Searching for the will to conscientiously prosecute sexual crimes in Zanzibar

Introduction

The passage of the Sexual Offences (Special Provisions Act) (SOSPA)[1] in 1998 intended to promote the prosecution of crimes of gender based violence (GBV) more broadly. Specifically, it sought to strengthen the protection of victims and survivors of sexual violence. In 2004, the Zanzibar legislature, the Zanzibar House of Representatives, amended SOSPA further including it in Part XV of the 2004 Zanzibar Penal Act with the objective of making the law more readily accessible to functionaries in law enforcement and the judiciary, and therefore facilitate its implementation.

Since the legislative victory, few efforts have been made in the isles to ascertain whether the law is living to its promise of availing victims of GBV better protections and justice. This article seeks to review available case law on sexual crimes to examine the extent justice institutions seek to implement the intention of SOSPA and the Zanzibar Penal Act of 2004. Hopefully, the insights obtained from this inspection will enable activists and public officials consider further legal and extra legal measures necessary to afford victims and survivors of sexual violence greater protection under the law as well as institutionally.

A problem buried in contrast to its enormity

The case law on crimes against morality is scant. For this study, a total of ten cases were available for review. Very few of the cases involving sexual violence that are heard at district and regional courts go on appeal to the High Court. This is in spite of the fact that there is a greater likelihood for miscarriage of justice at courts of first instance. At the time of this research, the cases that were available in the High Court Criminal Registry involved coerced sexual crimes. Most of the cases involved incidents of sexual assault by a male adult on male or female children, mainly adolescent girls.

The few cases that made it to the High Court are often dismissed on technicalities, not so much on the substance of the law. Perhaps for this reason, Zanzibar is yet to develop her own body of precedent with regards to sexual crimes or the standards under which specific sexual crimes would be defined and tried. Moreover, there are very few conviction rates for sexual crimes. Among the cases reviewed there was only one conviction in the case of R v. Mzee Abdulla Suleiman or the Kitangi case which we will refer to later. This begs the question of whether the new law facilitates convictions of people charged with sexual crimes or makes it harder to convict and punish them as envisaged by the law.

On the whole, reviewed cases indicate that fewer women report sexual crimes against their persons, a fact also established by the GBV Zanzibar Study[2]. This may be partly due to the fact that they may feel ashamed to publicize the violation against their person in a society that predominantly still blames the victim for bringing the misfortune on themselves. But perhaps a bigger factor is the prevailing practice to establish whether a sexual offense has taken place or not, one that requires the deflowering of a girl or woman. Since women are less likely to be virgins, they cannot prove forced entry!

Cases in the Zanzibar High Court Criminal Registry show that there is a high incidence of child sexual abuse in the isles, a fact that is also confirmed by the GBV Zanzibar Study. The case files indicate that the children were being sexually assaulted on a regular basis. Many of these children are under 12, with the oldest sexually assaulted child, being a girl of 16 while the youngest, at the time of the trial was eight years old. The suspects are usually people very close to the children, in a care relationship to the child like an uncle, a madrasa teacher,[3] a neighbour, which may explain the fact it takes a while before a parent becomes aware of the crime being committed.[4]

Cases doctored to fail

In a number of cases, charges against the accused are dropped because the court finds that based on the evidence the accused has been wrongly charged. [5] In a few cases the charges are amended often from a more serious charge of rape to a less serious charge of indecent assault. For example, in R vs. Khalifa Hassa Kaita, the charge sheet was amended to read indecent assault even though sex had clearly happened for fear that a rape charge would not stand. In view of the fact that this case was filed after the law was amended, requiring a minimum standard of proof to convict an accused person, one wonders why a charge of grave sexual assault under §156 was not substituted instead considering that the crime is more severe and the standard of proof less strict.

Changing the charges routinely results in fewer convictions of those accused of sexual crimes; or in case of conviction, to the accused being tried on a lesser charge, which ultimately attracts lower prison terms or compensation amounts. If this is the case, it begs the question why the Director of Public Prosecution (the DPP) who commonly tries criminal cases on behalf of the state is not willing to revise a loosing strategy in protecting victims and survivors of gender based violence.

The records on file, as well as the GBV Zanzibar Study, suggest strongly that a weak prosecution of GBV related cases, especially crimes of a sexual nature begins not in the court room but with the arrests and drawing up charges. As it is police officers and the DPP seem to be fumbling with the law, not being quite sure what charge will make a conviction stick. Alternatively, it is they, and not the court, who rule on the merit of the case deciding what charge is appropriate or not to convict the accused. Moreover, it is questionable why the prosecution feels obliged to charge the suspect narrowly when the law allows for multiple charges to be drawn up increasing the risk of being found guilty under multiple counts instead of a single charge.

Importantly, the weakness in drawing up appropriate charges against persons accused of committing sexual crimes may indicate the presence of bigger issue in need of resolution. Chiefly, it could indicate that the law is impractical as it is and may need to be amended to facilitate the course of justice, especially for victims and survivors of violence. Secondly, it could suggest that there is an urgent need to strengthen the capacities of prosecutors in drawing charges and prosecuting sexual crimes.

Equally important to review is the practice of law enforcement functionaries in how they handle sexual assault cases. The GBV Zanzibar Study indicated that many cases fail for lack of strong evidence to make the charges stick beyond a reasonable doubt. In the ten cases reviewed, in only one was the child examined within twenty-four hours of the assault, something that facilitated conviction . Instead the records show how evidence is being destroyed, many times unknowingly, such as by parents or guardians washing the child; but also because of poor judgment of the attending police officer or the investigating officer.[8] Indeed, it is not uncommon for these public officers to delay investigating the crime or seek to make a deal between the parties so that there is less work to do and they gain some benefit from the deal.

Furthermore, while activists have been demanding for legal institutions to deal more forthrightly with rape incidents, especially incidents committed against children this is far from the reality in Zanzibar . Although the amount of bail has been increased, none of the case files reviewed charged bail under USD100, about one and a half months salary. To post bail, an accused demands two sureties and a letter from the Sheha[10], to guarantee the applicant. In most cases the Sheha does not object to the posting of bail, even if it concerns someone who is notorious for sexually abusing children or for harassing women.

Prosecuting the crime is also rendered difficult on account of the jurisdiction of courts. While the statute prescribes maximum sentences, in actual fact these are hardly pronounced because courts of first instances have limited jurisdiction in passing out actual sentences. For example the maximum sentence a court of first instance can hand down is 7 years imprisonment. Consequently, sentences passed are not as harsh as envisaged under the Act, ranging from a few years in jail, with or without corporal punishment.

Applying an uncertain standard of proof

To prosecute a rape crime the court requires a prima facie case of rape. This means that there must be proof that there was carnal knowledge which is established and corroborated by penetration. However, the current law does not specify the object of penetration, although it is assumed to be the male sexual organ. Accordingly, under the law, women cannot be accused of rape.

The law requires proof of illicit or unlawful sex to establish a carnal crime. This is established by proving that the parties are not legally married or separated; and that both have capacity to consent to the sexual act. Also it is immaterial, in law, whether or not there is ejaculation or force. Yet, the practice of courts has been to neglect this legal standard and to instead apply a more personalized standard. Thus while in at least seven of the cases reviewed there was proof of penetration, the court considered the fact that there was no semen to associate the accused with the crime when making a ruling. In another instance, prior sexual activity raised doubt as to the “immediate” incidence of rape such that the cases of children who were found to habitually engage in sexual activity by the court were dismissed because there was no obvious incidence of bruising or tearing which coincidentally are not the legal standards to determine the crime of rape.

Furthermore, in at least seven of the cases the court dismissed the case not because it failed to establish that intercourse did take place, but because it suspected that there was a more sinister motive on the part of the parent or guardian of the victim to bring the case. This was the situation when a mother tried to bring her son’s madrasa teacher before the law after she suspected him of sodomizing her son. Effectively, the legal battle ceases to be about the victim, and is transformed to be about settling scores between the accused and the parents of the victim. In other instances the court is influenced by the testimony of persons who do not have authority to give expert opinion. For example in one case the court followed the opinion of the victim’s mother who concluded that there was no penetration because her daughter could walk by herself and not because a medical examination had proved otherwise.[11]

Other standards inferred from the cases reviewed include shifting the onus, even in making an arrest against a suspect, on the person alleging the crime![12] Since almost all of these cases involve minors it suggests strongly that the onus is being shifted to a person who legally is incapable of consenting to the crime to prove that a crime was indeed committed against their person contrary to the law which criminalizes intercourse with a minor even if the minor consented to the sexual act; or if the minor misrepresented their age.[13] Also, the law rules out consent obtained by giving money to a child or through threats.[14]

Corroboration is required and established if another party witnesses the crime or becomes privy to the information first hand such as by the confession of the accused person.

All the while the law does not allow corroboration from the child, who often is the only party who can speak with authority about what was done to them. Otherwise, there is the problem of hearsay in admissibility of evidence. It is interesting to note that while risk to contaminate others with HIV/AIDS aids influences courts to make a conviction to deter others from the practice, not a single court ordered an HIV/AIDS test or other types of tests to determine if the child has been infected with STDs/STIs, even where evidence suggests that the child is emitting some foul discharge.[15]

Powerlessness, Vulnerability and Equal Protection

Consistently, the court penalizes children for not reporting the crime immediately after it happens without regard to the Statute of limitation.[16] This is done in spite of the fact that numerous studies confirm that given the nature of the crime, it is quite normal for children to feel angry and even recluse about what has happened to them.[17] . The Lancet, for instance, notes that most forms of violence are not unique incidents but are ongoing and can even be continued for decades.

The question of informed consent influences not only public opinion but also the bench in so far as sexual crimes are concerned. In the only case where there is an outright conviction, the Kitangi case, the boy was considered too young to agree to a sexual encounter. The Kitangi case involved a 50 year old man accused of sodomizing a five year old boy. This followed a protracted period of media reports of young boys being abused sexually. Mzee Abdulla Suleiman was consequently apprehended and convicted on the evidence of his young victim. Also, the fact that there was bruising on the young boy indicated to the court that he was forcefully entered. Nevertheless, courts have not always ruled in favour of abused children more so when they are assumed old enough to acquiesce to the advances of the adult, even if in fact they are still minors under the law as is demonstrated by the bulk of cases cited herein.

Victims and survivors of violence appear as a star witness in their own case. What they say depends very much on what they are asked by the prosecutor. An accused person can seek mitigation for his crimes. This makes it hard for victims to emphasize the gravity of the crime committed against their person but allows an aggressor the benefit of negotiating for their liberty/life something a young person when violated is denied.

Whereas the UN In-depth Study on VAW acknowledges that VAW is both a cause and a consequence of deeply ingrained inequality between men and women the law and legal practice evidences favouritism on account of sex in addressing incidents of sexual crimes. For example bail for crimes involving sodomy, which mostly involve young boys, is routinely posted higher than in cases involving rape which mostly involve young girls.[18] Also the likelihood to believe and find in favour of a male victim is greater than in cases female children are defiled. Yet medical personnel interviewed at different locations for the GBV Zanzibar Study, as did the reviewed cases, confirmed that a high number of female children exhibit prolonged sexual activity, strongly suggesting that underage girls are subjected to protracted incidences of sexual abuse which remain largely unaddressed.

Zanzibari society seems more likely to tolerate sexual activity with minor girls, as long as they are married to someone. However, the law prohibits older but unmarried girls i.e. “spinsters” engaging in sexual activity lest they loose their chastity. No similar concern is shown towards male children. Moreover support services for survivors of GBV are inexistent, inadequate or shunned (Banda, 2003). The impunity perpetrators too often enjoy results in part from the trivialization of GBV issues. Likewise, the victims of abuse may be threatened during or after legal process something that may affect their willingness to persist with the legal process.

Conclusion

Sexual Offenses (Special Provisions) Act is a testament to legislative reforms in light of growing sexual crimes against young children of both sexes, as well as women. Exiting anomalies in dealing with GBV institutionally, though acknowledged by public officials and civil society generally, continue unchecked. The impasse in firmly dealing with GBV crimes may directly impact people’s willingness to pursue and prosecute GBV crimes. Also, the reluctance of judicial officers as well as law enforcement officers to proactively address the weaknesses in law and in practice suggests that while there is a revolutionary piece of legislation to tackle GBV crimes, specifically sexual crimes, there lacks a will among those vested with the responsibility to interpret and implement the law in a manner that ascertains that the legal objective is met.

From ACAS Bulletin 83: Sexual and gender based violence in Africa

About the author

Trained in Law (LLM from Georgetown) with a focus on Human Rights and Women’s Law, Salma Maoulidi is the Executive Director of Sahiba-Sisters Foundation, a women’s development and advocacy network working mainly with Muslim and provincial women and youth with members in 12 regions of Tanzania concerned with the impact of cultural and religious discourses on women. Salma has over 20 years in the women’s and social movement in Tanzania working on and writing about legal and development related issues from an African woman’s feminist-activist perspective. Salma was one of the legal experts providing input from CSOs in Tanzania that contributed to the SOSPA reforms. She continues to use her experience working as an activist and as a consultant in various local and regional forums. Furthermore, she has initiated and coordinated a number of grass roots based Gender Based Violence campaigns including the lattest one against sexual corruption at the workplace involving women in low paying jobs in four regions. In 2007, she was one of the lead consultants for the Ministry of Labour, Youth, Women and Children Development to undertake the fist GBV prevalence study in Zanzibar.

References

A. Publications

Ali Hassan and Usu Mallya (2004) A study of the Policies and Laws related to Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in Zanzibar, the Ministry of Youth, Employment, women and Children Development, Zanzibar project for advocacy and gender

Charlotte Watts and Cathy Zimmerman (2002), “Violence Against Women: global scope and magnitude” in the Lancet Vol. 359 pp.1232-37

Chris Maina Peter,(2003) “Legal Aid and Access to Justice in Zanzibar: Examining Criteria for Provisions of Legal Assistance” in Perspectives on Legal Aid and Access to Justice in Zanzibar, Chris Maina Peter and Haroub Othman (eds.)

Division for the Advancement of Women (2005), Secretary-General’s study on violence against women, 61st session of the General Assembly Item 60(a) on advancement of women Forthcoming as document A/61/122/Add

Human Rights Watch (1994), Criminal Injustice: Violence Against Women in Brazil and America Watch Report.

Ministry of Community Development Gender and Children (2001), Stop Gender Violence: A national Plan of Action for the Prevention and Eradication of VAW and Children 2001-2015

Salma Maoulidi and Usu Mallya (2007) Study on GBV prevalence in Zanzibar, Ministry of Labour, Youth Women and Children Development.

S.F Rumisha (2004), “Child Violence and Sexual Abuse in Tanzania”, Tanzania Health Research Bulletin Vol.6, No. 1 pp.30-35

Sarah Venis and Richard Horton, “Violence against women: a global burden”, The Lancet, Volume 359, Issue 9313, 6 April 2002, Page 1172

United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (2006) Ending Violence against Women: from words to action. Study by the Secretary-General available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw/SGstudyvaw.htm

WHO (2005) Multi- Country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence against Women and Initial Results on Prevalence, Health Outcomes and Women’s Responses available at http://www.who.int/gender/violence/multicountry/en/

WHO (2006) “Global Estimates of Health Consequences due to Violence against Children”. Background paper for the United Nations Study on Violence against Children A/61/299

B. Statutes

1. The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, Education Act No.6, 1982
2. The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, the Sexual Offenses (Special Provisions) Act No 7 of 1998 Cap 13
3. The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, the Penal Act No 6 of 2004 Cap 13
4. The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, the Interpretation of Laws and General Clauses Act No. 7 of 1984
5. The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, the Spinsters and Single Parent Children Protection Act, No 4 of 2004
6. The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, the Kadhis Court Act, Act No 3 of 1985
7. The Laws of Zanzibar, Evidence Decree (1917) Cap 5
8. The Laws of Zanzibar, Penal Decree (1934) Cap 13

C. Case Law

1. R vs. Mzee Abdulla Suleiman, Criminal Case No.224 of 1995
2. R vs. Abdulla Orasta Nanduya, Criminal Case No.53 of 2003
3. R vs. Abrahman Suweidi Samalia, Criminal Case No.332 of 2002
4. R vs. Ahmed Twahiri Ali, Criminal Case No.28 of 2002
5. R vs. Ame Ramadhan Muombwa, Criminal Case No.64 of 2003
6. R vs. Amton Rafiel Saimon, Criminal Case No.113 of 2002
7. R vs. Khalifa Hassan Kaita, Criminal Case No. 49 of 2005
8. R vs. Mohammed Amour Ally, Criminal Case No.116 of 2001
9. R vs. Mzee Amiri, Criminal Case No.11 of 2002
10. R vs. Shehe Juma Ame, Criminal Case No.119 of 2001

ACRONMYS

AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
CSO Civil Society Organization
DAW Division on the Advancement of Women
DV Domestic Violence
e.g. for example
i.e. that is
GBV Gender Based Violence
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HRW Human Rights Watch
MLYWCD Ministry of Labour, Youth, Women and Children Development
MoHSW Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
PF3 Police Form 3
R Republic
SOSPA Sexual Offences (Special Provisions Act)
STDs Sexually Transmitted Diseases
STIs Sexually Transmitted Infections
UN United Nations
VAW Violence Against Women
vs. versus
WHO World Health Organization
Tshs. Tanzanian Shilling
USD United States Dollars

DEFINITION OF TERMS

The bench: refers to members of the judiciary hearing a judicial matter i.e. magistrates or judges.

Kadhi: A Muslim judge with authority to conduct marriages. In Zanzibar it is an official position.

Sheha: a government representative at the basic level of governance in the local government structure in Zanzibar i.e. a neighbourhood.

The Isles: refers to the Islands of Unguja and Pemba making up the semi autonomous state of Zanzibar.

Notes

1. Act No. 7 of 1998.

2. The Zanzibar GBV Prevalence Study sponsored by the Ministry of Labour, Youth Women and Children Development.

3. A religious school teacher.

4. A similar finding was made by the Horizon Study where among the 21 women who reported being sexually abused before the age of twelve, eight were abuse by a family members, five were abused by a neighbour, three were abused by a family friend, two by a male worker in the house and two by a stranger and one by a male friend.

5. R vs. Amton Rafiel Saimon, for example, the accused was charged for rape but court ruled he was charged under a wrong section and he must have been charged for defamation.

6. See for example the case of R vs. Khalifa Hassan where the original charge sheet stated the offence as kubaka or rape but was actually convicted on indecent assault.

7. R vs. Abrahman Suwedi Samalia

8. When someone goes to the police with a complaint, the first person they meet is a desk officer who simply records the complaint. The case is then assigned to an investigating officer. Many times connecting with an investigating officer can take days.

9. Some for instance want the crime to be equated with murder and to deny those accused of sexual violation bail especially since granting them bail ultimately results in their freedom.

10. An official presiding over the smallest administrative unit of local government, the Shehia.

11. R vs. Khalifa Hassan Kaita.

12. In R vs. Shehe Juma Ame, for example, an imbecile was raped in her home. Her brother caught them in the act but in dismissing the suit the court reasoned that the brother should have caught and overpowered the suspect in the act, since he was in a compromising state.

13. This is a significant departure from the old law where a suspect could claim being misled as to the age of his female victim.

14. §145 (B).

15. In R vs. Ame Ramadhani court establishes presence of vaginal and anal sex

16. In one case the Magistrate dismissed the case because the victim reported the offence to his grandmother on the third day while the Statute of Limitation in criminal cases does not place such restriction in prosecuting an offence once it becomes known.

17. See for example S.F Rumisha (2004), “Child Violence and Sexual Abuse in Tanzania” or WHO (2006) “Global Estimates of Health Consequences due to Violence against Children”.

18. e.g. in case of R vs. Ahmed Twahiri bail was set at Tshs.500,000 while bail was posted at the same amount in only one rape case. Otherwise the bail rates were relatively less for other types of sexual crimes e.g. indecent assault at about Tshs. 100-300

Zanzibar GBV advocacy: important lessons for future legal reform strategies

Background

The passage of the Convention of the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1979 revolutionized advocacy for women’s rights in global, national and local spaces. Subsequent global conferences on women, especially those convened by the United Nations, squarely put women’s rights issues on national agendas. Specifically, the naming of violence against women a human rights violation to be considered as a moral and legal crime by CEDAW, the Vienna Declaration and the Beijing Platform for Action (BoA) reinvigorated local activism against gender based violence (GBV).

The GBV concept has its roots in feminist epistemology, in its articulation of women’s human rights. Specifically, it focuses on violations directed against women and other vulnerable groups and attempts to assess:

•the Provision of GBV services by the state as well as other actors. These include post-rape care; medical care; and legal aid and support services;

•efforts to Prevent GBV by the state as well as relevant actors either through education programmes, putting in place an infrastructure that minimizes incidents of abuse e.g. screening of offenders; or the reduction of secondary victimization;

•the level of Protection afforded to victims and survivors of GBV such as affording them with safe houses or protection orders; and

•State keenness to Promote GBV services such as by making the necessary budgetary and human resource allocations, at all levels, to GBV related services; and enacting and adopting relevant GBV laws and policies. The punitive aspect of the law is an important indicator of the state’s willingness to enforce laws.

Kithaka (2008) describes sexual offences legislations cropping up in the region in the last two decades as intended to prevent and protect people from harmful and unlawful sexual acts. Armed with these International Human Rights instruments, women human rights activists around the world campaigned for legal reform to bring local laws up to universal standards. Chiefly, they engaged the state demanding it to take action to safeguard the personal integrity, dignity, liberty of women and children as required under international law. One area women in Tanzania immediately began organizing around was against sexual crimes committed against women and children. The concern was to protect women against crimes perpetrated by the state or its agents as well as by intimate partners.

Breaking the silence on various forms of violence against women was the primary advocacy strategy deployed by activists resulting in three main outcomes. Foremost, it led to the increased reporting of GBV incidents in communities, especially among women who had suffered prolonged abuse . Secondly, it led to there being increased attention, outreach services and advocacy on these issues by civil society organizations as well as concerned citizens ensuring greater media coverage of the issues. Notably, the increased advocacy led to the passage of the Sexual Offences Special Provisions Act (SOSPA) in 1998, the first popularly instigated legislative initiative in Tanzania.

More than ten years after the passage of SOSPA, how has the law enhanced protections for vulnerable groups? In this paper, I will use the experience of legal reforms in Zanzibar to explore this question. Specifically, I will look at how the justice system translates and gives force to the legislative intention of the law. The study and conclusions are informed by an extensive review of laws governing morality as well as reported cases in the High Court Criminal Division Registry. Information was also derived from interviews with functionaries in law enforcement and the judiciary, particularly those who deal with GBV matters in Zanzibar, carried out between 2005 and 2006. Another important reference is the GBV prevalence study undertaken in Zanzibar on behalf of the ministry responsible for women and children affairs in 2007.[3]

The genesis of GBV advocacy in Zanzibar [4]

Compared to the Mainland, GBV advocacy in Zanzibar took off much later. This could be explained to, among other things, the reluctance to bare sexually explicit content in public, as well as the relative low reporting of GBV incidents in law enforcement bodies and the media. Like on the Mainland, it would be the work of the Tanzania Media Women’s Association’s (TAMWA) Zanzibar Office that would set the spark. The association’s coverage of the government’s practice to incarcerate pregnant un-wed mothers surfaced some of the human rights violations women and children continued to endure in the isles contrary to the spirit of CEDAW. An effectively orchestrated media campaign called for legal reforms against discriminatory legal provisions in various laws that penalized or discriminated against women on account of their sex.

At another level the ‘outing’ of sexual offenses can be linked to the dual pandemic of HIV/AIDS and poverty which were intensifying in the early nineties as Tanzania gradually abandoned state sponsored welfare policies and programmes. The Tanzanian media raised the alarm about “cleansing” practices to either rid oneself of the HIV virus or the poverty bug. Journalists linked the rapid increase of sexual abuse of young children to HIV/AIDS after they learnt that some waganga[5] advised people infected with HIV that sleeping with a virgin, would cure them of the virus. Equally, they advised the emerging crop of local businessmen that sleeping with young virgin girls or boys would increase their luck in business. While many women and children were being sexually violated some were being killed for their sexual body parts, another practice associated with poverty cures.

In Zanzibar, the arrest and incarceration of one Bwana Kitangi who was long suspected of defiling and sodomizing young children provided an impetus for civil society organizations to pursue legal reforms in the law with vital support from the Ministry responsible for women and children affairs. Certainly, the link between women’s vulnerability to violence and HIV infection prompted calls for greater measures to minimize women’s and children’s risk to HIV infection through sexual violence. Likewise, the egregious nature of sexual crimes against women e.g. rape, gang rape, sodomy, ravishing of sexual parts and the like raised added security concerns for women.

The Sexual Offenses (Special Provisions) Act No. 7 of 1998

The Sexual Offenses (Special Provisions) Act was passed amidst public outcry and intense lobbying against what many decried as immoral crimes committed against vulnerable groups. Although women were disproportionately affected, the attacks on children helped to win public sympathy over the issue.[6] Hither to its passage activists’ attempt to prosecute abusers of sexual or domestic violence often failed because of laws that were outdated or inappropriate to protect certain groups like children and people with disabilities. Similarly, the successful prosecution of GBV cases failed due to the dismissive attitudes of the larger society, as well as the inability of law enforcement bodies to take GBV issues seriously.

Before the passage of SOSPA in 1998 sexual offences were contained in the Penal Decree of 1934, a law reflective of colonial preoccupation with morality. Therefore, SOSPA amends this law fundamentally by modernizing it. Foremost, the Act adopts gender sensitive language. Also, it includes both minimum and maximum sentences and expands the option for punishment to include imprisonment, corporal punishment, fine and compensation. In fact, SOSPA makes compensation mandatory upon conviction (§121) a development that could be read to recognize the wrong and harm done to survivors of violence au lieu of blaming them for the violence as was often the case.[8]

In many ways, the SOSPA reflects ongoing concerns with rising and new forms of crimes committed against women and children, not only in Tanzania but across the world such as trafficking for sexual and labour exploitation[9] ; sexual harassment and prostitution; and cruelty towards children including compelling them to undergo FGM. [10] It is also an attempt by the government to stay abreast of developments in international Human Rights Law. For example, §148 raises the age of consent to a sexual act for girls to eighteen years while the former law excused such acts, if committed on girls as young as 14, as long as the defiler believed she was older.

The1998 Act requires a lower standard to prove sexual crimes. Similarly, punishment imposed is more severe. New crimes are also introduced in the law. For example, prostitution, defined as offering the (human) body for consideration, is introduced as an offence and procurement of prostitution is explicitly recognized as a crime. The Act criminalizes non-consensual sex for minors and women including consent obtained by giving money to a child or through threats. [11] Also, it doubles the punishment for acts of gross indecency against minors compared to people of the same age.[12]

Sentences under the 1998 law are much stricter than the former law. Conviction for rape (§120), as well as gang rape (§121A), for instance, is life imprisonment. The law does away with the requirement for corroboration to prove rape demanding only proof of penetration regardless of there being ejaculation or the use of force. Moreover, an accessory to the crime of rape receives the same punishment as the offender. An attempt to carnally know a boy or girl, if convicted, attracts a 25 year sentence with corporal punishment.

The Penal Act of 2004

In 2004, the Zanzibar legislature took the additional step to include SOSPA within the Penal Act with a dual objective: First it would make the law more readily accessible to functionaries in law enforcement and the judiciary; and secondly it would ensure that SOSPA has the same status as crimes in the principal legislation. Offences against morality are contained in Part XV of the 2004 Penal Act and comprise of 39 sections i.e. §124 through §163. Although most provisions of the 1934 and 1998 legislations are retained, there are significant additions to the 2004 law, reflecting changing social realities, as well as political considerations.

Notably, the 2004 Act introduces new crimes mainly of marital rape (§125(2) (a) and (e); lesbianism (§153); the sexual exploitation of children (§155); same sex marriage (§157); and sexual harassment (§158). However, the law fails to provide the standard to prove a number of offences essentially making it difficult to charge anyone with the crime. For example, under Sections 132, 150 and 152, sodomy is a crime when performed against young boys not when done against women and girls. Nevertheless, the law demonstrates a willingness to break the silence against violence rather than keeping sexual crimes under wraps. Also, it shows a willingness to prosecute people who are otherwise held in esteem like public officials (§125(3) (a)); officials in remand homes (§125(3) (b)); hospital officials (§125(3) (c)); and traditional healers or religious leaders (§125(3) (d)).

While there is an attempt to use gender neutral and gender inclusive language in the law, the law still demonstrates a bias towards the male sexual norm. For example, homosexuality between men is punished more severely (14 to 25 years and a fine at Tshs.700,000 about USD700) than is homosexuality between women (five years and Tshs.500,000 fine about USD500). Moreover, sexual crimes committed against males attract higher sentences than those committed against other groups including women or people with disabilities.

Thus, anyone who indecently assaults a woman or girl, upon conviction is liable to 3 to 14 years in jail (§ 131 (1) and (3) while for those who assault young boys are liable upon conviction to a jail term of not less than twenty five years (§152). Provisions of this kind indicate a male centric notion of ‘natural’ sexual relations. In the present context of increased advocacy on sexuality based rights such provisions pose an equal protection challenge as to the criminalization to a life style choice between consenting adults.

Holes in the Law

GBV laws are scattered in various legislations including SOSPA, the Penal Code/Act, the Education Act, the Law Marriage Act and the Spinster and Single Parent Children Protection Act 2005. However, as a concept GBV is a much broader than what is currently contained in the legal framework where the focus is mainly on sexual crimes. Despite the presence of a robust legislation, reports of GBV crimes, especially sexual crimes, remain high while the conviction rates for sexual crimes and GBV generally remain low in the isles. The Zanzibar GBV study established that 40% of sexual offenses cases fail due to insufficient evidence. Additionally, culprits escape the arm of the law due to institutional weaknesses such as case delays or transfers, improper collection and storage of evidence, faulty charges and conflicting laws and jurisdiction.

A major finding in the Zanzibar GBV Study is the serious conflict between the substantive law with procedure. For instance, the Penal Act provides for a maximum sentence of thirty years or life for rape, but courts of first instance where most matters are heard only have jurisdiction to pronounce sentences of between 3 to 7 years. Most cases heard at the lower courts are rarely appealed availing little opportunity for justice to be done. In addition, whereas GBV cases should normally be heard under criminal jurisdiction, the GBV study found that incidents of GBV are addressed in formal and informal structures. Formal structures comprised of the Sheha’s Office; Courts; the Police; the Kadhi’s Court; and Hospitals.

Informal structures comprised of family and religious structures. Each structure is guided by its own set of laws and rules. Medical staff, for example, comply mostly with medical guidelines when carrying out examinations on survivors of sexual assault with very little guidance on what the law says about such assaults. An added dimension to GBV prosecution is Zanzibar’s dual court structure: the normal common law courts and religious courts. GBV is a criminal matter and thus subject exclusively to criminal jurisdiction. However, in practice, the Kadhis Court which is only empowered to hear civil matters regularly hears and adjudicates over GBV matters. Religious structures treat cases of sexual assault as civil cases with little indication that they recognize them as crimes under the law.

Furthermore, public institutions like the police, local government or hospital don’t always treat GBV as a cognizable offence. One Sheha, for example confessed that he took suspects to the police station supposedly only “to scare them so that they realize the gravity of the problem”. The fact that many cases are dropped before they are heard by a competent prosecutor or a court of law is indicative of how the law enforcement machinery approaches sexual crimes. Most institutions investigated were not proactive about addressing GBV incidences but acted only if moved. And even then, rather than enforce the law, most institutions were happy to follow the whims of the families when dealing with GBV incidences.

A review of cases of sexual offences in the High Court Criminal Registry reveals that few victims of sexual crimes are compensated for the harm endured. What purpose is then served to have a progressive legislation when the same is impracticable? Is the situation just a matter of legislative oversight or does it reflect a general reluctance to act decisively on sexual crimes because doing so would implicate men who often assume the role of moral policemen, and by so doing, defeat the notion of women being the weak moral element ?

Early in 2009 the Tanzania Court of Appeals, the highest court on the land circulated its draft rules for comment. These rules deal mostly with procedural aspects of civil and criminal cases. A number of lawyers in Zanzibar complained about the absence of relevant rules in key legislation suggesting that courts in the isles operate without the benefit of clear operational guidance. Anne Kithaka also notes that in Kenya many sections in the legal framework are not operational for lack of regulations to make them effective. For instance Section 39 of SOA requires the Registrar of the High Court to keep a register and data bank of convicted sexual offenders. Likewise Section 47 empowers the Minister to prescribe regulations on the contents of the data bank. Section 329 (A) requires the Chief Justice to make rules and regulations to guide the manner in which Victim Impact Statements can be received and used by the court.

Absence of Effective Institutional Responses

Compared to other countries in the region, Tanzania made quick and great strides in so far as legislating against GBV, especially in fighting sexual violence . Nonetheless, efforts to criminalize the same have attracted much resistance, more so from the legislators and even the public officials whose obligation is to enforce the law. While speaking to the national legislature in the January 2009 Parliamentary session, the Minister of Justice is quoted in the media to call for reduced sentences for the crime of rape . Surprisingly, this same Minister, then a Deputy Minister, is quoted in an earlier news piece admitting that at 15 girls are still biologically and psychologically immature to marry or have sex .

Yet, cases of sexual and other gender related crimes committed against women and children inundate the ministry responsible for women and children and various civil society actors . Moreover, over 75% of all public institutions interviewed during the Zanzibar GBV Study reported receiving cases involving gender based violence (GBV). In over half of these institutions GBV matters comprise 41% of the caseload while in four of the 12 institutions interviewed they constitute over 50% of its caseload. All institutions identified sexual assault as the highest type of complaint coming before them. Attempted rape was identified by 11 institutions, in some institutions comprising about 30% of the caseload.

Women are more likely to report GBV crimes to institutions. Girls are more likely to be victims of sexual violence than women or male children. Interviews held with medical personnel in various district hospitals in Unguja and Pemba confirmed that a high number of female children exhibit prolonged sexual activity which suggests protracted incidences of sexual abuse which is largely unaddressed. The same was confirmed in law reports. Even so, the Zanzibar GBV study consistently found medical examiners not reporting to court to give evidence or prosecutors who rarely gave other functionaries feedback on outcomes of cases. This has given rise to a situation where departments addressing GBV are constantly at logger heads with the ministry responsible for women and children or civil society organizations, the blame game comprising a major feature of the institutional relationship.

Similarly, the study found that local government and religious officials regularly inhibit the law from taking its course. In case of rape or sexual assault they preside over hastily arranged marriages on the demand of the girl’s parents, the concern being to save the situation at hand not to comply with the law. Other than the fact that such a practice forces the girl to relive a traumatic experience, marrying the girl to the rapist, not only rewards the criminal but also attempts to legalize his crime. These marriages are short lived and often leave women and girls destitute, raising young families on their own.

The lack of an enforcement and monitoring mechanism fails to ensure compliance with the law. As matters stand the victim or survivor of violence stands alone in that they have no automatic right to legal representation or other types of legal and psychotic support.

Sexual offenders and GBV perpetrators operate with impunity mainly because national-level responses to GBV remain weak, if at all existent. In Zanzibar, there is not a single institution dedicated to GBV survivors or victims. Also, public institutions that could help women like the ministry responsible for women are toothless to enforce most provisions of GBV law like maintenance in case of neglect of children.

Certainly, the effective prosecution of sexual crimes under the law requires different actors at different levels complimenting one another in making and substantiating a legal case. In reality, there is very little interaction and cooperation between these bodies in prosecuting GBV crimes. Presently, there is no connection between social work, law and medicine something that makes an integrated approach to legal and social issues in the medical field impracticable. Overall, there is little effort to monitor compliance with GBV law in public institutions. Moreover, the absence of reliable data on GBV incidence means that it is difficult to establish the impact if any of available measures. Also it results in weak institutional responses denying women, girls and children survivors of GBV legal relief. GBV victims suffer in guilt and silence, allowing the perpetrators of GBV to abuse other victims with impunity.

Despite the move to merge SOSPA provisions in the Penal Act, laws related to GBV are not readily available to all law enforcement functionaries. The Zanzibar GBV study found that 70% of people interviewed in institutions report not having copies of any laws related to GBV as opposed to 30% with the relevant laws. An equal number of functionaries report never having read or going over any of the relevant GBV provisions. Additionally, most judicial, health and administrative personnel have not been trained in applying provisions related to GBV law. Although some magistrates believed it was enough to know the law to apply it effectively, few appreciated that by their nature GBV crimes required additional skills to enable legal personnel and the police to effectively work with a survivor or victim of GBV lest they relapse to old habits. Also, functionaries need specialized training in sexual abuse crimes so that they do not omit important medical-legal information crucial in proving the crime as discovered by the Medical Legal Institute in Brazil.

Prevailing Attitudes vis-à-vis the Law

Ann Njogu suggests strongly that VAW and the violation of women’s rights, at peace time as well as during conflicts, is indicative of a crisis in masculinities. Rosemary Okello on her part attributes incidents of gender violence to gender inequalities. Public awareness and knowledge about GBV remains low in the larger Zanzibar society resulting in many cases being unreported; or summarily dismissed as petty when reported. In the Zanzibar GBV Study, more than 65% of individual respondents did not know of any law related to GBV while about 40% of institutional informants claimed never hearing of SOSPA.

Values, embedded in culture, religion and patriarchy very much influence the outlook of the law with regards to regulating the moral framework in the isles. For example, the Spinster and Single Parent Children Protection Act of 2005 absolves men from a moral responsibility with regards the consequences of an illicit sexual act. It only requires he maintains the child until it reaches eighteen (sections 5(1), 8 and 9). However, and perhaps borrowing from Islamic jurisprudence, the law does not expect the father to have a protracted relationship with the child, stopping the maintenance order if he marries the mother.

Parents whose daughters have been defiled are mostly concerned with saving face, a preoccupation entertained by law enforcement bodies. Accordingly, the rapist may be forced to marry the girl; or the two families may come to some settlement about the unborn child. Generally, sexual Offences against minors attract lower fines compared to say those imposed on consenting adults accused of homosexuality. Sex with a minor is only discouraged if such act occurs between people who are not married since it is acceptable that pubescent girls can be married off.

A 2005 WHO Study found that 50% of women have experienced intimate partner violence. According to the TDHS 2004 violence is an accepted part of the male- female relationship. Women can be beaten if she burns the meal, argues with her husband, leaves the home without his knowledge, neglects the children or if she refuses to have sex with him. Anne Kithaka (2008) notes the subtle discrimination in the legal framework whereby marital status and cultural relativism are being used to deny a certain section of women constituency from the communal calabash of justice.

The Law Contrasted with Judicial Practice

In the Zanzibar GBV Study, 31% of informants working in institutions dealing with GBV reported not using the Penal Act in matters concerning GBV. Subsequent interviews and case reviews reveals that the prosecution and the bench in Zanzibar use their discretion more readily than the law when handling GBV crimes as demonstrated in the following case:

A 17 year old girl was raped by her mother’s lover. The magistrate issued a lower sentence because he established that prior to the rape, the girl was already sexually active albeit not with the rapist. He was doubly prejudiced when, at the time of the trial, he found she was pregnant with another man’s child. He also admits taking into consideration the fact that the rapist was known to the household. Because he could not bear sending a 27 year old man to prison for raping a promiscuous girl, he handed a sentence of 7 years!

Additionally, court officials still required corroboration to prove rape even though the legal standard is solely proof of penetration. One female magistrate interviewed justified the importance of corroboration for those who alleged sexual violence. “If there is no corroboration”, she explained, “Men will be imprisoned on vendetta”. Routinely, legal and health personnel require evidence of bruises or the use of force to prove rape even though the law recognizes the possibility of rape in instances where a party may be tricked or coerced into having carnal knowledge, such as through false representation or being drugged.

Public uproar over sexual crimes remains great but the quantity of reported cases hardly reflects the gravity the matter. Legal practitioners consulted during the research blamed the society for being unwilling to prosecute such crimes. For example, a Regional Magistrate asserted that during her time at the bench she only knew of two cases where the parents of a child who had been violated were adamant about prosecuting the accused for the crime. However, reviewed cases strongly suggest that the legal process may actually deter victims and their families from seeking redress through the courts. After suffering a traumatic experience it is not uncommon for families and survivors to wait for months, if not years before the investigation is concluded and the case for sexual assault is heard to conclusion before a competent and impartial court of law.

Since delays are common, many parents and survivors may be led to believe that it is not worth the trouble to subject themselves through another degrading process. The longer the case takes the greater the possibility of key evidence to be lost or forgotten. Unreasonable delays led one parent to complain on record over the stalling of his child’s case which remained pending because the prosecutor was on study leave. Assigning a new prosecutor would mean starting a fresh case. The parent challenged this practice as denying the wronged child justice. Cases are also dismissed on account of lacking expert witnesses e.g. health personnel not attending court sessions to give their expert opinion or poor prosecution.

Concerns of corruption were universally voiced more so in so far as obstructing the legal process against dealing appropriately with the perpetrator of violence. Local attitudes are partly to blame for the state of affairs since most prefer to deal with “whom they know” to either bend or expedite the legal or judicial process, inviting corrupt elements to take advantage of a population that is largely illiterate in legal matters. Survivors and victims of violence who are unable ‘to buy’ their justice are routinely compromised by law enforcement officials keen to maximize profits from the misfortunes of others. Ethical considerations have little bearing on their professions.

In practice, no case of sexual assault is entertained absent a Police Form Three (PF3). The requirement to present a PF3 in all GBV cases is problematic and more so when it involves a sexual crime. Foremost, in a human resource strained health sector their admissibility requirement e.g. to be filled by a designated medical officer, is hard to realize. For instance, it is hard to find the caliber of medical officer empowered to fill the form in most peripheral public health facilities. Also, the actual form is unsatisfactory for recording sexual crimes in detail. The size of the form, roughly one third of an A4 paper, does not motivate health officials to include additional information or diagrams which may assist to elaborate the injury. Likewise, the options to fill out the form are limited to superficial injuries and not other types of injuries .

In addition, there is a problem with the instructions issued to establish whether a crime has taken place or not. For example, during the GBV Study health officials reported being asked to establish whether the girl was a virgin and not if she has been raped while police officers reported being asked by parents to establish if the girl is pregnant not to investigate a rape. Purportedly, the rape allegation comes up only if the young girl is pregnant and the parents want to save face by threatening the impregnator to marry her lest he is slapped with a rape charge.

Furthermore, SOSPA provisions are defeated by the presence of laws like the Spinster and Single Parent Children Protection Act 2005 which is loaded with moral connotations about acceptable sexual behaviour and seeks to deal with the consequences of ‘illicit sexual intercourse’ i.e. extra marital sex and having children out of wedlock. In most cases it is the woman who is punished for what is understood to be sexual indiscretions while formal and informal institutions collude to ease the burden on males.

Devising Responses Guided by Experience

Maoulidi and Mallya (2007) and Mlanga (2007) argue that GBV should be approached in a multi-sectoral and integrated way. The substantive law taken alone cannot facilitate a successful prosecution of sexual crimes under the prevailing judicial system. This review also underscores the necessity of support mechanism for victims and survivors of GBV. In England, DV advisors act as liaison between the victim and various statutory agencies. This will minimize the likelihood of cases being dropped prematurely. It will also reinforce a sense of support for victims and survivors of GBV. The establishment of specialist DV courts across the country also helps in expediting GBV trials.

The court requires expert opinion to help secure a conviction, but such opinion is limited to the opinions of civil servants who are ill advised and trained in the law. Generally, the courts have been less willing to consider ongoing research on GBV as well as opinions from advocacy organizations in both the isles as well as the Mainland. Perhaps the admissibility of video recordings, photographs and statements of GBV survivors can strengthen evidence tendered to the court rather than relying solely on expert witnesses.

Moreover, the judicial system in Zanzibar needs to remain abreast of legal development and scholarship on GBV. For instance, numerous researchers have pointed out the involvement of people close to the family, including blood relatives in cases of child sexual abuse (Rumashi and Banda, 2003). Similarly, the Zanzibar GBV study established that adolescent girls were disproportionately victimized in cases of sexual violence. A similar finding was made earlier in the United Nations Study on Violence against Children and by the Horizon Study where among 21 women who reported being sexually abused before the age of twelve, eight were abuse by a family members, five were abused by a neighbour, three were abused by a family friend, two by a male worker in the house and one by a male friend. Only two respondents were assaulted by a stranger. Therefore the view that rape and sexual assault is perpetrated by people alien to the victim or family is untenable.

Overwhelmingly, GBV advocacy and services are spearheaded by CSO. But rather than going at it alone or working in opposition to the government, Wamai emphasizes strengthening CSO relationships with provincial organizations in enforcement efforts. Maendeleo ya Wanawake in Kenya, for instance, works with local police and chiefs to do GBV case follow up. In Tanzania, CSOs like Sahiba-Sisters Foundation are implementing community responses in close collaboration with newly established women police units, community police and legal outfits.

Capacity building in critical skills to manage GBV is thus an important aspect of GBV enforcement mechanism. GBV training should be an integral part of the formation of law enforcement bodies as well as local government officials. Training should consider both the substantive as well as the procedural aspects and must be supplemented by relevant work tools such as the GBV Reference Manual a joint initiative between the AG ‘s Office in Kenya and WiLDAF. The manual expounds the law, sets standards and recommends best practices to various levels of providers e.g. medical practitioners, activists and investigators.

In addition to international human rights instruments, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa and the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development among others, require African nations to recognize full gender equality. Also, they require nations to provide the minimum standard in identifying and mapping GBV prevalence. Further, it calls for the periodic assessment of the level of institutional response to address GBV incidences.

Monitoring GBV prevalence, as well as legal and judicial practice, is thus critical to giving existing GBV laws life. The SADC Gender and Development Protocol calls for targets and benchmarks to reduce gender violence in the region. Pamela Mhlanga’s article is informative in so far as appreciating the selective application of the SADC Gender and Development Declaration in respect to enforcing the law relating to marital rape. She notes that only 9 sub-Saharan African countries, including Tanzania, recognize marital rape.

Equally, there is an urgent need to investigate available mechanism to respond to GBV incidents at different levels. Certainly, information about the status quo is critical to inform future GBV advocacy strategies and institutional responses. A welcome development is the incorporation of VAW statistics in the TDHS since 2004. The AU is considering initiating a VAW fund to address the problem of enforcement of GBV laws. An equally commendable development in the region is the Waki Commission Report which isolates sexual and GBV for special attention following the post election violence in Kenya.

Ann Njogu asserts that political will is required to profile sexual and gender based violence at par with other serious crimes. Tanzania has already developed a GBV Policy. Kenya is presently considering a national policy framework to guide in the implementation and enforcement of SOA in compliance with the law. Meanwhile there must be efforts to strengthen the prosecution of GBV crimes. England, for example, has instituted specialist Domestic Violence Courts while Turkey makes pathology services in criminal cases available in the court house .

Kithika calls for a paradigm shift in service delivery system, seeking to make them consumer friendly and sensitive. Close monitoring of GBV cases by CSOs cannot be under emphasized. Media Women’s Association in four Eastern African countries recently launched a Media Code on Violence. While the code mainly targets the reporting of case involving child sexual abuse, the idea of a code can also be popularized to other professionals to underscore the ethical dimensions of GBV advocacy. In sum, there is an urgent need for an oversight body to police the administration of justice, especially in GBV cases.

Conclusion

In many respects the legal framework in Zanzibar has made great strides in redefining gender based violence and crimes of a sexual nature. SOSPA attests to the influence of global advocacy efforts in recognizing at locals contexts explicit crimes against women outlined in CEDAW and furthered at key conferences on women including Vienna Conference on Human Rights, ICPD and Beijing. The HIV/AIDS pandemic and the particular risk posed to victims of sexual crimes also influenced strong and deliberate measures to be taken against sexual offenders.

Existing laws relating to GBV contain some strong provisions but lack an enforcement mechanism to oblige institutional compliance as envisaged under various international, regional and national instruments. Significantly, the legal framework remains ineffective because it is toothless for lack of enforceability. Likewise, women’s rights continue to be compromised because they are analyzed within a religious context instead of being linked to the legal and political framework which demands de facto and de jure gender equality.

The lesson from the GBV study in Zanzibar for future reforms suggests that law reform initiatives must simultaneously emphasize substantive and procedural aspects of the law. Also, it suggests a strong need to periodically monitor and review judicial practices in so far as their compliance to specified legal standards. Certainly, an effective law rests upon a constant critique of judicial practice against people actual experiences in the legal process. Also it needs to take cognizance of emerging knowledge, and practice in the field. It is clear that the courts in Zanzibar confine themselves to the raw form of the law and rarely, if at all, seek the benefit of studies in the field of GBV when presiding over GBV cases. This denies them the opportunity to elucidate and develop the law consonant with the peculiarities of the Zanzibar legal context.

From ACAS Bulletin 83: Sexual and gender based violence in Africa

About the author

Trained in Law (LLM from Georgetown) with a focus on Human Rights and Women’s Law, Salma Maoulidi is the Executive Director of Sahiba-Sisters Foundation, a women’s development and advocacy network working mainly with Muslim and provincial women and youth with members in 12 regions of Tanzania concerned with the impact of cultural and religious discourses on women. Salma has over 20 years in the women’s and social movement in Tanzania working on and writing about legal and development related issues from an African woman’s feminist-activist perspective. Salma was one of the legal experts providing input from CSOs in Tanzania that contributed to the SOSPA reforms. She continues to use her experience working as an activist and as a consultant in various local and regional forums. Furthermore, she has initiated and coordinated a number of grass roots based Gender Based Violence campaigns including the lattest one against sexual corruption at the workplace involving women in low paying jobs in four regions. In 2007, she was one of the lead consultants for the Ministry of Labour, Youth, Women and Children Development to undertake the fist GBV prevalence study in Zanzibar.

References

A. Publications

Anil Kija, Analysis: “Outdated laws, SOSPA and EPA Cases”, in This Day Tuesday February 3, 2009

Anna Joachim, “Wanaharakati wamng’ag’ania Waziri Chikawe”, in Tanzania Daima February 12, 2009

Anne Kithaka (2008) Enforcement of the Sexual Offences Act in Kenya available at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/49923

Benedict Sichalwe, “Chikawe awavaa wanaharakati”, in RAI February 8, 2009

Division for the Advancement of Women (2005), Secretary-General’s study on violence against women, 61st session of the General Assembly Item 60(a) on advancement of women Forthcoming as document A/61/122/Add.

Elieshi Lema (Ed.) (2008) 20 Years of Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA) Moving the Agenda for Social Transformation in Tanzania, E&D Vision Publishing Ltd

Emma Njoki Wamai (2008) “Reflections on 16 days of activism” available at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/48325

Jessie Bwambo et al (2001), “HIV and Partner Violence- implications for HIV Voluntary Counseling and Testing Programs in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania”

Ministry of Community Development Gender and Children (2001), Stop Gender Violence: A national Plan of Action for the Prevention and Eradication of VAW and Children 2001-2015

Nelson Banda, “Gender Based Violence” in Femnet News Oct- Dec 2003

Nevala, S. (2005), The International Violence against Women Surveys, Geneva, European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control

Pamela Mhlanga (2007) “Southern Africa: Justice for survivors of marital rape, how far has SADC come?” Available at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/categories/16 days/45014

Paul Perret, a Call of Action on HIV/AIDS-Related Human Rights Abuses against Women and Girls in Africa.

Rosemary Okello (2008) “African leaders signal commitment to finance gender equality” available at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/16 days/52578

Salma Maoulidi (2009) “Reduce Executive Incompetence not SOSPA Sentences” available at Pambazuka http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/54973

Salma Maoulidi and Usu Mallya (2007) Study on GBV prevalence in Zanzibar, Ministry of Labour, Youth Women and Children Development

Sarah Venis and Richard Horton, “Violence against women: a global burden”, The Lancet, Volume 359, Issue 9313, 6 April 2002, Page 1172

S.F Rumisha (2004), “Child Violence and Sexual Abuse in Tanzania”, Tanzania Health Research Bulletin Vol.6, No. 1 pp.30-35

United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (2006) Ending Violence against Women: from words to action. Study by the Secretary-General available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw/SGstudyvaw.htm

United Republic of Tanzania, The Tanzania Health and Demographic Health Survey of 2004/05

WHO (2006) “Global Estimates of Health Consequences due to Violence against Children”. Background paper for the United Nations Study on Violence against Children A/61/299

WHO (2005) Multi- Country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence against Women and Initial Results on Prevalence, Health Outcomes and Women’s Responses. Also available at http://www.who.int/gender/violence/multicountry/en/

B. Statutes

1. The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, Education Act No.6, 1982
2. The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, the Sexual Offenses (Special Provisions) Act No 7 of 1998 Cap 13
3. The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, the Penal Act No 6 of 2004 Cap 13
4. The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, the Interpretation of Laws and General Clauses Act No. 7 of 1984
5. The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, the Young and Children’s Offenders Act 1998
6. The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, the Spinsters and Single Parent Children Protection Act, No 4 of 2004
7. The Marriage and Divorce (Muslim) Registration and Divorce (Cap 91)
8. Marriage (Solemnization and Registration) Decree Cap 92
9. The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, the Kadhis Court Act, Act No 3 of 1985
10. The Laws of Zanzibar, Evidence Decree (1917) Cap 5
11. The Laws of Zanzibar, Penal Decree (1934) Cap 13
12. The United Republic of Tanzania, Sexual Offences Special Provisions Act, 1998
13. The United Republic of Tanzania, The Penal Code Cap 16
14. The United Republic of Tanzania, Children and Young Person’s Act, Cap 13

C. Case Law
1. R vs. Mzee Abdulla Suleiman, Criminal Case No.224 of 1995
2. R vs. Abdulla Orasta Nanduya, Criminal Case No.53 of 2003
3. R vs. Abrahman Suweidi Samalia, Criminal Case No.332 of 2002
4. R vs. Ahmed Twahiri Ali, Criminal Case No.28 of 2002
5. R vs. Ame Ramadhan Muombwa, Criminal Case No.64 of 2003
6. R vs. Amton Rafiel Saimon, Criminal Case No.113 of 2002
7. R vs. Khalifa Hassan Kaita, Criminal Case No. 49 of 2005
8. R vs. Mohammed Amour Ally, Criminal Case No.116 of 2001
9. R vs. Mzee Amiri, Criminal Case No.11 of 2002
10. R vs. Shehe Juma Ame, Criminal Case No.119 of 2001

ACRONMYS

AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AU African Union
CSO Civil Society Organization
DAW Division on the Advancement of Women
DV Domestic Violence
e.g. for example
i.e. that is
GBV Gender Based Violence
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HRW Human Rights Watch
MLYWCD Ministry of Labour, Youth, Women and Children Development
MoHSW Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
PF3 Police Form 3
R Republic
SADC Southern Africa Development Cooperation
SOA Sexual Offences Act
SOSPA Sexual Offences Act
STDs Sexually Transmitted Diseases
STIs Sexually Transmitted Infections
§ Section
§§ Sections
TDHS Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey
Tshs. Tanzanian Shilling
UN United Nations
USD United States Dollars
UWZ Umoja wa Walemavu Zanzibar
VAW Violence Against Women
vs. versus
WiLDAF Women in Law and Development
WHO World Health Organization
ZAPDD Zanzibar Association of people with developmental disabilities
ZANAB Zanzibar National Association for the Blind.

Notes

1. Without doubt the critical role of the Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA) was instrumental in the early successes of GBV advocacy. For greater details see, Lema, E (Ed.) (2008) 20 Years of Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA).

2. Describing GBV offences of a sexual nature as “crimes of morality” is a colonial legacy and reflects a Victorian concept of propriety with regards to sexual relations.

3. I served as one of the principal researchers for the study. The ministry concerned is the Ministry of Labour, Youth, Women and Children’s Development but since the name changes periodically I will retain the usage of the ministry responsible for women or children’s affairs to identify it. This Ministry acts the national coordinator for gender equality and equity outlining the appropriate mechanisms for gender mainstreaming.

4. Although Zanzibar is part of Tanzania, it is semi-autonomous and has a separate legal and judicial system.
5. Traditional healers or witch doctors, like the shaman, people consult for their different problems.

6. This is a critical fact in view of the more radical demands being presented by a more autonomous women’s rights movement to the establishment as well as to a rather conservative society.

7. For example, see §127, §144 or §145.

8. Also see, §298A of the Criminal Procedure Decree Cap 14. In many cases, courts are also obliged to prescribe fines and award corporal punishment.

9. §156. This includes surrogacy.

10. §153A

11. § 145B

12. § 145A

13. §120 (3) (a) and (b).

14. §125 (1)

15. The Zanzibar House of Representatives

16. Undoubtedly, the clamp down on homosexuality was influenced by the tense political climate prevailing in the isles at the time where government policies were attacked by both the official opposition as well as religious groups.

17. I am referring here to the Islamic notion that describes women as ‘fitna’ (commonly translated as chaos but in this context as temptresses) and which absolves men for any indiscretions they commit while blaming women for any crime against their person by default.

18. The Kenyan Sexual Offence Act only passed in 2006 while in South Africa it was passed 10 years after it was first proposed by the South African Law Commission in 1998. Accordingly, these laws have had the benefit of incorporating major lessons from other jurisdictions.

19. See among others, Anil Kija, Analysis: “Outdated laws, SOSPA and EPA Cases”, in This Day Tuesday February 3, 2009; Anna Joachim, “Wanaharakati wamng’ag’ania Waziri Chikawe”, in Tanzania Daima February 12, 2009; and Benedict Sichalwe, “Chikawe awavaa wanaharakati”, in RAI February 8, 2009.

20. See “Tanzania Government to amend girls age consent for marriage” in Afrol News/IRIN of 10 November 2008.

21. Notable among them are organizations of people with disabilities such as UWZ, ZAPDD or ZANAB which all report incidence of abuse against their members.

22. This body was empowered to analyze sexual and physical violence but because staff at the Institute did not have specialized training in sexual abuse crimes key information went unreported compromising the cases.

23. see §13 (1). Certainly, marriage is no guarantee that he will maintain the child. Conversely he may divorce the mother leaving the child in need defeating the object of the law.

24. Interview with Hon. Salma Maghimbi.

25. Letter written by Juma M. Abdulla with reference PHQ/Z/574/67 written on 3 November 2003 to the Principal Secretary Ministry of Health

26. see for example case of R vs. Mzee Amiri Kajele where a parent complained about why an accused who should be in court was roaming freely in the street.

27. Essentially, this form is filled in cases of injury from ‘accidents’ necessitating treatment.

28. A spinster is defined as a girl between 16 and 21 years in the old law and 18 and 21 in the 2004 law

29. While this attracts its own problems, what remains key is facilitating access to GBV services, especially after the violation.

Bush administration Security Assistance Programs for Africa

For Fiscal Year 2009 (which begins on 1 October 2008), the Bush administration is asking Congress to approve the delivery of some $500 million worth of military equipment and training to Africa (including both sub-Saharan Africa and north Africa) in the budget request for the State Department for Fiscal Year (FY) 2009. The administration is also asking for up to $400 million for deliveries of equipment and training for Africa funded through the Defense Department budget and another $400 million to establish the headquarters for the Pentagon’s new Africa Command (Africom).

The State Department budget request includes funding for major new arms deliveries and increased military training to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Botswana, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, and Uganda. It will be channeled through a variety of programs, including a number of new programs initiated by the Bush administration as part of the “Global War on Terrorism.” These include the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership, the East African Regional Security Initiative, and the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program. The U.S. government is also expected to license up to $100 million worth of private commercial sales of military and police equipment through the State Department’s Direct Commercial Sales program in FY 2009.

The following description is based on information contained in the State Department Budget Justification for Foreign Operations for FY 2009 (released by the State Department in March 2008) and the Defense Department Summary Justification for the Budget Request for FY 2009 (released in February 2008).

STATE DEPARTMENT PROGRAMS

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement

The budget includes funding for the continued expansion of the U.S. civilian police contribution to UNMIL in Liberia, which rose from $1 million in FY 2007 to an estimated $4.096 million in FY 2008, and the administration is requesting $4.130 for FY 2009. The budget also includes funding for the continued expansion of law enforcement programs conducted by the U.S. as part of the implementation of the Sudan peace accords; these rose from $9.8 million in FY 2007 to an estimated $13.578 million in FY 2008, and the administration is requesting $24 million requested for FY 2009. And the budget contains funds to continue new program for law enforcement assistance to the Democratic Republic of Congo; these were initiated with an initial appropriation of an estimated $1.488 million in FY 2008 and the administration is requesting $1.7 million for FY 2009.

Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs

The budget includes funding for the continued expansion of U.S. Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) programs in Africa, particularly by expanding the Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) program in sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa and increasing funding for the East Africa Regional Strategy Initiative (EARSI) in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. For all programs throughout the world, ATA received $185.1 million in FY 2007 and an estimated $153.8 million in FY 2008; the administration is requesting $160 million FY 2009. It is difficult to know what proportion of this funding will be used in Africa, but it is reasonable to assume that approximately $40-50 million will be spent on African programs.

Foreign Military Financing

One of the most significant FMF programs in Africa is providing funding for increased arms sales to the Democratic Republic of the Congo; funding rose from nothing in FY 2007 to $397,000 in FY 2008, and the administration is requesting $600,000 in FY 2009. The budget contains money for major increases in FMF funding for Ethiopia; after receiving $1.9 million in FY 2007, funding for Ethiopia was reduced to $843,000 in FY 2008, but the administration is requesting $4 million in FY 2009. It continues funding for Djibouti—which fell from $3.8 million in FY 2007 to $2 million in FY 2008, but which the administration wants to increase back to $2.8 million in FY 2009. It also includes funding to continue programs in Liberia—which received $1.5 million in FY 2007, then just $298,000 in FY 2008, but which will receive $1.5 million in FY 2009 under the new budget. And it contains funding for the continued expansion of arms sales to Nigeria, with FMF funding rising from $1 million in FY 2007, to $1.3 million in FY 2008, to a requested $1.35 million in FY 2009.

International Military Education and Training

One noteworthy new program is the one for Libya; initiated in FY 2008 with $333,000, Libya will receive $350,000 worth of training in FY 2009 under the new budget. The budget also contains funding for significant increases in training programs for military officers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (which received $263,000 in FY 2007, another $477,000 in FY 2008, and is expected to receive $500,000 in FY 2009); Ethiopia (472,000 in FY 2007, $620,000 in FY 2008 and $700,000 in the request for FY 2009); Guinea Bissau ($454,000 in FY 2007, $524,000 in FY 2008, and $750,000 in the request for FY 2009); South Africa (just $48,000 in FY 2007, but $857,000 in FY 2008, and $850,000 in the request for FY 2009); and Uganda ($283,000 in FY 2007, $477,000 in FY 2008, and $500,000 in the request for FY 2009). And it includes money to continue major programs for Botswana ($600,000 in the request for FY 2009), Ghana ($600,000 in the request for FY 2009), Nigeria ($800,000 in the request for FY 2009), and Senegal ($1 million in the request for FY 2009).

Peacekeeping Operations

The budget includes money to continue increases in funding in FY 2009 for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which includes the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA). In addition to ACOTA, most of the rest of the GPOI funding will also go to Africa-related programs, amounting to an estimated total of $80 million worth of security assistance. GPOI rose from $81 million in FY 2007 to $96.4 million in FY 2008, and the administration is requesting $106.2 million in FY 2009. The budget also maintains recent levels of funding for the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which got $13.75 million in FY 2007 and $9.9 million in FY 2008; for FY 2009, the administration is requesting $15 million. The administration is also requesting $7.5 million for the first time in FY 2009 to launch the East Africa Regional Security Initiative—modeled on the TSCTP—to provide counter-terrorism training and equipment to military forces in the East Africa region (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi).

The budget contains funding to continue the administration’s new program to provide training, equipment, and infrastructure improvements to the Democratic Republic of the Congo; presumably much of this will be supplied to the forces deployed in the eastern part of the country. Funding for this program began with $5.5 million in FY 2008 and the administration is requesting another $5.5 million for the Democratic Republic of the Congo in FY 2009. It also includes money to continue providing training, equipment, and infrastructure improvements to the Liberian military, which received $53.25 million in FY 2007 and $51.7 million in FY 2008; the administration is requesting $49.6 million in FY 2009. And it contains funding to continue providing training, equipment, and infrastructure facilities to the Sudanese military to help integrate former combatants from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. Programs in Sudan received $54 million in FY 2006—including $20 transferred from the Department of Defense and $70.8 million in FY 2008; the administration is requesting $30 million for these programs in FY 2009.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PROGRAMS

Building Partnership Capacity

The budget contains $800 to substantially expand funding for the Global Equip and Train program ($500 million for this program which was established by FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act Section 1206), the Security and Stabilization Assistance program ($200 million for this program which was established by FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act Section 1207), and the Combatant Commanders’ Initiative Fund ($100 million for this program established by FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act Section 902). Of this, an estimated $300-$400 million will go to provide training and equipment to military, paramilitary, and police forces in Africa.

Establishment of new Africa Command (Africom)

The budget contains $398 million to set up the headquarters for the new Africa Command (Africom) in Stuttgart, Germany. This money will be used to pay for the operating costs of Africom over the coming year. This will include the cost of creating an Africom intelligence capability, including a Joint Intelligence Operations Center; launching a stand-alone Theater Special Operations Command for Africom; deploying support aircraft to Africa; building a limited presence on the African continent that is expected to include the establishment of two of five regional offices projected by Africom; and conducting training, exercises, and theater security cooperation activities.

* Daniel Volman is the Director of the African Security Research Project in Washington, DC (www.concernedafricascholars.org/african-security-research-project), and a member of the Board of Directors of the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars. He is a specialist on U.S. military activities in Africa and the author of numerous articles and research reports.

AFRICOM: The New U.S. Military Command for Africa

On 6 February 2007, President Bush announced that the United States would create a new military command for Africa, to be known as Africa Command or Africom. Throughout the Cold War and for more than a decade afterwards, the U.S. did not have a military command for Africa; instead, U.S. military activities on the African continent were conducted by three separate military commands: the European Command, which had responsibility for most of the continent; the Central Command, which oversaw Egypt and the Horn of Africa region along with the Middle East and Central Asia; and the Pacific Command, which administered military ties with Madagascar and other islands in the Indian Ocean.

Until the creation of Africom, the administration of U.S.-African military relations was conducted through three different commands. All three were primarily concerned with other regions of the world that were of great importance to the United States on their own and had only a few middle-rank staff members dedicated to Africa. This reflected the fact that Africa was chiefly viewed as a regional theater in the global Cold War, or as an adjunct to U.S.-European relations, or—as in the immediate post-Cold War period—as a region of little concern to the United States. But when the Bush administration declared that access to Africa’s oil supplies would henceforth be defined as a “strategic national interest” of the United States and proclaimed that America was engaged in a Global War on Terrorism following the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, Africa’s status in U.S. national security policy and military affairs rose dramatically.

According to Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs—the highest ranking Defense Department official with principal responsibility for Africa at the Pentagon, who has supervised U.S. military policy toward Africa for the Bush administration—Africom attained the status of a sub-unified command under the European Command on 1 October 2007, and is scheduled to be fully operational as a separate unified command no later than 1 October 2008. The process of creating the new command will be conducted by a special transition team—which will include officers from both the State Department and the Defense Department—that will carry out its work in Stuttgart, Germany, in coordination with the European Command.

Africom will not look like traditional unified commands. In particular, there is no intention, at least at present, to assign the new command control over large military units. This is in line with ongoing efforts to reduce the presence of large numbers of American troops overseas in order to consolidate or eliminate expensive bases and bring as many troops as possible back to the United States where they will be available for deployment anywhere in the world that Washington wants to send them. Since there is no way to anticipate where troops will be sent and the Pentagon has the ability to deploy sizable forces over long distances in a very short time, Washington plans to keep as many troops as possible in the United States and send them abroad only when it judges it necessary. This, however, was exactly the intention when the Clinton and Reagan administrations created the Central Command and based it in Tampa, Florida; and now the Central Command is running two major wars in southwest Asia from headquarters in Qatar.

Africom will also be composed of both military and civilian personnel, including officers from the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the commander of the new command will have both a military and a civilian deputy. On 10 July 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced that the President had nominated four-star General William E. “Kip” Ward to be the commander of Africom. General Ward, an African-American who was commissioned into the infantry in 1971, is currently serving as the deputy commander of the European Command. Previously he served as the commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) in Mogadishu, Somalia during “Operation Restore Hope” in 1992-1994, commander of the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia during “Operation Joint Forge” in 2002-2003, and chief of the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation at the American Embassy in Cairo, Egypt. The novel structure of the new command reflects the fact that Africom will be charged with overseeing both traditional military activities and programs that are funded through the State Department budget (see below for details on these programs).

The Bush administration has emphasized the uniqueness of this hybrid structure as evidence that the new command has only benign purposes and that and that, in the words of Theresa Whelan, while “there are fears that Africom represents a militarization of U.S. foreign policy in Africa and that Africom will somehow become the lead U.S. Government interlocutor with Africa. This fear is unfounded.” Therefore, Bush administration officials insist that the purpose of Africom is misunderstood.

On closer examination, however, the difference between Africom and other commands—and the allegedly “unfounded” nature of its implications for the militarization of the continent—are not as real or genuine as the Bush administration officials would have us believe. Of course Washington has other interests in Africa besides making it into another front in its Global War on Terrorism, maintaining and extending access to energy supplies and other strategic raw material, and competing with China and other rising economic powers for control over the continent’s resources; these include helping Africans deal with the HIV/AIDS epidemic and other emerging diseases, strengthening and assisting peacekeeping and conflict resolution efforts, and responding to humanitarian disasters. But it is simply disingenuous to suggest that accomplishing these three objectives is not the main reason that Washington is now devoting so much effort and attention to the continent. And of course Washington would prefer that selected friendly regimes take the lead in meeting these objects, so that the United States can avoid direct military involvement in Africa, particularly at a time when the U.S. military is so deeply committed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and preparing for possible attacks on Iran. The hope that the Pentagon can build up African surrogates who can act on behalf of the United States is precisely why Washington is providing so much security assistance to these regimes and why it would like to provide even more in the future. Indeed, as argued below, this is actually one of the main reasons that Africom is being created at this time.

So why is Africom being created and why now? I would argue that the answer to this question is twofold. First, the Bush administration would like to significantly expand its security assistance programs for regimes that are willing to act as surrogates, for friendly regimes—particularly in countries with abundant oil and natural gas supplies—and for efforts to increase its options for more direct military involvement in the future; but it has had difficulty getting the U.S. Congress and the Pentagon to provide the required funding or to devoting the necessary attention and energy to accomplish these tasks. The creation of Africom will allow the administration to go to the U.S. Congress and argue that the establishment of Africom demonstrates the importance of Africa for U.S. national security and the administration’s commitment to give the continent the attention that it deserves. If Africa is so important and if the administration’s actions show that it really wants to do all sorts of good things for Africa, it hopes to be in a much stronger position to make a convincing case that the legislature must appropriate substantially greater amounts of money to fund the new command’s operations. And within the Pentagon, the establishment of Africom as a unified command under the authority of a high-ranking officer with direct access to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will put the new command in a much stronger position to compete with other command for resources, manpower, and influence over policymaking.

Secondly, key members of the Bush administration, a small, but growing and increasingly vocal group of legislators, and influential think tanks have become more and more alarmed by the growing efforts of China to expand its access to energy supplies and other resources from Africa and to enhance its political and economic influence throughout the continent. These “alarmists” point to the considerable resources that China is devoting to the achievement of these goals and to the engagement of Chinese officials at the highest level—including President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, both of who have made tours of the continent and have hosted high-level meetings in Beijing with African heads of state—as evidence of a “grand strategy” on the part of China that jeopardizes U.S. national security interests and that is aimed, ultimately, at usurping the West’s position on the continent. The creation of Africom, therefore, should be seen as one element of a broad effort to develop a “grand strategy” on the part of the United States that will counter, and eventually defeat, China’s efforts. It should also be understood as a measure that is intended to demonstrate to Beijing that Washington will match China’s actions, thus serving as a warning to the Chinese leadership that they should restrain themselves or face possible consequences to their relationship with America as well as to their interests in Africa.

So, what will Africom actually do when it becomes fully operational? Basically, it will take over the implementation of a host of military, security cooperation, and security assistance programs, which are funded through either the State Department or the Defense Department. These include the following:

Bilateral and Multilateral Joint Training Programs and Military Exercises

The United States provides military training to African military personnel through a wide variety of training and education programs. In addition, it conducts military exercises in Africa jointly with African troops and also with the troops of its European allies to provide training to others and also to train its own forces for possible deployment to Africa in the future. These include the following:

Flintlock 2005 and 2007

These are Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises conducted by units of the U.S. Army Special Forces and the U.S. Army Rangers, along with contingents from other units, to provide training experience both for American troops and for the troops of African countries (small numbers of European troops are also involved in these exercises). Flintlock 2005 was held in June 2005, when more than one thousand U.S. personnel were sent to North and West Africa for counter-terrorism exercises in Algeria, Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad that involved more than three thousand local service members. In April 2007, U.S. Army Special Forces went to Niger for the first part of Flintlock 2007 and in late August 2007, some 350 American troops arrived in Mali for three weeks of Flintlock 2007 exercises with forces from Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, Burkina Faso, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Both Flintlock exercises were conducted as part of Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) which now links the United States with eight African countries: Mali, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Nigeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. In 2004, the TSCTP was created to replace the Pan-Sahel Counter-Terrorism Initiative, which was initiated in 2002. The TSCTP also involves smaller, regular training exercises conducted by U.S. Army Special Forces throughout the region. Although changing budgetary methodology makes it difficult to be certain, it appears that the TSCTP received some $31 million in FY 2006, nearly $82 million in FY 2007, and is expected to receive approximately $100 million annually from FY 2008 through FY 2013.

Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA)

This program, which began operating in 2002, replaces the African Crisis Response Initiative launched in 1997 by the Clinton administration. In 2004, it became part of the Global Peace Operations Initiative. ACOTA is officially designed to provide training to African military forces to improve their ability to conduct peacekeeping operations, even if they take place in hostile environments. But since the training includes both defensive and offensive military operations, it also enhances the ability of participating forces to engage in police operations against unarmed civilians, counter-insurgency operations, and even conventional military operations against the military forces of other countries. By FY 2007, nineteen African countries were participating in the ACOTA program (Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia). New budgetary methodology makes it impossible to ascertain the levels of funding for ACOTA, since the program’s funding is subsumed within the budget for the Global Peace Operations Initiative.

International Military Education and Training Program (IMET)

The IMET program brings African military officers to military academies and other military educational institutions in the United States for professional training. Nearly all African countries participate in the program—including Libya for the first time in FY 2008—and in FY 2006 (the last year for which country figures are available—it trained 14,731 students from the African continent (excluding Egypt) at a cost of $14.7 million.

Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS)

This program sells U.S. military equipment to African countries; such sales are conducted by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency of the Defense Department. The U.S. government provides loans to finance the purchase of virtually all of this equipment through the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF), but repayment of these loans by African governments is almost always waived, so that they amount to free grants. In FY 2006, sub-Saharan African countries received a total of nearly $14 million in FMF funding, and the Maghrebi countries of Morocco and Tunisia received almost another $21 million; for FY 2007, the Bush administration requested nearly $15 million for sub-Saharan Africa and $21 million for the Morocco and Tunisia; and for FY 2008, the administration requested nearly $8 million for sub-Saharan Africa and nearly $6 million for the Maghreb.

African Coastal and Border Security Program (ACBS Program)

This program provides specialized equipment (such as patrol vessels and vehicles, communications equipment, night vision devices, and electronic monitors and sensors) to African countries to improve their ability to patrol and defend their own coastal waters and borders from terrorist operations, smuggling, and other illicit activities. In some cases, airborne surveillance and intelligence training also may be provided. In FY 2006, the ACBS Program received nearly $4 million in FMF funding, and Bush administration requested $4 million in FMF funding for the program in FY 2007. No dedicated funding was requested for FY 2008, but the program may be revived in the future.

Excess Defense Articles Program (EDA)

This program is designed to conduct ad hoc transfers of surplus U.S. military equipment to foreign governments. Transfers to African recipients have included the transfer of C-130 transport planes to South Africa and Botswana, trucks to Uganda, M-16 rifles to Senegal, and coastal patrol vessels to Nigeria.

Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)

In October 2002, the U.S. Central Command played the leading role in the creation of this joint task force that was designed to conduct naval and aerial patrols in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the eastern Indian Ocean as part of the effort to detect and counter the activities of terrorist groups in the region. Based at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, long the site of a major French military base, the CJTF-HOA is made up of approximate 1,400 U.S. military personnel—primarily sailors, Marines, and Special Forces troops—that works with a multi-national naval force composed of American naval vessels along with ships from the navies of France, Italy, and Germany, and other NATO allies. The CJTF-FOA provided intelligence to Ethiopia in support of its invasion of Somalia in January 2007 and used military facilities in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya to launch its own attacks against alleged al-Qaeda members involved in the Council of Islamic Courts in Somalia in January and June of 2007. The command authority for CJTF-HOA, currently under the U.S. Central Command, will be transferred to Africom by 2008.

Joint Task Force Aztec Silence (JTFAS)

In December 2003, the U.S. European Command created this joint task force under the commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet (Europe) to carry out counter-terrorism operations in North and West Africa and to coordinate U.S. operations with those of countries in those regions. Specifically, JTFAS was charged with conducting surveillance operations using the assets of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and to share information, along with intelligence collected by U.S. intelligence agencies, with local military forces. The primary assets employed in this effort are a squadron of U.S. Navy P-3 “Orion” based in Sigonella, Sicily. In March 2004, P-3 aircraft from this squadron and reportedly operating from the southern Algerian base at Tamanrasset were deployed to monitor and gather intelligence on the movements of Algerian Salafist guerrillas operating in Chad and to provide this intelligence to Chadian forces engaged in combat against the guerrillas.

Naval Operations in the Gulf of Guinea

Although American naval forces operating in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea and other areas along Africa’s shores are formally under the command of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, based in the Mediterranean, and other U.S. Navy commands, Africom will also help coordinate naval operations along the African coastline. As U.S. Navy Admiral Henry G. Ulrich III, the commander of U.S. Naval Forces (Europe) put it to reporters at Fort McNair in Washington, DC, in June 2007, “we hope, as they [Africom] stand up, to fold into their intentions and their planning,” and his command “will adjust, as necessary” as Africom becomes operational. In a significant expansion of U.S. Navy operations in Africa, the U.S.S. Fort McHenry amphibious assault ship will begin a six-month deployment to the Gulf of Guinea in November 2007. The ship will carry 200-300 sailors and U.S. Coast Guard personnel and will call at ports in eleven countries (Angola, Benin, Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, and Togo). Its mission will be to serve as a “floating schoolhouse” to train local forces in port and oil-platform security, search-and rescue missions, and medical and humanitarian assistance. According to Admiral Ulrich, the deployment matches up perfectly with the work of the new Africa Command. “If you look at the direction that the Africa Command has been given and the purpose of standing up the Africom, you’ll see that the (Gulf of Guinea) mission is closely aligned,” he told reporters.

Base Access Agreements for Cooperative Security Locations and Forward Operating Sites

Over the past few years, the Bush administration has negotiated base access agreements with the governments of Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, Namibia, Sao Tome, Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia. Under these agreements, the United States gains access to local military bases and other facilities so that they can be used by American forces as transit bases or as forward operating bases for combat, surveillance, and other military operations. They remain the property of the host African government and are not American bases in a legal sense, so that U.S. government officials are, technically, telling the truth when they deny that the United States has bases in these countries. To date, the United States has done little to improve the capabilities of these facilities, so that there is little or no evidence of an American military presence at these locations.

In addition to these publicly acknowledged base access agreements, the Pentagon was granted permission to deploy P-3 “Orion” aerial surveillance aircraft at the airfield at Tamanrasset in southern Algeria under an agreement reportedly signed in during Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s visit to Washington in July 2003. The Brown and Root-Condor, a joint venture between a subsidiary of the American company, Halliburton, and the Algerian state-owned oil company, Sonatrach, is currently under contract to enlarge military air bases at Tamanrasset and at Bou Saada. In December 2006, Salafist forces used an improvised mine and small arms to attack a convoy of Brown and Root-Condor employees who were returning to their hotel in the Algerian town of Bouchaaoui, killing an Algerian driver and wounding nine workers, including four Britons and one American.

Over the course of the next eighteen months, there is one major issue related to the new command that remains to be resolved: whether and where in Africa will Africom establish a regional headquarters. A series of consultations with the governments of a number of African countries—including Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Djibouti, Kenya—following the announcement of Africom found than none of them were willing to commit to hosting the new command. As a result, the Pentagon has been forced to reconsider its plans and in June 2007 Ryan Henry, the Principal Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy told reporters that the Bush administration now intended to establish what he called “a distributed command” that would be “networked” in several countries in different regions of the continent. Under questioning before the Senate Africa Subcommittee on 1 August 2007, Assistant Secretary Whelan said that Liberia, Botswana, Senegal, and Djibouti were among the countries that had expressed support for Africom—although only Liberia has publicly expressed a willingness to play host to Africom personnel—which clearly suggests that these countries are likely to accommodate elements of Africom’s headquarters staff when they eventually establish a presence on the continent sometime after October 2008.

_______________
* This article is a revised and shortened version of an article that will be published in a forthcoming issue of The Review of African Political Economy.

Daniel Volman is the director of the African Security Research Project in Washington, DC, and the author of numerous articles on US security policy and African security issues.

Tanzania: A haven of peace

By Goran Hyden
February 14, 2008

Originally published in the Gainesville Sun

President Bush is on his way to Africa this week. One of his destinations is Tanzania. He will be the first American president to ever visit the country.

Unlike its northern neighbor Kenya, Tanzania is relatively little known in the U.S. although it is the location of Kilimanjaro, the highest mountain on the African continent, Serengeti, the richest endowed wildlife reserve in the world, and – for all Valentine lovers – the exquisite Tanzanite gemstone.

There are reasons why no U.S. president has visited Tanzania and why the country remains little known to Americans. For a long time, Tanzania was devoted to building a socialist state – an experiment that collapsed in the 1980s leaving the country to rebuild its economy along market economy lines.

There was no love lost between the United States and Tanzania during those socialist years, although, paradoxically, according to a study of foreign aid to Tanzania, Republican presidents – Nixon, Ford and Reagan – gave more money for its development than their Democratic counterparts Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter did.

Today socialism is history in Tanzania. President Bush will visit a country that is an African economic success story. Its growth rate in recent years has averaged over 6 percent. Its mineral and natural gas resources are drawing in foreign investors. Its large tracts of unused land are being developed for agriculture and cattle ranching. Its beautiful beaches on the islands of Zanzibar as well as the mainland are attracting increasing numbers of tourists.

Some of these developments may be met with mixed feelings by ordinary Tanzanians but there is little doubt that Tanzania is now on the move.

Rapid changes like those taking place in Tanzania now have caused social and political upheavals in other African countries. No one can rule those out even in Tanzania. Yet, it has a record of political stability that none of its neighbors, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo or Mozambique can match. It is a true haven of peace in Africa living up to the name of its largest city. Dar es Salaam means exactly that.

Governments in Africa have been difficult to hold accountable. Despite corruption and misrule they have stayed on, a shortcoming that afflicts these countries as they try to democratize. President Bush will come to Tanzania just a few days after it struck a political first in Africa.

Its Prime Minister, Edward Lowassa, was forced to resign after parliamentarians in his own party revealed his involvement in a scandal involving misappropriation of government funds. President Jakaya Kikwete immediately dissolved the cabinet and has just appointed a fresh one with a new Prime Minister, Peter Mizengo Pinda.

This change of government is all the more remarkable as Lowassa was a very close ally of the president. Kikwete’s decision to let him go is an indication that he is ready to tackle the issue of corruption that has eluded so many of his fellow African heads of state. It raises eyebrows among investors and foreign donors alike. It augurs well for Tanzania.

The country’s political stability is not a coincidence. Ever since independence, the ruling party – Chama cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party) – has been careful in choosing presidents who come from small and insignificant ethnic groups rather than from the larger and more prosperous ones. This has spared the country from the tensions that have afflicted Kenya and Uganda where the largest ethnic group has tried to rule the country and ignored the interest of other groups.

Tanzania was for a long time the darling of European donors. Ever since its socialist days, China has also been an important investor and donor.

In the past two years, Tanzania has gone out of its way to lure Americans to take an interest in the country. President Kikwete has visited the U.S. three times and not only attended the odd meeting at the United Nations as his predecessors did. Kikwete has been as interested in Washington as in New York.

President Bush will get a warm welcome in Dar es Salaam when he arrives this week. He will see for himself an African country that is a genuine haven of peace; one that has turned its economy around and is now a showcase of what other African countries should aim for.

Goran Hyden is Distinguished Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida. He can be reached at ghyden@polisci.ufl.edu

Open Letter to President Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania

Association of Concerned Africa Scholars
February 5, 2001

President Benjamin William Mkapa,
United Republic of Tanzania
The State House
PO Box 9120
Dar Es Salaam
Tanzania
FAX 22-211-3425

Dear President Mkapa,

The Association of Concerned Africa Scholars writes today to condemn the killings of activists on the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba in late January and the ongoing suppression of peaceful citizens exercising their democratic rights. We support the call of our colleagues in the Legal Aid Committee of the Faculty of Law of the University of Dar Es Salaam (28 January 2001) for an end to police violence and repression.

As a national association of scholars in the United States, many of whom have had a long association with and respect for the United Republic of Tanzania, we are deeply concerned by these violations of fundamental human rights and the killings on the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba on Saturday 27 January 2001. We were equally appalled by the reports of arrests, harassment, torture, injury and incarceration of the leaders of political organizations exercising their rights to peaceful assembly on these islands and in Dar Es Salaam. We condemn these actions unequivocally and call for your government to immediately put a stop to such measures and to investigate the abuses of the police and other security forces.

We note that the Legal Aid Committee, which has been providing human rights training for members of the police force since 1997, expresses particular concern at the behavior of the police force and we call on the government to ensure that the commanders of this force are held accountable for the actions of their subordinates.

Mr. President, we look forward to hearing from you the actions that your government is taking to put a stop to these violations of human rights and we will be following these events closely in this country and working to make others aware of the reports from your country.

Sincerely,
William Martin
Co-Chair, Association of Concerned Africa Scholars
Fernand Braudel Center
Binghamton University
PO Box 6000
Binghamton, NY 13902-6000
wgmartin@prairienet.org
http://acas.prairienet.org

cc.
Ambassador Charles R. Stith
United States Embassy
P.O. Box 9123
Dar es Salaam
Tel [255] (22) 2666010/1/2/3/4/5
Fax 2666701
Email: usembassy-dar2@cats-net.com

His Excellency Mustafa Salim Nyang’anyi
Embassy of the United Republic of Tanzania
2139 R St. NW, Washington, DC 20008, USA.
Tel: (202) 884-1080 & (202) 939-6125
Fax: (202) 797-7408
e-mail: balozi@tanzaniaembassy-us.org

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell
U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, 20520
Fax: 202-261-8577
e-mail: secretary@state.gov