary methodology makes it difficult to be certain, it appears that the TSCTP received some $31 million in FY 2006, nearly $82 million in FY 2007, and is expected to receive approximately $100 million annually from FY 2008 through FY 2013.
Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA)
This program, which began operating in 2002, replaces the African Crisis Response Initiative launched in 1997 by the Clinton administration. In 2004, it became part of the Global Peace Operations Initiative. ACOTA is officially designed to provide training to African military forces to improve their ability to conduct peacekeeping operations, even if they take place in hostile environments. But since the training includes both defensive and offensive military operations, it also enhances the ability of participating forces to engage in police operations against unarmed civilians, counter-insurgency operations, and even conventional military operations against the military forces of other countries. By FY 2007, nineteen African countries were participating in the ACOTA program (Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia). New budgetary methodology makes it impossible to ascertain the levels of funding for ACOTA, since the program’s funding is subsumed within the budget for the Global Peace Operations Initiative.
International Military Education and Training Program (IMET)
The IMET program brings African military officers to military academies and other military educational institutions in the United States for professional training. Nearly all African countries participate in the program—including Libya for the first time in FY 2008—and in FY 2006 (the last year for which country figures are available—it trained 14,731 students from the African continent (excluding Egypt) at a cost of $14.7 million.
Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS)
This program sells U.S. military equipment to African countries; such sales are conducted by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency of the Defense Department. The U.S. government provides loans to finance the purchase of virtually all of this equipment through the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF), but repayment of these loans by African governments is almost always waived, so that they amount to free grants. In FY 2006, sub-Saharan African countries received a total of nearly $14 million in FMF funding, and the Maghrebi countries of Morocco and Tunisia received almost another $21 million; for FY 2007, the Bush administration requested nearly $15 million for sub-Saharan Africa and $21 million for the Morocco and Tunisia; and for FY 2008, the administration requested nearly $8 million for sub-Saharan Africa and nearly $6 million for the Maghreb.
African Coastal and Border Security Program (ACBS Program)
This program provides specialized equipment (such as patrol vessels and vehicles, communications equipment, night vision devices, and electronic monitors and sensors) to African countries to improve their ability to patrol and defend their own coastal waters and borders from terrorist operations, smuggling, and other illicit activities. In some cases, airborne surveillance and intelligence training also may be provided. In FY 2006, the ACBS Program received nearly $4 million in FMF funding, and Bush administration requested $4 million in FMF funding for the program in FY 2007. No dedicated funding was requested for FY 2008, but the program may be revived in the future.
Excess Defense Articles Program (EDA)
This program is designed to conduct ad hoc transfers of surplus U.S. military equipment to foreign governments. Transfers to African recipients have included the transfer of C-130 transport planes to South Africa and Botswana, trucks to Uganda, M-16 rifles to Senegal, and coastal patrol vessels to Nigeria.
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)
In October 2002, the U.S. Central Command played the leading role in the creation of this joint task force that was designed to conduct naval and aerial patrols in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the eastern Indian Ocean as part of the effort to detect and counter the activities of terrorist groups in the region. Based at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, long the site of a major French military base, the CJTF-HOA is made up of approximate 1,400 U.S. military personnel—primarily sailors, Marines, and Special Forces troops—that works with a multi-national naval force composed of American naval vessels along with ships from the navies of France, Italy, and Germany, and other NATO allies. The CJTF-FOA provided intelligence to Ethiopia in support of its invasion of Somalia in January 2007 and used military facilities in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya to launch its own attacks against alleged al-Qaeda members involved in the Council of Islamic Courts in Somalia in January and June of 2007. The command authority for CJTF-HOA, currently under the U.S. Central Command, will be transferred to Africom by 2008.
Joint Task Force Aztec Silence (JTFAS)
In December 2003, the U.S. European Command created this joint task force under the commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet (Europe) to carry out counter-terrorism operations in North and West Africa and to coordinate U.S. operations with those of countries in those regions. Specifically, JTFAS was charged with conducting surveillance operations using the assets of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and to share information, along with intelligence collected by U.S. intelligence agencies, with local military forces. The primary assets employed in this effort are a squadron of U.S. Navy P-3 “Orion” based in Sigonella, Sicily. In March 2004, P-3 aircraft from this squadron and reportedly operating from the southern Algerian base at Tamanrasset were deployed to monitor and gather intelligence on the movements of Algerian Salafist guerrillas operating in Chad and to provide this intelligence to Chadian forces engaged in combat against the guerrillas.
Naval Operations in the Gulf of Guinea
Although American naval forces operating in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea and other areas along Africa’s shores are formally under the command of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, based in the Mediterranean, and other U.S. Navy commands, Africom will also help coordinate naval operations along the African coastline. As U.S. Navy Admiral Henry G. Ulrich III, the commander of U.S. Naval Forces (Europe) put it to reporters at Fort McNair in Washington, DC, in June 2007, “we hope, as they [Africom] stand up, to fold into their intentions and their planning,” and his command “will adjust, as necessary” as Africom becomes operational. In a significant expansion of U.S. Navy operations in Africa, the U.S.S. Fort McHenry amphibious assault ship will begin a six-month deployment to the Gulf of Guinea in November 2007. The ship will carry 200-300 sailors and U.S. Coast Guard personnel and will call at ports in eleven countries (Angola, Benin, Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, and Togo). Its mission will be to serve as a “floating schoolhouse” to train local forces in port and oil-platform security, search-and rescue missions, and medical and humanitarian assistance. According to Admiral Ulrich, the deployment matches up perfectly with the work of the new Africa Command. “If you look at the direction that the Africa Command has been given and the purpose of standing up the Africom, you’ll see that the (Gulf of Guinea) mission is closely aligned,” he told reporters.
Base Access Agreements for Cooperative Security Locations and Forward Operating Sites
Over the past few years, the Bush administration has negotiated base access agreements with the governments of Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, Namibia, Sao Tome, Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia. Under these agreements, the United States gains access to local military bases and other facilities so that they can be used by American forces as transit bases or as forward operating bases for combat, surveillance, and other military operations. They remain the property of the host African government and are not American bases in a legal sense, so that U.S. government officials are, technically, telling the truth when they deny that the United States has bases in these countries. To date, the United States has done little to improve the capabilities of these facilities, so that there is little or no evidence of an American military presence at these locations.
In addition to these publicly acknowledged base access agreements, the Pentagon was granted permission to deploy P-3 “Orion” aerial surveillance aircraft at the airfield at Tamanrasset in southern Algeria under an agreement reportedly signed in during Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s visit to Washington in July 2003. The Brown and Root-Condor, a joint venture between a subsidiary of the American company, Halliburton, and the Algerian state-owned oil company, Sonatrach, is currently under contract to enlarge military air bases at Tamanrasset and at Bou Saada. In December 2006, Salafist forces used an improvised mine and small arms to attack a convoy of Brown and Root-Condor employees who were returning to their hotel in the Algerian town of Bouchaaoui, killing an Algerian driver and wounding nine workers, including four Britons and one American.
Over the course of the next eighteen months, there is one major issue related to the new command that remains to be resolved: whether and where in Africa will Africom establish a regional headquarters. A series of consultations with the governments of a number of African countries—including Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Djibouti, Kenya—following the announcement of Africom found than none of them were willing to commit to hosting the new command. As a result, the Pentagon has been forced to reconsider its plans and in June 2007 Ryan Henry, the Principal Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy told reporters that the Bush administration now intended to establish what he called “a distributed command” that would be “networked” in several countries in different regions of the continent. Under questioning before the Senate Africa Subcommittee on 1 August 2007, Assistant Secretary Whelan said that Liberia, Botswana, Senegal, and Djibouti were among the countries that had expressed support for Africom—although only Liberia has publicly expressed a willingness to play host to Africom personnel—which clearly suggests that these countries are likely to accommodate elements of Africom’s headquarters staff when they eventually establish a presence on the continent sometime after October 2008.
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* This article is a revised and shortened version of an article that will be published in a forthcoming issue of The Review of African Political Economy.
Daniel Volman is the director of the African Security Research Project in Washington, DC, and the author of numerous articles on US security policy and African security issues.
U.S. Military Activities in Kenya
Now that President George Bush’s special envoy to the Kenyan crisis, Jendayi Fraser (US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs) has admitted that the elections in Kenya were seriously flawed (a polite way of saying they are fraudulent) and ordered President Mwai Kibaki to meet the opposition leader, Raile Odinga, it is easy to forget that the United States Ambassador in Kenya only weeks ago declared the elections free and fair.
But neither position is contradictory as the US is heavily invested in stability in Kenya.
Kenya has long been a key military partner of the United States and a major African recipient of U.S. military assistance.
The Pentagon gave Kenya $1.6 million worth of weaponry and other military assistance in 2006 and an estimated $2.5 million in 2007 through its Foreign Military Sales Program. In 2008 the Bush Administration expects to provide Kenya with $800,000 in Foreign Military Financing Program funds to pay for further arms purchases. Kenya has also been permitted to make large arms deals directly with private American arms producers through the State Department’s Direct Commercial Sales Program. Kenya took deliver of $1.9 million worth of arms this way in 2005, got an estimated $867,000 worth in 2007, and is expected to receive another $3.1 million worth this year.
In addition, the Bush Administration intends to spend $550,000 in 2008 to train Kenyan military officers in the United States through the International Military Education and Training Program at military academies and other military educational institutions in the United States.
The United States is also providing training and equipment to Kenya’s military, internal security, and police forces through several global and regional programs. These include, the:
• The East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative established in 2003 as a multi-year program with $100 million in funding to provide training to Kenya as well as to Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia.
• The Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program was created in 1983—under the administration of the State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security—to provide training, equipment, and technology to countries all around the world to support their participation in America’s Global War on Terrorism. The largest ATA program in Africa is targeted at Kenya, where it helped created the Kenyan Antiterrorism Police Unit (KAPU) in 2004 to conduct anti-terrorism operations, the Joint Terrorism Task Force in 2004 to coordinate anti-terrorism activities (although the unit was disbanded by the Kenyan government in 2005, and is now training and equipping members of a multi-agency, coast guard-type unit to patrol Kenya’s coastal waters. Between 2003 and 2005 (the most recent years for which this information is available), ATA provided training both in Kenya and in the United States to 454 Kenyan police, internal security, and military officers.
The creation of the KAPU was financed with $10 million IN 2003, along with $622,000 from ATA; the ATA spent $21 million on training for Kenya in 2004, $3.5 in 2005, and another $3.2 in 2006. The Bush administration requested $2.9 for 2007 and an additional $5.5 in 2008.
• The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was created in October 2002 to conduct naval and aerial patrols in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the eastern Indian Ocean as part of the effort to detect and counter the activities of terrorist groups in the region. The CJTF-FOA used military facilities in Kenya as well as in Djibouti and Ethiopia to launch air and naval strikes against alleged al-Qaeda members involved in the Council of Islamic Courts in Somalia in January and June of 2007.
In addition, the Bush administration has negotiated base access agreements with the government of Kenya—along with the governments of Gabon, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, Namibia, Sao Tome, Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia—that will allow American troops to use their military facilities (know as Cooperative Security Locations and Forward Operating Sites) whenever the United States wants to deploy its own troops in Africa.
The Bush Administration has built a close military relationship with the government of Mwai Kibaki and has played a central role in the creation of his internal security apparatus, now being deployed with such bloody results throughout Kenya.
The United States, thus, has a direct responsibility for what is going on in Kenya and for bringing it to an end. Jendayi Frazer has certainly surprised many outside the US with her most recent comments, but one can be sure that also has US military priorities in mind when she urges Kenyans to end the violence.
Daniel Volman is Director of the African Security Research Project in Washington, DC, and a member of the Board of Directors of the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars. He is a specialist on U.S. military policy toward Africa and African security issues.
Political Islam in Morocco: The Case of the Party of Justice and Development (PJD)
The impact of America’s War on Terror on the evolution of the Moroccan democratic initiative and especially on its impact on the moderate Islamic Party of Justice and Development (PJD) is important to comprehending the current political conditions in Morocco. This analysis will look at the evolution of the PJD since the Casablanca bombing in 2003 and will explain how this event has created new political dynamics between the government and the party.
Background
The moderate Islamic Party of Justice and Development (PJD) was founded by Dr. Abdelkrim Al Khatib, a politician known for his sympathy with the Monarchy, under the name of the MPDC (Popular Democratic and Constitutional Movement). The party was known for its political amnesia for many years until various members of a clandestine association Chabib Islamia (Islamic Youth), who later formed the MUR (Movement for Unity and Reform), joined the party, with the blessings of former interior minister Driss Basri. In 1988 the party officially became the PJD. Some scholars argue that the PJD name was inspired by the Turkish Party of Justice and Development. The Moroccan party differs from the Turkish PJD, however, in its brand of liberalism and modernity.
On September 27, 2002 during the legislative elections, the PJD took 42 out of 325 seats, winning most of the districts where it was represented. Since 2004, the party’s leader has been Saadeddine Othmani, a charismatic and a well respected politician. The PJD accepted the political game by participating in the political system and recognizing the institution of the monarchy, unlike Al Adl Wa Al Ihssane (Justice and Spirituality), a radical Islamist Organization that has refused to participate in the process of democratization that Morocco is going through.
Before the 2003 Casablanca bombings, the party used to publish harsh criticism and violent diatribes targeting Morocco’s opening to Western values in the MUR’s newspaper Attajdid (The Renewal). Since 2003 the party has been redefining its criticism and gives the appearance of having softened its political stances by adopting a more moderate rhetoric. Under pressure from the palace, the leaders of the PJD were urged to redefine their political discourse and to embrace the politics of modernization that constitute an important ideological tool for the new monarchy. Because of Mohammed VI’s agenda to develop a modern state with viable democratic institutions, Morocco became an attractive country to Western Europe and to the United Sates. As stated by Marvine Lowe,
As one of a handful of Arab countries which Washington can comfortably consider a friend, Morocco is viewed as a cornerstone for the American policy of promoting democracy in the region. Caught between the process of democratization and the growing momentum of political Islam, Morocco is a place that anyone concerned with the future of democracy in the Arab world should be watching closely.
The complication of the political games in Moroccan national politics should be understood within the context of the social and the economic strategic vision adopted by the palace and the government. It should also be articulated in the global context of the war on terror and of its impact on the evolution of the Islamist parties in Morocco. In order to grasp the evolution of Moroccan society toward a democratic stage, we should look at this evolution in its historical dimension.
After the death of King Hassan II, known for his autocratic and authoritarian regime, Morocco has gone through drastic political changes. In the last years of his reign, Hassan II’s political openness was crucial to the changes that were going to take place after his death. By offering the post of the prime minister to Abderrahman Youssoufi, the opposition leader of the socialist political party, Hassan II understood the historical necessity of change and of creating a new political atmosphere adapted to the liberal tendencies of his son. The heir to the throne, Mohammed VI, a well esteemed prince known for his political and democratic openness, took over in a smooth political transition. The regime change brought hope to the people of a country who were accustomed to living in a state of fear and insecurity under the ideology of the Makhzen. The Makhzen ideology, incarnated in the person of the interior minister Driss Basri, was based on oppression, humiliation and violation of the most basic human rights. In the early 1990s, Hassan II launched a political project that allowed opposition parties to freely participate in the new political process to pave the way to a smooth transition to the heir of the throne.
Reacting to the rise of Islamism in his own country, King Hassan II was able to avoid many of the problems facing other Arab countries at the time by successfully playing Islamist parties against the left, whom he saw as his main opponents. These measures kept Islamist groups at bay for most of King Hassan II’s 38-year reign. However, the prominence of political Islam started to grow again in the late 1990s as King Hassan II started opening up the government to opposition parties in order to ensure an orderly succession to the throne for his son Mohammed VI. This rise in popularity and appeal among Morocco’s Islamist parties was strengthened by the political relaxation carried out by King Mohammed VI upon his ascension to the throne in 1999. As a result of the king’s new policies, such as tolerating an independent press, Islamists benefited greatly from the freedom to exploit the government’s numerous unfulfilled promises. (Howe)
Democratization After 2003
Morocco’s political openness is coupled with multiple attempts to democratize society and to enhance a spirit of responsibility, ethics and nationalism. In this political context, parties that were banned under Hassan II, especially Cheikh Abdesslam Yassine’s radical movement Al Adl Wa Al Ihsane, started to emerge as anti-establishment parties embodying dissidence, contestation and a staunch criticism of the monarchy. On the other hand, the PJD’s moderate tone allowed it to continue to enjoy popularity among a large segment of the Moroccan population. The PJD’s ideological stances and its political position within the framework of the Moroccan political arena appeal to people who are disenchanted with the rhetoric of the secular parties. However, after the 2003 terrorist acts in Casablanca, the PJD was targeted by the security apparatuses as one of the movements that contributed to the spread of a culture of religious intolerance. As stated by Marvine Howe,
The debate over the PJD has intensified in recent months as the party has adopted a more assertive attitude. The Islamists lowered their profile after the 2003 Casablanca attacks, which led to a torrent of criticism that the PJD was contributing to a climate of intolerance. The attacks also provoked a new law banning political parties based on religion, leading the PJD to emphasize that it was no more than a party with “Islamic references.”
We should wait until the legislative elections to see the outcome of governmental manœuvres to contain the propaganda machine of the PJD. Because the PJD is viewed as a moderate political party by the United States and the European Union, it benefits from the support of the international community and from a growing number of Moroccan sympathizers. In this perspective, the PJD has succeeded in promoting an ideology that condemns political violence and recognizes the centrality of the structure of monarchy. Moreover, members of the PJD embrace social initiatives that have a strong impact on voters. Its charitable associations are very involved in social work in the whole country.
According to Roula Khalaf, earlier in 2006 polls showed that 47 per cent of the electorate embraced the party’s ideology. The PJD’s rise illustrates the trend across the Arab world where Islamist movements enjoy popularity because of their dedication to social justice coupled with a staunch opposition to American imperialism and a sustained criticism of failed social policies and initiatives of the coalition government in place. It is clear to Islamic scholars that the PJD defines itself as a political party that values communications, dialogue and negotiations and condemns any resort to violence as a means to political, social and economic gains.
In this perspective, PJD leaders’ resort to an ideology of proximity is associated with the party’s harsh criticism of the government’s failure to provide jobs and security to a growing number of Moroccans. Lahcen Daoudi, one of the top leaders of the movement, an economist by training and a significant political capital for the PJD, argues that the government is not performing and that Moroccans are looking for a political alternative. They are seeking a way out that is undoubtedly associated with the party’s reformist agenda and with a redefinition of the government’s priorities and previous initiatives. As an opposition party, the PJD criticizes the amnesia of a coalition government unable to implement economic structural changes.
Despite its popular appeal, however, the PJD remains a very controversial political party. The two main secular parties, the leftist Socialist Union of Popular Forces and the nationalist Istiqlal (Independence) argue that the moderate tone of the PJD is only a strategic move to win the upcoming legislative elections. They view the PJD’s political philosophy as anchored in a radical ideological framework. If the movement succeeds in building bridges beyond the national borders, it is still subject to criticism in a culture of Islamophobia.
Government officials as well as secular rivals accuse the party of embracing a radical ideology while presenting itself to the world with a moderate face. For example, Nabil Benabdallah, the minister of communication and a government spokesman, believes that the PJD’s ideology undermines the vision of modernity promoted by the king, including a 2004 Family Code that strengthens women’s rights. The party’s reactions to Marock, a controversial movie made by a young Moroccan woman film maker, are also revealing of the PJD’s deceptive position to issues of women’s anticipation, fasting, inter-ethnic/religious relationships, etc.
As a moderate state, Morocco has emerged as one of the most trusted Arab countries for the United States. Its new political culture has allowed it to occupy a leading position among the Arab nations that are in the process of modernizing their political institutions. However, this political opening is urging the palace and the government to redefine their political rhetoric and priorities. After attempts to implement a fully democratic electoral culture, the government is very aware that the radical Islamic movements might capitalize on this opening and be the first political parties to benefit from it. In this respect, new strategies and alliances have been taking place to contain the popularity of PJD and to minimize its political impact during the upcoming legislative elections. On the other hand, the leaders of the party multiply their social appearances and activities nationally and internationally to promote their political agenda. Othmani’s previous visits to the United States, Spain, and other European countries were the product of this strategy.
Leaders of the PJD are very aware of their political role in a country in the process of redefining itself. Since his ascension to the throne, King Mohammed VI has been striving to develop a strategic vision that will enhance Moroccan economic development to encounter the challenges of the 21st century. With the increase of youth unemployment, illegal immigration and drug trafficking, the PJD movement takes advantage of this historical situation to anchor its oppositional rhetoric within the framework of a country incapable of transcending its imminent contradictions. As a result, the party is well positioned to acquire the confidence of the voters.
PJD’s prospects for the futureAccording to national and international political observers, the PJD enjoys a very promising position in the Moroccan political landscape. Since the 2002 elections, the Islamist party continues to attract individuals from different strata of the Moroccan society. Its Islamic ideological referential is engrained within the context of a society striving to reconcile between tradition and modernity. The PJD leadership is very conscious of this fundamental polarity in Moroccan politics and culture. Since its inception as a political party, the PJD has been using a reconciliatory political rhetoric. The party tries to stay in tune with the modernizing strategies of the palace and to participate in the promotion of the ideals of an open and democratic state. Many political analysts are skeptical about the party’s ability to reconcile between these two drastic political agendas, arguing that even though PJD leaders embrace an “open” interpretation of Islam, their political success in the June 2007 elections may pave the way for more radical Islamist movements in Morocco. Some observers believe that their electoral success will certainly benefit Al Adl Wa-Al Ihsan (Justice and Charity), the most controversial Moroccan Islamist party.
However, some prominent PJD leaders urge the secularist critics to avoid deepening the polarization in society. For example, Dr. Daoudi argues that the PJD is a barrier against radicalization and weakening it will only benefit radical movements. According to Marvine Howe, this moderate Islamist party can be seen as a “buffer against al-Qaeda-inspired groups that have sought to mobilize impoverished Moroccans” such as those who were involved in the 2003 Casablanca bombings. From this perspective, one could argue that the PJD can be used by the Moroccan government and by the United States as a barrier to the development of radical violent Islamic movements that would challenge the monarchy. The US sees in this political party a promising departure from movements with an anti-imperialist and an anti-western stance. With an awareness of the evolution of fundamentalist groups around the Arab world as a result of their involvement in Iraq and Palestine, the United States is capitalizing on political parties that embrace moderation, tolerance and openness toward the West. As mentioned earlier, PJD has already taken many steps in this direction. Al Othmani’s trips to the US and Europe testify to the tendency of the party to articulate its tribulations within a moderate alternative.
As a moderate party, the PJD appeals to a variety of voters from different social and economic classes. The party’s benevolent associations are visible in the poorest areas of the big cities, such as Casablanca, Rabat, and Marrakech. The proximity strategies that the PJD has celebrated since its inception as a political organization are beneficial for a positive reputation of the party. The PJD’s good sense of organization and management is well respected by its opponents and its one of its major strengths.
PJD and the National PoliticsThe PJD currently has 42 out of 325 seats in the Chamber of Representatives won in most of the districts where it was allowed to compete during the legislative elections of 2002. Besides, the party participates in the government of about 60 municipalities, including Casablanca and Rabat and controls 14 municipal and village councils, including the city of Meknes. On the national level, the PJD representatives attempt to improve public services, redefine priorities for public spending, fight corruption, and reach out to the public. As reflected in the party’s title, the PJD’s motto is social justice and economic development; two major areas that need improvement in a country with a high level of illiteracy and unemployment. The organization’s electoral program has five pillars: authenticity, sovereignty, democracy, justice and development.
Authenticity: the concept of authenticity means the revival of an Arabo-Islamic tradition. Morocco, according to the leaders of the party, is sliding toward all forms of corruption; prostitution, drugs, etc. that destroy the fabric of an Islamic society. In order for the country to meet the challenges of the 21st century, it needs to embrace an ideology of reconciliation with its historical past.
Sovereignty: Like other political parties in Morocco, sovereignty is a sacred concept that needs to be integrated in the program of any party that promotes integration and nationalism. The PJD like other major national parties recognizes the “Moroccanness” of the Western Sahara. It also promotes the integration of all the northern enclaves (Ceuta and Mellilia) to the motherland.
Democracy: Morocco is going through a period of democratization of various institutions, including the creation of a number of organisms that promote human rights. The King’s controversial revision of women’s status is articulated within this perspective. The PJD encourages these initiatives, except the redefinition of women’s status, and proposes to continue in this direction in order to build a new Morocco attractive to foreign investment and tourism.
Justice: With the empowerment of the position of the prime minister, the PJD hopes that the minister of justice will be nominated by the prime minister instead of the king. The justice ministry is one of the sovereignty ministries under the Palace’s control. If the PJD wins in the upcoming legislative elections of June 2007, and in the case that the king appoints the leader of the party as the prime minister, the question of the reinvention of a new Justice department may well be raised. The revision of the constitution is one of the most important components of the party’s political agenda.
Since becoming king, Mohammed VI took many initiatives to modernize Morocco. His development strategies encompass a variety of economic sectors. The king’s strategic involvement in these endeavors is aimed at developing the country as well as at inhibiting the rise to power of oppositional parties, especially the PJD. In this respect, the PJD will need a strong economic package to offer to voters before elections day.
ConclusionThe American war on terror has certainly created a tense political environment in contemporary Morocco. Due to this ideology of war, the Moroccan government has felt the obligation to redefine its relationships to the main Islamic political movements and especially the Party of Justice and Development. However, the leaders of this party continue to promote their political agenda by offering a moderate interpretation of their political platform. In the aftermath of the 2003 Casablanca bombings, the government has engaged in its own war against Islamic extremism. The idea of integrating the PJD into the government, in the event that they win in the upcoming legislative elections, has provoked deep concern in the palace and beyond.
Currently, Mohammed VI is at a historical watershed, faced with two options. His first option is to integrate into his political agenda the growing voices of change by pushing for more economic, social and democratic reforms. His second option is to continue enjoying executive power by maintaining the politics of the status quo. If the king opts for the second strategy, the PJD will have a strong chance of gaining a majority in the upcoming parliamentary elections by appealing to the disenchanted segments of the Moroccan population.
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Mohammed Hirchi teaches Arabic and French language & literature at Colorado State University. He is the author of a number of articles on postcolonial francophone literature. Currently, he is working on a manuscript on Arabophone and Francophone Moroccan women writers.References:
Mohammed Tozy. (1999). Monarchie et islam politique au Maroc. Paris: Presses de Science Po, Collection Références.Marvine Howe. (2005) Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—–. http:www.mideasti.org/articles/doc385.html.
Roula Khalaf. “Morocco sees the rise of ‘acceptable’ Islamist party,” http://www. iri.org/newsarchive/2006/2006-05-23-News-FinancialTimes-Morocco.asp.